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

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MILLENARIANISM DEFENDED;

A

REPLY TO PROF. STUART'S

"STRICTURES ON THE REV. G. DUFFIELD'S RECENT WORK ON THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST,"

IN WHICH

THE FORMER'S FALSE ASSUMPTIONS ARE POINTED OUT, AND THE FALLACY OF HIS INTERPRETATION OF DIFFERENT IMPORTANT PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE ARE BOTH PHILOLOGICALLY AND EXEGETICALLY EXPOSED.

BY

GEO. DUFFIELD,

PASTOR OF THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF DETROIT.

"I scarce ever knew an author who had a nostrum in divinity, a contrivance of his own, but he was more impatient for that, than the great fundamentals of Christianity. He could argue against the man who denies the truth, with more temper, than against one who is afraid of his scheme."

NEW-YORK:

MARK H. NEWMAN, 199 BROADWAY.

1843.

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NOTICE.

THE Publisher deems it but justice, both to the Author and himself to state, that the delay in the publication of this work, beyond the time announced for its appearance, was a source of mutual disappointment, entirely owing to accidental circumstances over which neither of them had any control.

New York, June, 1843.

ERRATA.

For *Daubeny*, page 12 line 14 and page 15 line 19, read *Daubuz*.
Page 34, last line, for *of sential things*, read *essential thing*.
Page 94 line 27, for *reverts*, read *resorts*.

PREFACE.

The following pages have been prepared, and are presented to the public under many embarrassments. Pastoral duties and engagements, and interruptions incident to the pastoral office, place a minister settled among a numerous flock, at great disadvantage, compared with him, who is free from the cares and labours attendant on preparations for the Sabbath, and week-day services, and other unavoidable demands on his time. The remoteness, too, of the region, where the author dwells, — especially at this season of the year, — the distance being by reason of the state of the weather and roads, threefold greater than in the period when navigation is open, — of necessity caused delay; and gave public and more favourable opportunity, for the publication to which this is a reply, to make its impression, and to pursue its way without any thing to counteract it. Add to this, the great reputation, the high station, the commanding influence possessed by, and the almost prescriptive right of authoritative judgment in such matters extensively conceded to, the Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover, might predispose some to think, it were rash, presumptuous in the extreme, for one who had received such severe castigation to attempt to rejoin. Beside, there are not wanting indications of the danger, which he is

apt to incur who happens to be singly brought in conflict with one whose dicta are laws, and who by reason of his position wields an amount of influence enough to overpower, or at least to terrify.

The Author of the following analysis, freely confesses, that all these things have been present to his thoughts, and that he has felt the fearful odds, with which he ventures to contest the opinions of one, who so long has contributed to mould the minds, to form the taste, to direct the studies, and to stamp his own character on so large a portion of the educated and effective Evangelical Ministry in these United States. But truth has claims, superior to all those of personal consideration; and it has demanded a defence against "the Strictures" recently published by Professor Stuart, on the Author's work entitled "Dissertations on the Prophecies relative to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ." So far as the personal interests of the Author are concerned, they would readily have been confided to the care of Providence; but being set for the defence of the Gospel, it is not left optional with him to remain silent. The reader will judge whether Prof. S., or the Author of the Dissertations, adheres most closely and implicitly to the sure and unerring word of God.

The spirit and style of "the Strictures," have determined the method of reply. Violence was attempted; and it cannot be repelled without indications of resentment. Resentment is very different from vindictiveness; and under certain circumstances is imperiously demanded. For the perfect freedom of speech, and liberty assumed in canvassing the

arguments of Prof. S., as well as in expressing his convictions and views, alike of the truth in general, and of the logic and language of his censor, the Author has no apology to make. To Prof. S. as a brother and Christian minister, and biblical professor, he cheerfully concedes, and renders all the respect, that may be due. Nor does he harbour one thought or feeling, inconsistent with Christian and social good will, or that would embarrass in personal intercourse with him.

He regrets the haste with which Prof. S. has written, and his evident determination to turn to ridicule, and to consign to contempt the views he undertakes to censure. He would have much preferred, a calm, grave, kind, and courteous investigation and interchange of thought. It was in this spirit and temper that the Author of the Dissertations expressed his dissent from some of Prof. S.'s positions, and made assertions touching the exegetical views dropped in the "Hints," which he had hoped he would have met and shown his ability to maintain.

Prof. S. evidently felt himself challenged; and having chosen his weapons, it has not been left wholly optional with the Author of the following pages, in what manner to reply. Whatever of severity there may be thought to be in the reply, the reader is assured that it has been induced by no personal pique or ill-will, but by the full consciousness of there being nothing, either in disparity of age or station, in mutual relations to each other, and to the church of God, or in reciprocal obligations, to impose any other restraint than courtesy and Christianity dictate upon the freedom of

speech,—in expressing dissent from his views,—in exposing the falsity of his charges, and the fallacy of his reasonings,—and in maintaining and vindicating what the Author believes,—more firmly than ever, after a careful analysis of the Strictures,—to be the plain and simple truth of the sacred Scriptures.

Detroit, Nov. 29, 1842.

REPLY TO THE "STRICTURES" OF PROFESSOR STUART.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

A plain unsophisticated reader, after having quoted the following words of Professor Stuart, viz. "I have read Mr. D's work with *all the attention which time has permitted*," remarked, "this is but a poor way of bespeaking confidence, and plainly intimates his conviction, that a mere casual attention to the subject is all which he need give." Whether the remark be true or false will appear in the sequel.

In undertaking a defence of myself, I have no apologies to make, nor complimentary bows with which to approach and to introduce myself to the learned professor. I have ever despised flattery. As a plain man, I speak what I believe to be the truth, with all plainness, even though it may at times be disagreeable. This one thing, however, I wish to be distinctly known,—that I neither regard Professor S. as a scholar and biblical critic to be infallible, nor concede to him any right, by his authority, or *ipse dixit*, as "PROFESSOR, in Andover Theological Seminary,"—whether sole, associated, of all science and literature, or of any particular branch, I cannot tell from the title he appends to his name—to sit in judgement as umpire in criticism, theology, philology, prophetical interpretation

or scriptural exposition. By the force and conclusiveness of *arguments* must *his* opinions, as well as any other man's, be established.

I feel somewhat reluctant to judge of his spirit and intention; yet cannot help remarking, that, from the very commencement to the close of his "Strictures," and by the very modest title he has given his own production, the impression has been made, that he felt the dignity of the professor to have been somewhat offended and designed to castigate the bold or impudent stripling,* that dared to call his opinions in question. It is perhaps natural, or at least reasonable to expect, that one, who has so long sat in "Moses' seat," and been accounted by multitudes an Oracle in biblical matters, should have been startled at the distant sound of dissent from, or condemnation of, some of his favorite positions. I am not therefore surprised, nor have I any ground to complain, that Prof. S. should have felt himself urgently called to notice the work which has received his "Strictures."

In reference to his views,—expressed in his "Hints on the interpretation of prophecy"—relative to the slaying of the two witnesses, and their lying dead in the streets of Jerusalem, I had stated,—that he had assumed as his guide, in the exposition of the Apocalypse, certain positions which had not been proved,—and that he had asserted other things to be so very obvious as not well to be denied, which, however, *have actually been denied*, and the denial *supported by argument*, of both which facts I did not think it probable that he was ignorant. I had also stated,

* A malignant effusion, signed E., in a late political gazette, published in Newark, N. J., while it breathes the adoration of some poor satellite for the "old giants in philology and sacred lore," and denominates the author of the Dissertations "a youthful aspirant," advising him to tarry at Judea till his beard be grown, betrays alike the ignorance, servility and malignity of the writer.

that his explanation, of the predictions relative to the two witnesses and the septimo-octavo head of the apocalyptic beast, especially of the latter, afforded a striking specimen of prophecy being rendered so unlike the fulfillment as to make it difficult to say, whether it is not even more ridiculous, than vague and fanciful. See "Dissertations on the prophecies," pp. 395, 409. These things I confess demanded his attention. I intended and hoped, that my averments here, would make him feel the necessity of fortifying his exegesis with other considerations than he had adduced,—with ARGUMENTS *proving* it to be correct, rather than *suppositions* that "John *might* describe" things in this or any other way.—It is the business of an expositor to show what the writer *actually* DID *mean*, and not what he *might* mean. I felt that Prof. S. here was greatly in fault; and cannot resist the impression, that he has actually inverted the true order to be pursued, by doing what he has virtually but falsely charged against me, viz. *theorizing* or assigning a *possible* meaning, and then searching for arguments to make it appear plausible, instead of analysing both the language, and the entire context, and, irrespective of all theories and preconceived notions, endeavoring to ascertain what the writer *did mean*. I shall recur presently, and more particularly, to his mode of interpretation. My object in adverting to it now, is merely to bespeak the reader's candid attention, while I inquire, whether the assertions above stated, call for and justify, the TONE AND SPIRIT, betrayed in the Strictures—a few things characteristic of which I shall designate.

CHAPTER II.

THE TONE AND SPIRIT OF THE "STRICTURES."

1. He has sat in judgment on what he supposes to have been my mode of exposition, and my means of access to the writings of the fathers; which latter, whether true or false, does not affect the merits of the subject, but betrays a willingness, if not a desire, to make the impression, that I have been indebted entirely to the labors of "favorite authors." "He has read," says he "somewhat extensively, the more recent works of those who have assayed to defend," what he calls "the theory" of "a personal, actual, and visible descent of Christ and the glorified saints to earth, and of their ecclesiastico-political dominion here."

What he means by "more recent," I cannot say, but presume he will not class Mede and Daubeny, Sir Isaac and Bishop Newton among the *more* recent writers, who believed that the true interpretation of the prophetical Scriptures, sanctioned the expectation of Christ's personal visible coming. Why has he limited the range of my reading? and chosen to insinuate, that I have quoted writers I have not read? To say the very least this is an uncourteous attempt at the very commencement of his strictures. to prejudice the minds of his readers, by personal detractory insinuations. This attempt he has supported by representing me as bringing forward a "THEORY" and laboring to prove *it*, by the "more recent works of those who have assayed to defend it."

In so saying, he has entirely mistated the whole object, design, and character, of my work. I have brought forward NO THEORY at all; but have undertaken to institute

an inquiry and an investigation, as to *what is the true and proper meaning of the Sacred Scriptures, when they speak of the coming of Christ and of the dominion of the saints?* It is wholly a question of fact, whether the application of correct and admitted principles of interpretation will not bring out, as their only true and proper meaning, the idea of Christ's personal visible coming with his glorified saints before the Millennium? I have just as good a right to call *his* views a theory as he has mine; yea, much better, since he brings them with him to the Bible, confessedly preconceived ideas—and seeks to make its language support them. I have not brought any preconceived views to the Bible, but have gone to the Bible to learn what it means, in the language which it holds on this subject. I entertained once, in common with Professor S., the views of the millennium which he himself has given, only with this exception, that I did not claim to pass *so much* to the account of "*poetry*" as he has done. See Hints, p. 142, 1st ed. But I have been forced, after a long and careful study of the scriptures, as well "in the original" as in our English text, to abandon them, because untenable on Ernesti's principles of interpretation, now generally admitted to be correct. This does not look so much like *theorizing* as if I had done what Prof. S. has, to use his own term, first assigned a "supposed" meaning, and then undertaken to support it. See Hints, p. 122. Whatever prejudice therefore, he may have sought to excite against me, or odium against the doctrine of Christ's personal visible premillenial coming, by calling it a *theory*, he has only betrayed, how loosely he expresses himself. While he has failed to fasten that convenient charge of speculation and theorizing on me, his own language proves himself to be much more obnoxious to it.

2. He has distinctly and formally charged me with neglecting the study of the original scriptures, and insinuated

something bordering on plagiarism,—another uncourteous attempt to weaken his adversary by exciting prejudice against him, " He has" says he " however, advanced but little which is really new, and evidently depends, for most of his appeals to the Christian fathers and other writings (?) (rather solecistical) of somewhat remote origin, on the extracts which he finds in some of his favorite authors. If the time which he has expended in such a pursuit, had been spent in direct study of the original scriptures, he would have shunned many an error, which he has now committed, and in all probability he would have greatly mollified the incongruities in his work, which now abound to such a degree, that any one who reads him (?) through *carefully*, finds himself at length much more prone to be surprised and astonished than to become offended." That certainly is not the professor, as his own confessedly hurried perusal *of the book*, (the *author* of the book he has never read) and the severity of his attempted castigation prove.

Were I disposed to retaliate, I too might insinuate and quote various rumors about Gesenius and other " favorite authors" of his, for " extracts" not acknowledged, but I leave such matters with that noted lady whose word is not often entitled to credit; regretting that his want of courtesy here, renders me apparently uncourteous in repelling his coarse insinuations. Wholesale charges of error, and incongruities, *without specification*, and to a degree even of surprise, astonishment, and " ad nausaum," might justify a little resentment, but I wish to cherish all possible *bonhomie* even in quoting the trite remark that " they who live in glass houses should take care how they throw stones." Seneca's advice somewhat paraphrased is applicable here, as the sequel may show

Alium silere quod voles, primus sile.
Be silent and do not assail
Where foes of you may tell the tale.

What does Prof. S. know about the time I have or have not " spent in the direct study of the original scriptures ?" And where is the modesty in supporting this supposititious charge of neglect in this matter, by wholesale allegations of errors, which, but for this neglect, he somewhat condescendingly says, I *most probably* would have shunned, thus arrogating to himself, special praise and protection ?—particularly, when he either knows, or ought to know, that some Hebrew and Greek scholars, who can lay as lofty claims to erudition and knowledge of the original scriptures, as he can himself, such as Mede and Daubeny, have advanced the very same ideas which I have only historically stated in the general outline of Millennarian views, but which he has chosen to set forth and reprimand as *my* inconsistencies ?

> **Quod non vetat lex, hoc vetat fieri pudor.**
>
> **That which the law stoops not to blame**
> **Should not be done from very shame.**

3. He has flagrantly misrepresented me, and done me great injustice, by his too obvious attempt to fortify himself behind the clerical ' *esprit du corps*,' as though I had become the accuser of my brethren, and charged them with hypocrisy, &c. so contrary to what he says he always heard to be my temper. " It has not been my lot" he says, " to have any considerable personal acquaintance with Mr. Duffield. But I have always heard him spoken of, by my brethren in the ministry, as a man of kind and gentle spirit, uniting the christian and the gentleman. It was a matter of surprise to me therefore, when I found him speaking of those who hesitate about devoting their time to the study of *what they deem to be obscure prophecies*, as ' having reason to fear, that the charge and censure of the Saviour for *hypocrisy* may be applicable' to them, and intimating, that ' they are not in earnest about heavenly

things.' p. 23. He does not mean here to characterize mere scoffers at all divine truth, but he means such of his brethren as do not *agree with him*, in zeal for the study of what *they deem* prophecy *too difficult for them to understand.*" App. p. 154.

Now, with all due respect, as becomes "the christian and the gentlemen," I beg leave to say, I have done no such thing. This is his version of the matter: his constructive charge. I refer any and every candid reader to the context which he thus interprets, and confidently anticipate acquittal from this grievous accusation. The reader will find, by turning back to p. 18 of the Dissertations, that I am endeavouring to answer a very common objection against the study of "*unfulfilled prophecies*, IN GENERAL, and not this or the other special prediction, which brethren may think "too difficult for them to understand." The objection is, "that while the study of the prophecies already fulfilled may be proper and useful, *that of the prophecies unfulfilled is both useless and dangerous.*" Of course the remarks apply to none other but this one particular class of persons; I do not say whether clerical or lay, but mean both as the language shows. For the objection is offered alike by both, occasionally. I have also quoted the language of one, whether clerical or lay I know not, but one who belongs to the Editoral corps, a class of persons that do virtually contribute, and some of them claim a right, to form and controul public opinion; and I have said, that such language, especially the spirit of the objection quoted, deserves reproof, for reasons stated and drawn directly from the word of God, setting forth, first the divine obligation, imposed on us all, to study unfulfilled as well as fulfilled prophecy, and next its indispensable necessity in order rightly to understand the promises of God given for our support and consolation.

Having thus stated the objection, and quoted the lan-

guage of the Editor of the Boston Recorder,—who he is I know not,—in proof that it is a real objection and not a man of straw,—and having shewn its dangerous tendency, and utter fallacy, when brought to the test of God's word, I have asked, "Now, after all this, what shall we think of those who will tell us UNFULFILLED PROPHECY needs not to be studied—is of no use, but dangerous—till the events have fulfilled them? Assuredly such instructors deserve reproof, and to be sent back to their Bibles, themselves to study, more carefully, lest they should mislead others. They have reason to fear that the charge, and censure of the Saviour, for hypocrisy may be applicable;" and in pooof of this statement, I have shown that it was the very circumstances of the Pharisees' neglecting prophecy, on which the Saviour founded his charge of hypocrisy against them. My remarks apply wholly to the persons whom I have described, and particularly quoted, not to those whom Professor S. has seen fit to describe for me, and tell the world I *mean*. By no law of interpretation has he the right to put on my language the construction he has, and to work it up into an attack upon "many an honest and excellent *minister*," who does not agree with (me) in zeal for the study of what they deem prophecy too difficult for them to understand." I have admitted, that some unfulfilled prophecies are difficult to be understood, but affirmed, that that is no reason why they should not be studied, much less why *all unfulfilled prophecy* should be neglected.

My remarks apply only to those who fall in the latter class, whether ministers, editors, laymen, or professors. If Prof. S. interprets the language of his Bible, as he has done mine, he certainly needs to be sent back to learn some of the first principles of "Hermeneutics." What I have asserted from p. 18 to 23, I now assert again, without the least fear of Prof. S.'s attempt to rob me of any reputation

I may have had for a kind and gentle spirit: remarking only, that by the very same rule of interpretation, which has helped him to excoriate this grievous charge against me, he may stamp the charge, of being an accuser and denunciator, against any and every minister of the gospel, who will prove and enforce the precepts of the gospel in their plain and obvious import. I must say, that there is a weakness in this attempt so like the subterfuges and cry of men of the world, which ill comports with my previous ideas of Prof. S's. courtesy, and "Hermeneutics" both. Prof. S. would share most largely in the censure and condemnation, he seeks to dispense to me, were his own method of interpreting language and construing charges applied to himself. Besides those from the "Strictures" that will fall under notice, I refer the reader to passages in his Hints, which he may find on pp. 63, 127. It ill becomes a writer, himself so sensorious and dogmatical, to make such charges; but it is one among the many proofs we meet, of the readiness of men to accuse others of what they themselves are guilty.

His references to pages 71 and 265 of the Dissertations are of like character. I challenge him to produce any thing from the whole book, *taken in its proper connection*, that will justify such charges, and such a resort to the *argumentum ad invidiam* as the following, "At one time *the opponents of his views* are negligent of the scriptures; at another they are prejudiced, obstinate, bent upon peculiar hypotheses, and swayed by their own system; then again they are unwilling to follow the simple principles of interpretation; and they are indifferent about the glories of Christ and the saints. Moreover, some of them are led away by Platonic and other philosophy; and others particularly the author of Hints on the Interpretation of Prophecy pp. 395, 409, are led away by *German Theology*." App. p. 155. His zeal or something else must have

greatly affected the medium of his vision, before he would have magnified my legitimate objections against the allegorizing or spiritual *system* of interpretation, into charges against *my brethren* and *himself;* or conscience must have been at work,—one of the two. His remarks about my being exempt from any " charge of being led away either by Plato or the Germans," I accept as a compliment, notwithstanding the sneer, which they were designed to express, cannot be concealed, ill becomes him, and is beneath notice.

What I have specially affirmed of his explanations of certain prophecies, I shall notice in another place. I am truly surprised to see my arguments and objections, in reference to a *system of interpretation*, construed into invidious defamation of my brethren, which " blows somewhat rude and violent upon the very ears which are summoned to listen !!" He must needs have the power of Proteus that can transform things at this rate.

> Omnia transformat sese in miracula serum.
>
> His power of universal transformation
> Is marvellous indeed to admiration.

CHAPTER III.

HIS SKETCH OR REVIEW OF THE DISSERTATIONS.

1. He represents me as attempting,—through 150 pages of a work, which in the very third sentence of his "Strictures," he typographically or otherwise, errs in stating "contains 334 pages 12mo." nearly one half of the whole according to his shewing,—"to establish *hermeneutical* principles; from the application of which (I) expect to deduce (my) whole *theory* in respect of times future." p. 156. I notice the error just mentioned, in proof of the desultory attention he must have given either to the Dissertations, or the proof sheets of his Strictures, and how happily for him the error helps to give force to his general survey of the book. One half of a book devoted to establish hermeneutical principles by which to deduce a theory!!! This is construction with a vengeance. I utterly deny his allegation.

The impression which his language actually makes, and I have a right to believe it was designed to make, is, that I have labored, through a long, tedious, and unnecessary detail, requiring great *patience* to read, in order to establish some *new* or peculiar principles of interpretation, by which to make the Bible teach a preconceived idea of the Millennium. I have done no such thing: and say of Professor Stuart, that if he had given all the attention which time would permit to the book, he has not given, either time or attention, sufficient to be able to state its object or its argument. I have advanced no *new* principles of Hermeneutics whatever: but have brought into view two different systems of interpretation, which have

obtained and exerted an influence on the exposition of Scripture, and specially compared and contrasted them. I have attempted a regular analytical investigation of the import of Scriptural prophetical language, relative to THE SECOND COMING OF JESUS CHRIST. Previously, and indispensably necessary to that investigation, became the distinct apprehension and adjustment of the true principles of interpretation recognized and established in the Scriptures themselves. Will Professor Stuart object to this? Why then should he attempt to disparage an effort made in a work intended for all classes of readers, and especially for those unacquainted with the science of hermeneutics, to give a distinct and intelligible idea of the features, principles, and results, of two very different systems of interpretation, by which divines and professors have conducted their exposition of the Scriptures? Must no one entrench on what he may claim to be his province, *par excellence*, as biblical "professor in Andover Theological Seminary?" Has an attempt to make the whole subject intelligible to the common reader—especially when the original form of the work was Lectures prepared for a popular assembly—and to strip it of all *pedantic technicalities*, been rendered altogether unnecessary by professor Stuart's class-book for his students, entitled "Elementary Principles of Interpretation," translated from the Latin of Ernesti, with notes of his own and extracts from others? If he thinks so, there are multitudes who do not.

What I have attempted, in four chapters, to do, is to enable the reader to understand the difference between the two systems designated, and to decide for himself which shall be adopted. This I have done, first, by ARGUMENTS adduced, and, in the next place, by meeting and guarding against some common misapprehensions and misrepresentations as to what the one system, in contradistinction from the other, really is. Professor S. may think that twenty-five pages would have

sufficed for the whole, instead of 115, not 150 as he has said, p. 157. But diffuse in his style of writing as he is himself, it does not seem to have been enough to enable him to understand, either my language, or that of Ernesti, which I have quoted. Whether the fault is in me, or in the professor, will presently appear.

I have done no more than to unfold and endeavor to establish *the very same system of interpretation*, which Ernesti has defined and advocated, and which Professor S. has himself zealously asserted and vindicated. I defy him to produce a single passage from the whole book, which will authorize him to make the statement he has done, in order to produce the impression he evidently designed to do, that I have sought to establish any new or peculiar hermeneutical principles of my own, by which I expected to deduce my whole "theory" as to future times. A writer who can prefer charges at this rate, and so misstate the object and argument of an author, ought to be very careful that he does not himself present "many incongruities of representation," through failure "to distinguish things that differ." His whole attempt is to turn into derision what he had not been candid enough to state distinctly and accurately—no doubt aware that with most of readers, ridicule has more force than reason.

> Discit enim citius, meminitque libentius illud,
> Quod quis deridet, quam quod probat et veneratur.
>
> For quickly we discern,
> With ease remember, and with pleasure learn,
> Whate'er may ridicule and laughter move,
> Not what deserves our best esteem and love.

2. He has made a false issue, and put up a man of straw of his own creating, which he sets fire to, and demolishes, with most wonderful dexterity and self-complacency. "His grand position," he says of me, "is, *that all pro-*

phecy is to be LITERALLY *interpreted.*" The reader would suppose that I actually advanced a position, in these terms; and I cannot resist the impression, that HE MEANT IT SHOULD BE SO UNDERSTOOD. I defy him to produce any passage showing that I have advanced such a bold and unqualified proposition, or that I have, directly or indirectly, afforded just occasion, for him or any one else, so to state, what he calls, my grand position. He does indeed quote, in a suppressed and garbled form, what I have said, defining the general system, not of my excogitation, but long known in the church, and denominated *literal*, in contradistinction from the *mystic* or *spiritual*. "By *literal*," he means, (as he avers, p. 34,) "that system which assumes the *literality* or *historical reality*, of the events predicted." He means that the reader shall understand, that I, as well as himself, regarded this last proposition as identical, with what he had stated my "grand position" to be, and when he says that "more than sixty pages are occupied with illustrating and establishing THIS position," he errs most egregiously, from the fact. The two propositions are not identical, and cannot, by any efforts of exegesis, be tortured into entire resemblance.

I might here leave the question with the intelligent reader, confident that he will never identify my language, which Prof. S. quotes, with his statement of its meaning. I feel that I should but insult the understanding of the reader, were I to attempt to show the difference between "a *system* that assumes the historical reality of the *events* predicted," and "a *position* that *all prophecy*"—he means, and can mean nothing else than the *language* in which *all* prophecy is delivered—"is to be *literally* interpreted." He must be incurably blind indeed, that cannot see the radical, immutable, eternal difference, in the very nature of things, between a position and a system, events and language. But I feel also, that with all the reputation I may have for a kind

and gentle spirit, it would be making too great a demand for the sacrifice of self-respect, to submit to such a version and explanation as he has given, of what I have, in common with very many writers, styled the literal *system* of interpretation, and defined and explained at some length. Prof. S. is obnoxious to severe and deserved rebuke for the part he has acted here. For he has not only attempted to confound things essentially different, notwithstanding he so rightfully, but nevertheless magisterially, talks about and demands, yea, insists, that I must be "held to perspicuity and accuracy in the didactic part of (my) book;" but he has actually, and deliberately, TWICE *stopped short*, in the midst of the same sentence, and withheld from the reader, an essential idea in the definition or description which I have given of the literal *system* of interpretation. Pp. 156, 157.

My language is, "by the LITERAL we understand that *system* which assumes the LITERALITY, or historical reality, of the events predicted, and resorts to the grammatical interpretation of the *language* of prophecy, to determine its meaning." He may contend with whom he pleases, in opposition to the position he has attributed to me, and fight with all the chivalry of Sancho Panza against the windmill, but none of his thrusts or darts reach me. It is the creature of his own brain, and none of my positions, against which he directs his weapons.

In the sixty pages of which he speaks, I have quoted Ernesti frequently, and at great length, Dodwell, Vitringa, &c., in illustration and explanation of the system of interpretation to be adopted, and from which he will not himself dare to dissent; and having done so, in six not sixty pages, I have devoted the balance of the sixty, to *four* distinct, independent, and extended *arguments*, proving it to be the correct system, in doing which, I have even quoted Professor S. himself. When therefore he mirthfully says, "Often in reading them I have been constrained to stop

and inquire, Does the author mean really to assert, then, that all the language of prophecy is to be *literally* interpreted? Most of his remarks led me, against my will, to think that such *must eventually* be his position. More than once I began seriously to ask: And has it come to this now that we are to make a beginning, with the very first of all the prophecies in the Bible, and find out, by a *literal* interpretation, what is the meaning of the prediction: "The *seed* of the *woman* shall bruise the serpent's head?" I say, therefore, that when he thus speaks, I will not remark on the unseemly *entendre* in the words italicised, nor even declare what I think of his interrogations, for I perceive, that he literally thinks he is inflicting severe blows on me; but I refer him to pages 100 and 101 of the Dissertations, where, if he had read with ordinary attention, he might have learned, that he was fighting against a man of straw and not against me,—and where too, he will find a portrait drawn, of a certain class of spiritual interpreters, which will exhibit his own image and enable me to return his compliment.

——Mutato nomine, de TE
Fabula narratur.
Change but the name, of thee the tale is told.

3. He has indulged very freely in certain hypercriticisms, on my language, which deserve but a moment's attention. Having disproved his own allegations, and proved himself to have misrepresented and distorted my language, by acknowledging that I have produced "nothing but what is to be found in the usual principles of hermeneutics," he adds: "But it must be confessed still, that he has here produced, in addition to these, some things which *he* may *rightfully* claim *as his own*. What sort of language the *alphabetical* is, in distinction from and contrasted with, the other kinds named by him, I have not been able to make out, by any thing which he has said." App. p. 156, 157. His object is to mock at the word alphabetical, and to tell the world, as

he evidently thinks, that it is "a novelty of (my) own." In so saying and meaning he has only displayed his own ignorance. I have no apology to make for this charge, since truth requires me to speak plainly; I am not the first who has used the word alphabetical to designate the literal or plain style of speech or language, in contradistinction from that which is symbolical and figurative, just as the style of writing in alphabetical letters stands opposed to pictorial and hieroglyphical characters. More than half a century since, Johnson in his exposition of the Apocalypse thus made use of it; and his clear discriminating mind and profound judgment as an expositor entitle him to equal respect with Prof. S. Other writers too have employed it in this sense. But even, if I had been the first to use it, as he verily but ignorantly believes, I have so distinctly and accurately defined my meaning, that I am utterly amazed at his professions of inability to apprehend it. I have said, "Alphabetical language is the plain ordinary style of speech, which men employ to state or to set forth simple matters of history, and *unembellished by figurative expressions.*" I have also referred to examples in the Apocalypse, of this style of language, and quoted Ernesti's explanation of the thing, though he does not use the term. If after all this plainness and precision Prof. S. remains dull of comprehension, it is not my fault; and I may felicitate myself as did the celebrated Dr. Mason in like cases, that while under obligations to speak plainly and intelligibly, I am under none to provide understanding.

Professor S. says that tropical language, and also symbolical and typical, may also be called *alphabetical*, and so they may, using the term in a generic sense: but I have used it in a specific sense to denote that plain style of speech which is wholly devoid of any figurative embellishment whatever. When used in the generic sense, it is in contradistinction from hieroglyphics, which are writings, inscriptions or pictures, and the difference is as distinct as between language,

or words uttered or written and pictorial or hieroglyphical marks or signs. Professor S. does not seem to have noticed this distinction; but has employed expressions, which I have never, to my recollection, met in any accurate and good writer, who has treated on these subjects. He says, "We may easily distinguish between LANGUAGE *alphabetical and hieroglyphical.*" I defy him to do it. There is no such thing as *hieroglyphical* language. There are marks, signs, pictures, inscriptions, styles of *writing*, that are hyeroglyphical, and they may speak to the eye what words do to the ear. They may be deciphered and interpreted, but strictly and properly they are not *language*, or they cannot be expressed by appropriate sounds or names, nor do accurate writers so express themselves.

His own remarks about types, which, he says correctly, are not language, but things, apply to hieroglyphics with much greater force, than to symbols and types. He attempts, by calling it my "nomenclature," to throw odium on me, for employing such expressions as symbolical language, typical language, and charges me with "many incongruities of representation through failure to distinguish the things that differ." I have not invented these forms of expression, so as to entitle them to be designated as MY *nomenclature*. They are to be found in the best writers. I have given no occasion for him to make the following remark, as though I had confounded "things that differ," viz. "In respect to these last two designations, however," (he means *symbolical* and *typical* language,) "we have another remark to make, which is, that *types* are not language, but things, symbol is not language, but *thing*." Any tyro knows this. I have never said or intimated that they were. Nor do the phrases about which he affects so much fastidiousness imply it. I have—in common with "more recent," and more remote authors, with Daubuz and all that since his day have treated of symbols and types—used the expressions he criticises, just as any and every plain reader would understand

viz., SYMBOLICAL LANGUAGE denoting the language which designates or expresses symbols, or "things used as signs or representatives of ideas;" and TYPICAL LANGUAGE, the language which designates or expresses types, or those things that God appointed, and to which he gave significance, as shadows or representations of what he intended to be made known. In view, therefore, of these criticisms about "a little inaccuracy in modes of expression," I am willing to submit it to every candid reader, whether the Professor's admonition about "perspicuity and accuracy," would not be much more appropriate from me than from him.

Sic sæpe intereunt aliis meditantes necem.
So those who deadly hate to others cherish,
By their own schemes are often made to perish.

4. He has, disingenuously, defined my language to suit his own purpose, and instead of the plain, popular, ordinary sense of the expressions, and in which he could not but perceive they were used, has given them a high philosophical or metaphysical import. He seems himself to question the propriety of his own definition, but satisfies himself that it is *possible* to give my words such a meaning, and then adopts it, as the crucible into which he will cast my "fundamental position," as he calls, and erroneously states it, and by which he will put its accuracy to the test. "*A historic reality*," says he, "is something (or as we may say), any thing which takes place, or has an actual existence, in distinction from any thing which is merely supposed or imaginary. Nay, if we include within the circle of the world of mind, the Divine Being and angelic intelligencies, we may well say that there are more historic realities belonging to the world of mind, than to the world of matter; there are more, and more important things, *historical realities*, connected with the invisible world, than with the visible one." App. p. 157, 158.

This, I confess, is ingenious, and as it is the "great fundamental principle, on which every thing in his (strictures)

turns and depends," a few remarks must be made on his statement of it. I deny, however, its correctness, and insist that it will not stand the test of sound criticism. I have no need, however, for a crucible of my own invention, nor to resort to definitions of my own, philosophical, metaphysical, or otherwise, by which to try it. I appeal to the English Lexicographers, and the uniform use of language, or as Professor Stuart would say, the *usus loquendi*. Historical, or historic, is the adjective formed from the noun history, and means *of or belonging to history*. I write for plain readers, and must insist on subjecting the language of the Professor of Sacred Literature, since he writes in English, to the English standards, by which to judge of its correctness. *History* is not "EXISTENCE," either simple and absolute, i. e. as he has it, "*actual*," or "in distinction from any thing which is merely *supposed* or *imaginary*.

Professor S. will not find a solitary quotation in Richardson's English Dictionary in which the word is used in the sense he gives it, viz., *actual existence, simple entity*. How would the plain reader stare to be told by Professor S. that God is History, the angels history, the planets, stars, suns, and material universe history? And yet, according to his metaphysical definition of "historical reality," they are!

Here, doubtless, he will say, that he uses my own words, and that I am responsible for the absurdity, not he. He evidently thinks, that he has fairly turned the *argumentum ducens in absurdum*, against me. But he is greatly mistaken. I have nowhere said that LITERALITY, as an attribute or feature of prophecy, is identical or synonymous with *historical reality, in his sense*, that is, abstractly, absolutely speaking, as simple *existence*. He has indeed represented me to have so said. But when I have defined the *literal* system of interpretation, as applied to prophecy, and said that it assumes "*the literality*," &c., I have explained it, in what he calls "the epexegetical clause, designed to be its exponent

or equivalent,"—to be the "*historical reality* of THE EVENTS predicted." Why did Professor S. suppress these important and essential words, and represent me as identifying *literality* and *historical reality* in the high metaphysical generalization, or, to speak more logically, ABSOLUTE SENSE? He has done it, to try the correctness of my position by showing its absurdity, but I have only spoken of *events* or occurrences, so transpiring as to be, or to be capable of being, made matters of history, in the common and proper sense of the word, that is, events visibly occurring in this world, or externally manifesting themselves. Beyond this I deny that prophecy takes its range: he cannot prove the contrary; and it is a position of essential moment to be apprehended by every faithful interpreter of prophecy. His disingenuousness in shifting the meaning of the phrase *historical reality*, and perverting my idea,—the only proper idea of its meaning,—I shall presently declare. But I must first attend, a little further, to the true meaning of the word *history*.

It does not denote mere *science*, abstractly considered, any more than it does *existence*. It is true that it is a Greek word, ἱστορια, which lexicographers derive from ἱστωρ, science, knowing or having knowledge; from ἱσταμαι, to know; but as it has been adopted, in both the Latin and English languages, it means *the knowledge* of *things done*, of *deeds or facts*, also *the tale* or *narration* of them, the relation, *the record* of them. "Historical realities" therefore are THE REAL EVENTS OF HISTORY, according to the plain, obvious, established, authorized use of language. This being the only legitimate meaning of the expression,—and that it is so, I appeal to Tyndall, Bale, Ralegh, Usher, Tillotson, Bates, Gibbon, Beloe, Warburton and others, whose authority is far beyond the excogitated and novel definition of Prof. S.—the answer is at hand and obvious, when he asks, "How shall we show, then, that when a *spiritual* exegesis (as the author names it) is given to any particular

passage of Scripture, that (?) it does not as truly present us with a *historical reality*, as when we assign to it a meaning which has relation to external and visible occurrences?" App. p. 158. That answer is, that matters, simply and exclusively intellectual, or spiritual, are NOT matters of *historical record* at all; NOR CAN THEY BE. They may indeed have a veritable existence, but that existence can only become *known* to us by some *external, sensible* manifestation. Beyond such manifestation history does not go. God, and the angelical intelligencies, only become the subjects of history, as they, in some *external, visible*, or *sensible* way, event or occurrence, reveal themselves. It is an abuse of language to call them "*historical realities*," absolutely independent, or exclusive, of such manifestations.

The example, which Prof. S. quotes, and which he pronounces "undeniable," does not help him out of his metaphysical fog. "Jesus," says he, "declared to Nicodemus that except a man be *born again* he cannot see the kingdom of God." "Now if the explanation, which Mr. D. gives of his great principle is correct, we are not to give this a *spiritual* meaning, but a literal one. He cannot take refuge here, in any thing which he says about tropes, or symbols. There must be a *historical reality* (in his sense of the phrase) in these words; and this reality is one which is of a *visible* and *sensible* nature." App. p. 158. Here is the proof of his disingenuousness. He shows, in the last sentence just quoted, that he did accurately and fully apprehend the idea I intended to express by the phrase "historical reality of *the events* predicted." But he assigns another, and unjustifiable, meaning to the words "*historical reality*," viz., simple *existence*, and then thinks, by using my meaning of the phrase, and the only proper one, to shut me up to the necessity of denying *the doctrine* of the necessity of regeneration; or if he means the *fact* of regeneration, he has expressed himself very loosely and unintelligibly.

The *doctrine* of *the Necessity of Regeneration*, which the Saviour's language, as quoted by Prof. S. teaches, is an intellectual proposition, having reference wholly to a *spiritual* subject. He however would fain cut me off from all opportunity of retreat to the analogical import of the words "*born again*," expressing the nature of that change which the Saviour doctrinally taught to be necessary. I must take the phrase *literally*, as Nicodemus did, and wonder and inquire with him, how a man when he is old can enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born?

Now the disingenuousness of this thing appears FIRST, in his confounding "things that differ." Abstract *theological* truth, exclusively *doctrinal propositions*, matters simply of a "*spiritual* nature,"—I mean here, and so must and does Prof. S., intellectual, angelic, spiritual realities or existences, —totally disconnected from external manifestations, are not *events*, deeds, facts, things done, of such sort as to become, or to be capable of being made, matters of historical record or narration. Consequently they want an essential feature of the system of prophecy—are indeed radically different from it. For prophecies,—of which only I speak, using the word in its specific import, as Prof. S. must know, are strictly and properly PREDICTIONS, and have, as I affirm, uniformly and invariably, a reference to events which externally or visibly, and sensibly manifest themselves. Beyond this he has no right to press my language or "fundamental position," at least, until he shows, that I have not assumed a correct idea or definition of prophecy or predictions, or that, according to his assertion, simple abstract intellectualities,—mere spiritual *existences* that do not and will not manifest themselves by any external, visible, or sensible acts or revelations,—fall within the range of prophecy. This I defy him to do. Prophecy is adapted to our complex state of existence as spiritual and corporeal beings, dependent for our knowledge, as well on our senses as on our intellectual

perceptions and abstractions. The theatre for its great and glorious, and final developments and fulfilment, lies wholly on this globe,—in *events* and scenes to occur here, and to occur, in such manner, and manifestations, as to be perceptible by sensible creatures or mortal men. I challenge him to disprove this to be the fact, and to prove that intellectual spiritual verities, which never externally and sensibly manifest themselves, either are or ever can be the themes of prophecy. Yet has he either not discerned, or refused to recognize, the difference; and has applied *his constructive import* of my "fundamental position" on the subject of the interpretation of *prophecy*, to themes of an abstract, *theological*, intellectual, spiritual nature. It is ungenerous, unjust, thus to confound "things that differ," by insisting, as he has done, that DOCTRINAL *truths* are HISTORICAL *events*, and therefore, that in the explanation of the former, I must be debarred from all reference to the tropical import of language, and be compelled to interpret metaphorical expressions *literally*. When Prof. S. will prove, that Prophecy and Theology are identical, then, but not till then, can he crowd upon me the absurdities he has imagined.

The SECOND proof of his disengenuousness, which I notice, appears in his imperfect and distorted statement, of what he calls my "fundamental position." I have said that the literal system of interpretation, which applies to prophecy, "assumes the literality or historical reality of the events predicted, *and resorts to the grammatical interpretation of the language of prophecy to determine its meaning.*" P. 34 of Dissertation. Professor S. needs not to be told, that the *grammatical interpretation*—which I have affirmed must be resorted to in order to determine the meaning of prophecy—does NOT prohibit the application of the rhetorical and other rules appropriate to tropical, symbolical, or typical styles of language, when such language is employed by the prophets. I have quoted Ernesti and Vitringa, and given

an example, and amply illustrated this point, so that no one can fairly and legitimately charge me with teaching—or my "fundamental position," *as I state it*, with implying—that the language of prophecy is to be interpreted *literally* in Professor S.'s sense, viz., by the entire rejection and contempt of tropes, symbols, types and figures of speech. See pp. 35–37 of Dissertations.

I have shown also, that the habits of speech, founded on the very laws of human thought, according to which men express their ideas tropically, or by means of symbols and types, must and will be respected by the grammatical interpreter. What these are, I need not now state, having done so in the Dissertations. I have used the following language when purposely attempting to correct the misapprehensions existing, in reference to the literal or grammatical interpretation, as applied to the prophecies, "*That it does not reject the tropes of speech, and rhetorical embellishments of style, but interprets the meaning of the prophets, always by the same rules of exegesis that would be applied to the same kinds of composition*," and that it "*requires a careful attention to the different styles of prophetical language, for the purpose of applying the appropriate rules, by which to ascertain their import.*" See Dissertations, pp. 99, 105.

Professor S. must have read with great carelessness or haste, to have allowed himself so to misrepresent and distort, what he calls my "fundamental position," as to charge me and it with the absurdities he seems to think he has nailed to it, like some dead, hideous, frightful owl, which he has shot, and exposed, to forewarn all others of what they may expect from his rifle, if they will not become alarmed, but will dare to venture near his premises.

I have said other things, yet more explicit, if possible, and expletive of the system of "literal or grammatical interpretation" as applied to the prophecies; especially this one of sential things, which he has, most prudently, and

carefully, kept *entirely* out of view, not having even alluded to it once in the whole of his strictures, viz., that it "*carefully searches for the great and leading themes of prophecy which gives shape, character, and import to the entire system, and applying to them the rules of philosophical and biblical exegesis—the principles of grammatical construction and interpretation,—determines whether they are to be interpreted literally or allegorically.*" Professor S. seems to have had it in his view, nevertheless, when he attempted to make the impression, that prophecy ranges, as well in the abstract "world of mind" as in "the world of matter"—among simple intellectual or spiritual existences, and external sensible realities, or as he says correctly, when speaking of historic realities, "in the sense in which Mr. D. employs this phrase, i. e. mundane, visible, palpable reality." He cannot charge me with unfairness and disingenuousness here; for, if he did not mean to intimate, that prophecies, i. e. predictions, relate as well to simple intellectual or spiritual verities, which do *not* externally manifest themselves, i. e. find not their accomplishment in "mundane, visible, palpable reality," as to those that do, then all his attempt to put my "fundamental position," relative to the interpretation of prophecy, to the test, is perfectly abortive. I speak only of *prophecy*, affirming and teaching, that it finds its accomplishment in real historical events, "mundane, visible, palpable reality," as he knows.

If prophecy does indeed enter the regions of abstract intellectual and spiritual existences, lying without and wholly separate from this world, and not externally, visibly, palpably manifesting themselves in this mundane sphere, then I acknowledge, that I am altogether at fault, and shall ever despair of knowing, not only what is the fulfilment, but even what is the nature, of prophecy. But if it does not, if its theatre is *this* world, and not another, then, all that Prof. S. has said about "*historic realities*" including within the

circle of "the world of mind," the divine Being and angelic intelligences, as they exist,—he means independently of external sensible manifestations, if he means anything to the point,—is to no manner of purpose. That it does not, I once more affirm. If he means to say it does, I charge him first with holding and teaching a very vague, mystic, unmeaning, undefinable, absurd notion of the nature of prophecy; and second, with great disingenuousness toward me, in applying my fundamental position in a region, to which, according to its very terms and the essential nature of prophecy, it is totally inapplicable, and also in putting a forced and perverted construction on part of my language, directly in the very face of, and contrary to what I have stated to be the appropriate rule of interpretation, and what I have assumed and taught to be the nature of prophecy.

In his attempt to represent me as teaching absurdity, he has assumed too great a license, and having sketched his picture of monstrosities by putting things out of their proper elements,

> Qui variare cupit rem prodigaliter unam,
> Delphinum sylvis appingit, fluctibus aprum.
>
> He tries, with monstrous wonders to surprise,—
> In the broad forest bids his dolphins play,
> And paints his boars disporting in the sea.

But in so doing, he has rendered himself obnoxious to the very charge he brings against me. The reader's attention is requested, therefore, in the next place, to

CHAPTER IV.

THE ABSURDITIES AND DILEMMA INTO WHICH PROF. STUART'S DEFINITION OF HISTORIC REALITIES HAS LED HIM.

1. *It has led him to turn his own weapons against himself.* Having defined "*historic reality*" to be something or any thing which takes place or has an actual existence, in distinction from what is merely supposed or imaginary; having shewn, as he thinks, that God and angelic intelligencies, all existence in "the world of mind," are such, and, having taken my sense of "historic reality" as something "which is of a visible and sensible nature," to force me, for consistency's sake, to deny the necessity or spiritual nature and reality of regeneration, or "*being born* again," he says: "This is in reality a correct exposition and application of his (my) principle; and if so, and if (as is truly the case) this leads to absurdity, then there is not the weight of a grain of sand in what he brings forward to support *the idea of a visible, terrestrial, future kingdom of Christ.*" App. p. 158.

I must confess, that when I read this, I felt somewhat of his amazement whom the story reports to have gone to witness a juggler's feats, and having seen him, by an unlucky turn in the brandishings of his sword, cut off his own head, gravely inquired, "What will he do next?" He certainly has, by one dexterous *coup de main*, demolished, not mine, but his own fundamental position.

According to his bold, unqualified definition of "*historic reality*," whatever has existence is such, whether revealing itself by external sensible acts or manifestations, or not. All that it needs to make it such, as he teaches, is, that it is not a fiction—merely imaginary!! I wonder if the fictions of the imagination, according to his very showing, have not

as veritable an existence as any other acts in "the world of mind;"—unquestionably, just as veritable as the acts and operations of the mind that imagined them; but they are not realities after all, and every man of plain common sense would smile at Professor S. were he to call them such, because, forsooth, they lie within "the world of mind." This is one awkward and absurd result of his principle.

It will not do for Professor S. to say he means, that simple spiritual existence, or *entity*, is capable of becoming matter of historical record. This I do not deny; for it may make known both its existence and actings by external sensible manifestations, as God and angelic intelligencies have done. My assumed idea of historic reality, which is the common and authorized idea, does not exclude the Divine Being and angelic intelligencies, or even the new birth, from becoming matter of historical record, since they do externally and sensibly manifest themselves; but I insist upon it, that it is *only as they do so manifest themselves*, that they either are, or that we are capable of making and regarding them as *historical* realities. Existence, ipso facto, forms not an *historical* reality. It does but furnish the subject, theme, or material, which may become history by its manifestations. I challenge Professor S. to deny it.

Neither will it do for him to say he means only, that the acts of the Divine Being, and of angelic intelligencies, and the fact of the new birth, are as proper subjects for history as any other acts and facts. This I do not deny: but at the same time I affirm, that just as in the case of simple existence,—it is only as such acts and facts do manifest themselves externally and sensibly, that they are, or that we are capable of making or regarding them as historical realities.

The actings of our own minds may manifest themselves to ourselves, through our own consciousness, and recorded in our memory, they become part and parcel of the private personal history of our own being, known to ourselves. But they

can never become matter of history to others, except as they body forth in some sensible expression or manifestation.

In like manner, it is only as the acts of the Divine Being, and of angelic intelligencies, as regeneration, and other spiritual realities, embody themselves in some external, sensible manifestations, that they become subjects of historical record. This Prof. S. cannot deny that he knows, and did know, to be what I mean by historical reality; for he has virtually acknowledged it. He must therefore have meant it to be understood by his readers that his idea of historical reality was totally and radically different from mine,—something that takes place, or has an actual existence altogether independent of any external, visible, sensible manifestations. If this be his idea, then he is driven to the absurdity of maintaining, that we can have some intuitive, mesmeric knowledge, shall I say, of God and angels, and spiritual realities, which do not reveal themselves to us by any external manifestations: and, if so, how perfectly unnecessary must have been all the external manifestations of Deity, and the sublimer and more wonderful displays made in the Incarnation of the Son of God—"God manifest in the flesh"! But if he does not so mean, and admits, that it is just as God, angelic intelligencies, spiritual realities, "or, (as we may say,) any thing which takes place, or has an actual existence," i. e., some act or event, some being or fact, "in the world of mind," body forth in some external manifestation,—or, in other words, pass into the sensible world, we can have any knowledge of them, so as to make it matter of historical record, "then there is not the weight of a grain of sand, in what he brings forward, to support" his definition of historical reality, and the fundamental position, on which his spiritual interpretation of prophecy rests. It is all mist or smoke, from which he attempts to bring light. In a very different sense from what Horace says of Homer, I may use his words, and say of the Professor,

Non fumum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem
Cogitat.

He thinks, not with smoke, to shroud his glory bright,
But, from dense smoke, to radiate the lucid light.

2. *His metaphysical definition of "historic reality" has led him to reject, utterly and forever, the idea of a future visible terrestrial kingdom of Christ.* I have already quoted his language, but again bespeak the reader's attention to it. "There is not," he says, "the weight of a grain of sand to support *the* idea of a *visible* terrestrial future kingdom of Christ." I would not willingly misinterpret his language, nor take advantage of any looseness of expression, dropped in the haste with which he evidently wrote, to misstate his idea. So extraordinary, at first sight, did the above language appear, that I felt persuaded he must mean *my* idea, as he would call it, of the future kingdom of Christ; which, I confess, is distinctly, fully, avowedly, that of a kingdom both *visible* and *terrestrial;* if by terrestrial he means what I do, and the word imports, of, on, or belonging to this planet earth. On a more careful consideration, however, I find that he has not only made the assertion absolute, by the use of the definite article, but that his whole argument chimes, exactly, with the natural and obvious import of his language. Nay, more, he has actually challenged an issue on this very point. "The simple question," says he, "between us and him is, not whether matter of *fact* or *historical reality* is designated by the prophecies, but *whether the reality belongs to the world of matter or of mind:*" (the italicising is his own.) We say, to the latter; he says, to the former, *if not exclusively*, yet primarily and principally." App. p. 158.

It would seem, from his pointing, that while he cautiously and correctly admits, that my idea of the kingdom of Christ does not exclude the dominion of Christ from the minds of men, however it assumes its *terrestrial* visibility, he would

not be understood to teach or think, that the kingdom of Christ passes beyond "the world of mind" into any external visible revelations or manifestations. If this be his idea, I undoubtedly am not as obnoxious, as he thinks I am, to his rebuke, for what he calls "some seeming attempts secretly to ally them (the Spiritualists) with the skeptics, who expect only such a golden age as the perfectibility of man will usher in." App. p. 160. There is a much greater approximation in his idea of the kingdom of Christ, to the rhapsodies of Th. Parker about the transient and permanent in Christianity, than I had supposed ever would be made by one so sound and Evangelical in his Theological views as I regard Prof. S. He certainly differs from the common prevailing notions of the Spiritualists about the Millennium, as being the season of universal peace, prosperity, and dominant influence of *the Church* of God, by means of the gospel in its power and successful influence, and during which, her organization in its simplicity and purity, assumes a *terrestrial visibility*—both which ideas they consider appropriate to the kingdom of Christ, even though they deny His own personal visible presence on the earth.

I will not venture to say, whether Prof. S. actually and formally dissents from this; nor whether he denies the visible Church to be the kingdom of Christ,—which is the current idea among commentators; but I confess, that after reading the averments I have quoted, and comparing them with his views of the Millennium expressed in his Hints on the interpretation of prophecy, pp. 141—143, 1st ed., I am utterly at a loss to know, from any thing he has said, what his ideas of it are, and whether they are not as widely different from the great mass of those with whom he ranks himself, as from those who believe in the Saviour's visible coming.

But perhaps he will say, that the words, viz., "if not exclusively, yet primarily, and principally," are intended to

qualify his own implied idea, that the kingdom of Christ must ever be invisible, as it belongs to "the world of mind," as well as mine about its terrestrial visibility. What then becomes of his first unqualified assertion? But let us see how it will help him. Either he thinks, and means to teach the idea, that the kingdom of Christ belongs to "the world of mind" "*exclusively*," so as to be devoid of *terrestrial visibility*, or only "primarily and principally," yet not so as to be devoid of terrestrial visibility. If he means the former, as his language, argument and connection of remarks intimate, he contradicts the whole tenor and specific statements of the Bible. The kingdom of Christ, of which I spoke, as predicted in the Scriptures, is *not an invisible dominion* belonging "exclusively" to "the world of mind." I refer him to 2 Tim. iv. 1, where Paul charges Timothy "before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and dead *at his appearing* and *his kingdom*."—The one is just as visible as the other, and this earth too is the theatre for the manifestation of both. If Prof. S. does not like the translation,—*at* being somewhat obscure and unintelligible in this connection—I have no objection, that he translate it more exactly, and render κατα in relation to, in respect to, concerning, so as to designate what was in fact the subject of Paul's charge, "his own (Christ's) appearing or epiphany, τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν αὐτου and his own kingdom." The use of the definite article τὸν before λόγον in v. 2, and τῆς before ἀληθείας in v. 4, deserves his particular attention: and I commend the whole charge, from v. 2 to 5 inclusive, to his careful regard, lest by denying the terrestrial visibility of Christ's glorious kingdom at his appearing, he may, if he does so, be fostering the very state of things which Paul said would arise, during a future season καιρὸς when men will not endure *this* τῆς wholesome doctrine, but shall turn away the ear from *this* τῆς truth, and shall be turned to fables τοὺς μύθους, i. e. as I might add, the alle-

gorical, mythic, spiritual interpretation, introduced by their teachers to suit their tastes; and facts would prove the truth of the prophecy. The appearance and kingdom of Christ, which is everlasting, occur together; and so the angel taught Daniel vii. 27, 22, 13, for any thing to the contrary that Prof. S. in his Hints has been able to show.

But even denying the appearance of Christ, and admitting the Spiritualist's view of the Millennium to occur when "the kingdoms of this world shall become *the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ*, and *He* shall reign forever and ever," according to prophecy, it will unquestionably be *visible* and *terrestrial*. A mere dominion over "the world of mind" will not at all suit this description. It must body forth in some *visible*, palpable display. If Professor S. means to say that it will not, he is contradicted by the Scriptures in their plain and obvious import. He is referred to Mal. iii. 1–4: i. 11: Zech. xiv. 4–11: Hag. ii. 6, 7, compared with Heb. xii. 26–29: Zeph. iii. 8–17: Heb. iii. 3–6: Nah. i. 5–8: Mic. v. 4–15: iv. 1–7: Obad. xvii. 21: Amos ix. 11–15: Joel iii. 16, 17: Hos. i. 10, 11: ii. 14–23: Dan. vii. 27: Ezek. xxxviii. 19–23: xxxix. 21, 22: Jer. xxv. 30–33: Isai. lxiii. 1–6: lxii. 1–7: Psalm cx. lxxxix. 19–37: 2 Pet. iii. 10–13: 1 Pet. i. 4, 5, 7–13: Heb. ix. 28: 2 Thess. ii. 1–8: i. 7, 8, 9: 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17: ii. 19: i. 14: Eph. i. 10: Rom. viii. 17–19. Let him spiritualize and allegorize as he may, he must outrage every principle of interpretation, that claims the sanction of common sense, before he can get rid of the grand leading prominent truth, the future appearing of Jesus Christ, and the futurity of His glorious visible kingdom to be established on this globe.

If, however, he means to be understood, according to the latter construction of his language, that is not to deny the terrestrial visibility of Christ's kingdom altogether, but only to say, that it is not "primarily and principally" a visible terrestrial kingdom, he gives up the very question on which he

has made an issue; or rather, there is no room for the question at all, *whether* it belongs to the one or the other—"the world of mind," or "the world of matter"—for it actually, and by the very terms of his admission, belongs to both, and cannot be disparted from either. It is this union which makes it matter of history. Will Professor S. say how much, or how little, of its visibility, is necessary to render it capable of becoming matter of historical record? It matters not whether he goes to the extent that I believe the Scriptures do, or not. If it is in any degree visible, it belongs not wholly to "the world of mind;" and if so, what becomes of his distinction? It is of no use to him. I care not whether he says it belongs "*primarily and principally*" to "the world of mind," for so I believe, and so teach; but I affirm that it is only *as it becomes externally manifest*, i. e. visibly or sensibly bodies forth into "the world of matter," that it either is an "*historic* reality," or can become the subject of *historical* record. Simply, exclusively, as intellectual, rational or spiritual, it may be *reality*, in distinction from what is "supposed or imaginary," but not as "*historical* reality." Just so, the new birth may be a *reality*, and as such invisible, occurring in "the world of mind," according to Professor S.'s nomenclature. But it is only as it displays itself in external, sensible, or visible acts or evidences, so as to be discerned and reported among men, that it can ever become an "*historical reality*." I deem it, therefore, altogether unnecessary any further to answer his interrogatory, viz., "How now, on the ground of a visible historic reality being necessarily implied, are we going to prove that entering a second time into the womb and being born, is not the natural, yea, the necessary meaning of the words of the Saviour? We could not prove it." He has his answer. *Just by the same rules, by which we tell when an expression is a metaphor, and when it is not.* He might have read it in the Dissertations, pp. 109, 111. Nothing

that I have said contravenes or supersedes it. All he has said, in answer to it himself, just amounts to this, and no more: and so, after talking most grandiloquently about "*the world* of mind," and "the world of matter," and undertaking to tell us, most condescendingly, how to know when an expression denotes a reality in the one or the other, he puts us off with the old, trite, stale, simple rule, that every tyro in rhetoric has learned, how to tell when an expression is metaphorical!!!

> Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?
> Parturiunt montes; nascetur ridiculus mus.
>
> How will the boaster hold this yawning rate?
> The mountains labored with prodigious throes,
> And lo! a mouse ridiculous arose.

3. If Prof. S. means any thing more than this, then *his definition of "historic reality," has led him to violate a fundamental principle of interpretation, and to lay a foundation for scriptural exegesis, wholly untenable and dangerous.* Ernesti, as I have shown, Dissertations, pp. 34, 35, has taught us, that the true system of interpretation, "adheres to the words, and directs us to comprehend *things*, through the medium of words, and not words, through the medium of things." The mystic, spiritual system, which he condemns, he says, "*philosophizes* rather than *interprets*, and prefers to be *metaphysical* rather than grammatical, or as it is uncouthly expressed, *real* rather than verbal." He means to say that scriptural language must not be interpreted by any preconceived, metaphysical, or philosophical notion of the nature of the thing.

I have given examples of this sort, and shown even by the help of Prof. S. himself, the pernicious use, which has been made of Scripture, by employing a preconceived notion of the theological, spiritual, or recondite nature of the thing, as the key to unlock the meaning of the words. See Dissertations, pp. 36–45.

I shall now quote examples from Prof. S. of the violation of this very essential principle. Here are two. "It is *impossible*," says he, "in the nature of things, that *glorified* bodies should dwell in, and belong to a *material* world: and it would be utterly *incongruous* with the state of perfection and glory, promised to saints, to suppose that they are to come back from the presence and beatific vision of their God and Saviour, to a terrestrial, limited, and degraded condition; for degraded it really is, in comparison with their heavenly state." App. p. 159. How does he know? Let him prove his assertion. I will not attempt to conjecture what ideas Prof. S. has of the nature of *glorified* bodies, or whence he has obtained the knowledge on the subject which makes him judge so boldly and dogmatically of the *impossibility* of their dwelling in and belonging to *a material* world. He must have some private sources of information, with which the world is totally unacquainted. For I confess, that as to my knowledge about the matter, I have never heard, read of, or been referred, by any individual or book, to any other book, man, woman or child, that knew or could declare a whit more than I do myself on the subject, which is *just nothing at all!*

But this much I do know, as a matter of unerring history, that our Lord Jesus Christ, in his glorified body, did dwell for about forty days in this material world, somewhere among the mountains in Galilee, in habits of intimate and familiar converse with his apostles, yea, and did also eat before them, who were *mortal* men, *in the flesh*. See Acts i. 3: Matt. xxvi. 32: Mark xvi. 7: Luke xxiv. 41—43. I wonder if Professor S. can explain all this historical reality to belong to "the world of mind?" He need not attempt to tell us that our Saviour's raised body was *not* his *glorified* body, nor talk to us of Paul's tropical expression, "spiritual body," as though it were literally a third body he received at his ascension, for Paul will contradict him by telling him, in that "most extended and graphic account of

the resurrection of the saints," that "it is sown a natural body, it is *raised* a spiritual body." 1 Cor. xv. 44.

I know also, as matter of historical reality, that the glorified body of Elias, and Moses too,—I care not whether Professor S. will give the latter a glorified body, or only spirit, it was undeniably something living, moving, speaking, and visible, displaying itself externally and sensibly,—both did come from whatever place they dwelt in before and appeared in *this* material world and conversed with Christ, in the presence and hearing of his apostles, while yet in the flesh. Matt. xvii. 1—9. If the glorified bodies of Christ and of Moses and Elias could dwell in, and belong to THIS *material* world for *forty* days, or *forty* minutes,—and that they did Professor S. dare not deny,—it is perfect nonsense, a mere old womanish conceit, for him to tell us that "it is *impossible*, in the nature of things, that *glorified* bodies should dwell in and belong to a *material* world." He may laugh as he pleases at my *faith*; but with such facts as these, in disproof of his philosophy, or metaphysics, or conceits, about "the nature of things," he is not going to laugh me out of it. I therefore return his compliment, not in the miserable bungling manner in which he has attempted to quote Horace, see App. p. 164, in language which outrages the bard, and which a moment's attention to prosody, would have reproved his memory for having forgotten the hexameter measure; but in Horace's own words,

> Quod cunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.
> Whatever of this sort you state
> I do incredulously hate.

He may talk, and dream, as he pleases, about its being utterly "incongruous with the state of perfection and glory promised to the saints," that they should "come back from the presence and beatific vision of their God and Saviour, to a terrestrial, limited and degraded condition;" but in so doing, he only betrays his ignorance of Millenarians' faith.

They believe and teach no such thing. Wherever Christ is, "there is fulness of joy and pleasures for ever more." There, too, is the spot where the redeemed desire to be. The apostles, when they had but the transfiguration of their Saviour before them, conversing with Moses and Elias on the mount,—a mere representation of the real glory to come,—were overjoyed, and wished there to dwell. Paul desired to depart and be with Christ. That was heaven enough for him. To be with Christ is the consummation of heaven's felicity; heaven, without it, would be drear and desolate to the ransomed soul. The redeemed and glorified saints attend His presence. It is joy, glory, triumph, ineffable bliss and delight, to be where He is; whether it be where He now is, or where He shall be when He returns to earth. No Millenarian, whose writings I have ever read, teaches the idea of returning to a *degraded* state. Professor S. evidently thinks that any state on earth cannot but be a degraded state, compared with the heavenly. Whatever it may be, provided the glorified saints shall be associated with, related to, or dwell on, this material globe or any other, he assumes it must be far inferior. Here he begs the question. Proof, proof is demanded. Let him eclaircise his ideas of the heavenly state a little. I insist upon his giving something scriptural here, and will not be put off with the cry of tropes and figures, analogical language, &c. &c., and after all left in utter darkness and ignorance of where heaven is, and what it is—whether it is a state, a sphere, a vast concavity, an ethereal medium, a something utterly, absolutely, eternally separated from the material universe. I will not allow him thus to assume a philosophical, metaphysical, mystical, poetical, or any other idea of heaven, which the Bible does not teach, and then make it the key, by which to unlock the meaning of scriptural language; and having done so, undertake to judge of the *impossibility* of this or the other thing, directly in the very teeth of undeniable facts.

I know nothing more about the heavenly state, on which we shall enter at death, nor does Prof. S., than that whatever or wherever it is, it is *where Christ is*—and where those ransomed spirits that enter it enjoy conscious peace, rest and joy, in their Lord and Saviour. He and I, if we would die in peace, must both die in faith, like all the ancient worthies. If we would enter there, we must commit our souls into the hands of the blessed Jesus, assured that with Him they are safe, and that He will do all things right—but trust Him fully and implicitly. It has not pleased Him to give us any specific information as to the locality, employments, or any thing else in detail about the heavenly state, at least until the day of the resurrection of our bodies. For all the intervening period, we must trust Him with the most implicit and incurious faith, like the child that nestles in its mother's bosom in the midst of darkness. Doubtless it will be "joy ineffable and full of glory;" but the promises of God, that reveal our glory and triumph—the predictions that place before us a *new* Heaven and a *new* earth—the objects of hope and gladdening expectation, direct us to a glorious epoch or crisis in the affairs alike of Heaven and earth, even the day of our Redeemer's coming in the clouds of Heaven, for the resurrection of the bodies of the just. When this occurs, the vision of hope opens. It is the hour of adoption, the hour of victory, the realization of our hopes. Paul did not expect his "crown of righteousness" till that day—the day of Christ's appearing. Peter did not expect his crown, either, till that day; 1 Peter v. 4; nor the possession of his inheritance, incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away, though reserved in heaven, till the consummation of that salvation which was ready to be revealed in *the last time*, the time when his faith would be found unto praise, and honour, and glory,—*at the appearing of Jesus Christ*. 1 Peter i. 3–7.

Prof. S. has much to do in the way of biblical exegesis

and logical argumentation, before he will be allowed to take some things for *granted*, and to pronounce, by their help, others to be *impossible*, as he has done. Yet, on this slender, baseless, visionary, unjustifiable assumption, and begging of the question, he founds his whole system of exposition, and fortifies himself, planting his artillery, as he thinks, on some solid foundation, whence to hurl his missile interrogatories and charges of inconsistencies against the faith he ridicules, and which Millenarians entertain by virtue of the promises and predictions of Christ. But if he proves any thing, he proves too much. His bow outshoots the mark.

> Nec semper feriét quod cunque minabitur arcus.
> Nor always will the bow, though fam'd for art,
> With speed unerring wing the threatening dart.

I pass by the charges which Prof. S. prefers against me in p. 159 of his App., for *vehemence* in *accusing* "*those who differ from me* as to *Millennial* speculations," of "unfairness and want of candour," of "wilfully shutting their eyes against the light of truth," of "refusing to apply the plainest and most cogent rules of interpretation," and yet taking myself the very same liberty I censure in them. I have done no such thing, and challenge him to the proof,—even the miserable *constructive* proof on which he relies; averring that he will find nothing in the Dissertations to support such accusations, on any principles of construction that obtain among candid and honourable men. Before, however, I notice the next general topic in his strictures deserving attention, I present to the reader,

CHAPTER V.

A SPECIMEN OF PROF. STUART'S LOGIC.

He says, pp. 159, 160, "*Historic reality* belongs just as much to the *spiritual* world, as it does to the *material* and *visible* world. And as a great portion of prophecy, beyond all reasonable question, has respect to the *moral* and *spiritual* concerns of MEN, so we may very rationally believe, that a great portion concerns the moral and spiritual world, rather than the terrestrial and visible one." It is for him to prove, by other arguments than such sophistry, that prophecy refers to any thing exclusively and absolutely *spiritual*, totally disconnected from this terrestrial visible world, and from external sensible manifestations. Because a great portion of it relates to the moral and spiritual concerns of men dwelling in this terrestrial visible world, themselves part and parcel of it, it does not follow that *therefore* it belongs *exclusively* to "the world of mind," and does not find its fulfilment on this terrestrial visible globe,—unless indeed, he can show that *men* are no part of this world, mere spirit,—and that their *moral actions* and *interests* are not as really and truly mixed up with, or embodied in, external sensible transactions as in mere intellectual ratiocinations. Had he done so there would have been more appearance of logic, in this his grand conclusion, than at present. But the manner in which he shifts the meanings of his terms, and brings out his conclusion without any show of equilibrium, or balancing of import, or comparing between the subject and predicate, by his middle term, would deserve and receive rebuke were it the production of a youth exhibited to his professor. His argument reduced

to syllogistic form, with its terms specifically stated—according to his own meaning, runs thus:

Whatever belongs exclusively to the world of mind—the immaterial, invisible, spiritual state of existence, independent of any external sensible manifestations—is an historic reality capable of being made the subject of prophecy.

But prophecy, at least a great portion of it, has respect to the moral and spiritual concerns of men.

Therefore a great portion of prophecy concerns the moral and spiritual world, rather than the terrestrial and visible one, Quod erat demonstrandum, and so by inference first "all is *afloat* on the *ground* of Mr. D." I protest against being overflown and launched from the stocks in this style. Professor S. may find himself afloat in the world of mind, or between it and the world of matter, in some balloon of his own invention, but neither do my principles in the interpretation of prophecy, nor my exposition, carry me out of, or beyond, this terrestrial visible world as the proper and exclusive theatre of prophecy.

In review therefore of this whole critique of Prof. S., by means of his definition of historic reality, and of his attempt at the severest censure, I have been forcibly reminded of the fable of Phœdrus, de Vitiis Hominum, of the faults of men:

Peras imposuit Jupiter nobis duas:
Propriis repletam vitiis post tergum dedit,
Alienis ante pectus suspendit gravem.
Hac re videre nostra mala non possumus;
Alii simul delinquunt, censores sumus.

Jupiter gave to every man a sack,
To hold his faults and carry on his back.
Another one Jove gave, which from his breast,
Hung heavy with his neighbor's faults oppressed.
On this account man never can behold
His own, but can his neighbor's faults unfold.

CHAPTER VI.

A SPECIMEN OF PROF. STUART'S UNFAIRNESS AND SENSITIVENESS.

"PASSING by," says he, "*several inadvertencies* or *incorrectnesses in his statements* respecting the views of the spiritualists, and overlooking some *seeming?* attempts *secretly?* to ally them with the skeptics, who expect only such a golden age as the perfectibility of man will usher in, we come at once to the very essence of Mr. D.'s *literalism.*" Such insinuated charges may pass with those who believe Prof. S. to be infallible, or who concede to him the right to pronounce judgment *without rendering a reason.* But *specifications* are demanded, and justice requires them to be given. They are the more necessary, too, because, in making them, he might possibly unfold, a little more distinctly than he has done, his own views, that form the standard by which he judges. Let him attempt to *particularize*, and he will find more difficulty than he is aware of.

I have referred to authorities, and quoted the language of those who have expressed the more common and popular views of the Millennium. If Prof. S. accounts *them* inadvertencies and inaccuracies, be it so. The matter must be adjusted between him and those who belong to the same general class of interpreters, but do not believe just as he does. I refer to the N. Y. Evangelist and other periodicals, in proof of some of the disagreements which I have said exist among spiritualists. Prof. S. dare not deny, that there are various shades of belief among them. Does he mean to charge me with "inadvertencies and incorrectnesses" merely because I did not make *his* views the standard, with which to compare the common prevailing notions of the

Millennium? I prefer Buck as authority here. At best this is a cowardly method of attack, just like the Parthian's:

> Miles sagittas et celerem fugam
> Parthi.
>
> The Parthian soldier ever wise,
> Darts his arrow and quickly flies.

A manly accuser would have made his specifications.

And as to my secret attempt to ally the spiritualists and skeptics, the reader will judge, when I state, that, so far from my having had any secret design of this sort, Prof. S. has not even hinted at the *true* object of the general outline, which I have given of the two systems of interpretation in the particular views detailed. This was to unfold the very different results obtained by the two systems of interpretation. I have shown that both the spiritualist and literalist agree in certain general facts, such as the coming of Christ, the resurrection of the saints, a day of universal judgment, a Millennium and a kingdom of glory inconceivable and eternal; but that "they differ greatly as to the import of these facts, and the time, order, and manner of their occurrence." See Dissertations, p. 150. In presenting the views of the former, I notice some varieties in their belief, and further show, that, adopting the very same system of interpretation, others, such as Unitarians, Universalists, &c., have advanced opinions very diverse from those reputed orthodox.

Prof. S. displays great sensitiveness at this, calling it a *secret* attempt to ally them. Strange sort of logic, by the by, must it be to which he resorts to sustain such imaginings! But what must have been his sensitiveness when he learned, as he has by this time, that on the basis of his "Hints on the Interpretation of Prophecy," some Universalists have congratulated themselves on his approximation to them, and to their way of explaining the Scriptures? The "Univer-

salem," a paper published in Connecticut, supporting the doctrine of universal salvation, says, after the most extravagant panegyric, "really we were not prepared to expect that he (Prof. S.) could take such liberal, and *even Universalist grounds*, in the interpretation of Scripture, and defend them, with such openness and boldness, as he has done, in the work before us (viz. Hints, &c.). We do not say it, for the sake of saying it—we say it because we believe it is true, when we affirm that the "Hints on the Interpretation of Prophecy," if received, and we believe they must be, as based in truth, will produce a great and almost total change in the popular interpretations, not only of the *prophetic writings*, *but of the whole Scriptures*, and that this change will lead men to favor, if not to agree with, the views which *Universalists* entertain on these subjects. Certain we are, that Prof. Stuart, in this work, comes *nearer to Universalists*, in their views of the topics discussed, than any other writer of his school in this country, and *that he has taken out of the hands of the opposers of our faith, many of the props with which they are endeavoring to keep up the old castle which they are living in.*" When I wrote the chapter which has called forth the indications of Prof. S.'s sensitiveness, his Hints had not been published, so that I could not have had *him* in view, nor attempted secretly to ally *him* with the skeptics or Universalists. And indeed, in reading his appendix, I was surprised at his charge; because, though seeing the tendency of some of his modes of interpretation and exposition in the Hints, yet suspecting that I might possibly err in my estimate of them, by reason of having so recently received his unmerciful castigations, I feared to allow my own mind to trace the line of his path, for the purpose of seeing how *near* he actually did approach them. My conscious innocence in this matter made me the more amazed, but my surprise and amazement have all ceased. The reason and occasion of his sensitiveness are now appa-

rent. His grievous complaints against me are now intelligible.

Quid tristes querimoniæ
Si non supplicio culpa reciditur?

But wherefore does he thus complain
If Justice wears her awful sword in vain?

CHAPTER VII.

INEXCUSABLE ERRORS IN PROFESSOR STUART'S STATEMENT OF THE GRAND OUTLINES OF THE LITERAL SYSTEM OF PROPHETIC INTERPRETATION.

1. *He has studiously avoided all statement of, or allusion to, the great point at issue between the Spiritualist and the Millenarian, and which gives shape and character to the meaning of the predictions, relative to the Millennium, viz., whether, according to prophecy, it is a New Dispensation as miraculously to be introduced by God, as have been all the former dispensations of His Grace?* or *whether it is to be a mere expansion, progressive or sudden, and improvement of the present Evangelical Dispensation, by the universality of the extent to which, and the increased efficiency with which, the Gospel shall be preached?* The Spiritualists *generally*, and among them Professor S., assert the latter;—the Millenarian the former.

The latter denies, that the commonly received and ill-defined idea of the day of judgment being exclusively a simple judicial trial,—the holding of a grand court of general assizes, or of oyer and terminer and general jail delivery for the universe, of sinners and malefactors—is the scriptural idea of the day of judgment. On the contrary, it is affirmed that the scriptural statements on the subject, interpreted by the established rules of exegesis—which prohibit any preconceived idea of the nature of the thing—set forth the day of judgment as a Dispensation which shall be introduced by the personal, visible presence of God, as literally, and really, and visibly on this terrestrial globe, as ever was the Paradisiac, Adamic, or Antediluvian, Patriarchal, Sinaitic, or Evangelical dispensations before it. This I have dis-

tinctly brought into view, when giving the general outline of the two systems of interpretation referred to.

Prof. S. has not done the Millenarian views of Bible truth here, the justice even to drop a hint on this point. On the contrary, he has assumed two ideas, both of which, I, in common with others, deny, and the proof of which I demand at his hands, viz., 1. That the Millennium is but the enlarged prosperity and improved condition of the moral and spiritual world, by means *only* of the present, though extended, instrumentalities, institutions, and influences of a preached gospel. 2. That the day of judgment is merely a short and limited season for the exercise of Heaven's judiciary powers in passing sentence on the character and conduct of each individual of the human race, and dispersing or dissevering mankind, absolutely, entirely, and eternally from any material world whatever, especially the redeemed of the Lord. Every thing I have stated relative to the Millenarian views of the day of judgment being a new and glorious dispensation of Heaven's rule or dominion, in and during which other than judiciary powers will be exercised, he has most carefully shunned, and refused to declare. He can tell whether it was for this purpose he has abridged, as he hints, the statement. He says "abridged," that he may "give as briefly as may be, *the leading features of it.*" But I say, that so far from this being correct, he has contrived to exclude *the grand leading and essential feature altogether*—the very point on which the issue turns, between the system he advocates, and the Millenarian views of Bible truth.

2. *He has stated ideas to have been asserted by me, which he will not find, either directly, or by fair implication, in any thing I have written, nor in the Millenarian writers to whom I have referred.* From all appeal to them, however, he is cut off. His concern is with me; and I charge him with having, without foundation, attributed sentiments to me,

which I have nowhere expressed, I do not mean to impeach his veracity, as though he would knowingly do such a thing; but he has unwittingly done me this injustice. He is concerned to account for it, and not I, that he may yet retain the confidence of his readers in him as a reviewer and reporter.

Under the head (9) p. 161 of App. he makes me to teach "that nations will be born in a day, *by means of the saints who reign at Jerusalem.*" I have done no such thing, directly or impliedly, but referred this result to "the abundant and mighty influences of the Spirit of God"—His "powerful effusions,"—and stated that the fact of their new birth would evidence itself, "by their thorough conversion," and by their "cordial submission to *the dominion of Heaven by means of the saints.*" Surely he did not *mean* to *pervert* my language at this rate, as though in affirming "the dominion of Heaven by means of the saints," I taught "that nations will be born in a day by means of the saints who reign at Jerusalem"!!

Under head (10) he has represented me as teaching it to be part of the Millenarians' faith, "that the risen and glorified saints, *in the new metropolis* (he means the earthly Jerusalem), will be kings and priests for the administration of the political and religious interests of the (Jewish) nation." I have not done so. I have taught that the raised saints, according to the Millenarians' views of the prophecies are the governmental agencies, who shall be employed for the administration of the political and religious interests of *the nations*. By a misprint of the singular for the plural (which the context will clearly show is what must have been intended), Prof. S. having totally misapprehended what I had previously said, might naturally have supposed that I meant the Jewish nation pre-eminently or exclusively, and that therefore the raised saints must have their abode *in* "the new metropolis" of Jerusalem, as he calls it.

I may here take occasion to say, that there are various typographical errors which, owing to the circumstances under which the Dissertations were published, escaped correction, either when passing through the press or in an errata-sheet afterward, but which I regarded so trivial as to be capable of being corrected by the intelligent reader himself. But conceding to Prof. S. all the advantage which he may claim from the use of the singular instead of the plural, nothing that I have written authorizes him to represent me, as giving the raised saints their local dwelling in the *earthly* Jerusalem, the new metropolis, to be inhabited by the descendants of Jews in the flesh. If he knows not and I have said not where the raised saints will dwell with Christ, or what will be the site of the heavenly city, that is no reason why he should put them in Jerusalem.

In the sketch which he has "abridged" he shows that he may claim the merit of having, in some sort, profited by the hints which Horace has given the writer, who, to be successful, should imitate Homer and hurry to the object he has in view, or the impression he would make, by dexterously leaving out this and falsely introducing that, so as to give the whole the greatest effect.

Semper ad eventum festinat, et in medias res,
Non secus ac notas, auditorem rapit, et quæ
Desperat tractata nitescere posse, relinquit;
Atque ita mentitur, ni veris falsa remiscet,
Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imam.

But to the grand event he speeds his course,
And bears his readers with resistless force
Into the midst of things, while every line
Opens, by just degrees, his whole design.
Artful he knows each circumstance to leave
Which will not grace and ornament receive;
Then truth and fiction with such skill he blends,
That equal he begins, proceeds and ends.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROF. S.'S REMARKS ABOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE FATHERS.

He either thinks, or evidently designed to make the impression, that I have brought forward the wildest conceits, which can have no show of warrant for them in the word of God, and have therefore neglected to make any reference to the Scriptures for them, but have resorted to a very appropriate source—the "patristic writings," as he calls them, whence any thing, however visionary and absurd, may find its counterpart. "The unprejudiced and simple reader," he says, "will probably inquire, with some amazement: What can be brought now from the Scriptures in support of such stupendous arrangements as these? Who can satisfy us about occurrencies (?) which would seem to lie beyond any region reached by the loftiest or the most vagarious flight that the imagination of man has ever taken or *can* take?" App. p. 163.

Here are two questions to which I am very happy to give plain and direct answers. Prof. S. could not but have learned, that I intended not, and did not propose, to enter into a scriptural investigation of any of the points in detail embraced in the outline which he has abbreviated. I stated on the 162d page of the Dissertations, the general views I entertained myself, no farther than what I proposed in the volume to confirm by Scripture. At a future period, *the details* might undergo investigation by the aid of Scripture. I am not, therefore, to be charged with visionary speculations, unsupported by Scripture, because I have neither myself affirmed them, nor attempted to prove them from Scripture, in the volume published, but only stated some of the points or facts believed to be taught in prophecy by different Millenarian writers who had pursued their investigations farthest, giving at the same time their names, and

those of their works which the curious or interested reader might consult. Has Prof. S. read them? He certainly ought to have done so before he, a biblical instructor, asked, as though the thing were impossible and incredible, what could be brought from the Scriptures in support of such "*stupendous* arrangements;" STUPENDOUS as indeed they are. He will see, if he consults them, what *can* be produced.

He is not at liberty to assume the impossibility of there being *any* source of information on such points. Admitting, to the fullest extent of his meaning, that these things originally lie "beyond any region reached by the loftiest and most vagarious flight that the imagination of man has ever taken, or can (unaided) take;" if God has aided their minds, and predicted by the mouth of the prophets, that these or such like stupendous events and scenes shall take place, here in this world, in the progress of its history and of the scheme of redemption, will Prof. S. dare impertinently to inquire, "Who can satisfy us about such occurrences?" A God, of omniscience and infallible prescience, *can* do it, and do it perfectly. The only questions, at all appropriate, are, Has He so spoken? Does His language by the prophets, when fairly and truly interpreted, lead the mind to such conceptions? and was it *meant* to do so?

This I have said is a fair and legitimate topic for investigation, and imperiously demanding it. The Christian public will no longer be put off by the dogmas of the schools, the *dicta* of professors, the *decretals* of the Sorbonne, or any other theological authorities. The demand is made, and expressed in a thousand directions: Let us have the Bible testimony on this subject plainly and faithfully interpreted. Let us have God's word and not man's philosophy. I hold that it behoves us to meet the demand. If we have assumed things that are denied, and affirmed to be incapable of proof, we are bound to investigate them, and to see whether they can be supported by solid argument. If our interpre-

tations of Scripture have been contrary to the sound and stable rules of interpretation, let us correct them; but not claim, on the authority of names or schools, professors or synods, to teach what we cannot by sober, just, and veritable exposition, show to be the word of God.

I apply the remark to the Fathers also, and admit with Prof. S., to the fullest extent, all that he says about the character of much of their exposition of the Scriptures, "the *double-sense* exegesis which they had been taught to apply to Homer, and Pindar, and others; all the *mysticism* which they brought with them from the heathen schools," "their conceits and puerilities," &c. &c. He need not on this subject have waxed so wrathy, and threatened so marvellously. Such expressions as the following are by no means in good taste; nor do they add any dignity to the Professor. "But one thing I have to say—and *I wish them to mark it well*—let them be *careful* how they *challenge* the *proof* of *my* assertions. *I have read with my own eyes.* I judge, therefore, for myself. I can prove to any reasonable man, what I affirm." App. p. 165. On reading these terrific comminations I could not but think of Homer's enraged Achilles:

εἰ δ' ἄγε μὴν, πειρήσαι, ἵνα γνῶσι καὶ οἵδε·
Αἰψά τοι αἷμα κελαινὸν ἐρωήσει περὶ δουρί.

But let this first invasion be the last:
For know, thy blood, when next thou dost invade,
Shall stream in vengeance from my reeking blade.

Professor S. has admitted, notwithstanding his gasconade, all I wish or ask from him to sanction the use that I have made of the Fathers. "They were," he says, "at least many of them, men of *good faith, creditable witnesses of facts;* worthy of *deference even as to opinions,* when their superstitions and their visionary fancies were out of the question. *Whoever despises them, or disregards their*

testimony as to simple matters of fact, shows himself plainly to be a prejudiced or an unskilful judge." App. 166. I have quoted them not as authority, not in support of opinions, not even as *proof* of Millenarian views of prophecy, but in proof of "the views entertained by the early Fathers, (in which they) expressed their understanding of the Scriptures on this subject, (viz. of Christ's pre-millennial advent,) and as valuable historical testimony as to their *principles of interpretation.*" Prof. S. has done me injustice in intimating that I have referred to them for "their *interpretations* of prophecies which were dark." I have done no such thing. I have cited them as witnesses in relation to *this point* of *fact*, whether *the faith* of the Church, in the apostolic days, and in the first and beginning of the second centuries,—when it is confessed on all hands that it was far less perverted and polluted, by a double-sense exegesis, and a mysticism brought from the heathen schools, than towards the close of the second, and in the third and subsequent centuries,—did or did not embrace the personal, *visible*, pre-millennial advent of Jesus Christ. I suppose Prof. S. would admit it to be a perfectly legitimate inquiry, whether the faith of the Primitive Church, in the same period, embraced the justification of the sinner by faith in the righteousness of Christ, without the deeds of the law. Where is there greater impropriety in the former than in the latter inquiry? And what condemns the evidence of their testimony, more in the one case than in the other?

If Prof. S. means to say that I have *appealed to tradition* as "the most convenient of all possible methods of arguing," and like any and every sect and enthusiast which "find some prototype among the ancients," have gone to the Fathers for mine, he charges me unjustly and without show of evidence. He says, "I have observed, specially of late years, in my reading, that those always seem to rely most heartily upon the Fathers who feel themselves to be most deficient in

the power of establishing any thing directly from the Scriptures. So did not the first Protestants." Has he forgotten that Luther made his appeal to the Fathers, and did it most invincibly in his dispute with Eckius, in reference to the faith of the primitive church? I admit the sufficiency of the Scriptures, as "*the only infallible rule of faith and practice*;" but I deem it to be interesting, important, valuable information, to know what was the faith of the Fathers and Martyrs, and those holy men that lived nearest the days of the apostles—i. e. what they embraced, not as opinion, but as *facts* revealed to our faith.

I have carefully discriminated, as Prof. S. might have seen, see Dissertations, p. 174, "between what were matters of faith, simple statements of their belief founded on the word of God—and what were conjectures, and opinions founded on their inferences." Now having been so careful to define my object, in referring to what I called "traditionary *history*," not "traditionary *authority*" or opinions, and having as carefully distinguished between mere matters of conjecture, and the faith of the church, I cannot account for the obliquity of Prof. S.'s apprehensions, in undertaking to represent me as giving "with no very sparing hand, extracts from a number of the Fathers;" taking, "for the most part, what he finds selected for a purpose like his own, and leaving out what he would not wish to bring forward." I have hard work to muster up charity enough to prevent me from giving a plain name to such representations. Were I alone with him I should do it in the application of the Saviour's rule, and demand Christian satisfaction. I have affirmed, and referred to the Fathers in proof of the historical fact, that the faith of the primitive church embraced the personal, visible pre-millennial coming of Jesus Christ;—that there is not one of the early Fathers whose works are extant, and who have expressed their views or faith on the subject of the Millennium

and of Christ's second coming, who have not so stated it—or by fair implication assumed it;—and that none of the Fathers, yea, none down till after the Reformation—however differing from the Chiliasts, by which name a numerous class of writers were called, many of whom sensualized the faith of the primitive church,—ever advanced, for all that I can ascertain, the idea of *such* a Millennium as Prof. S. and those of his opinion adopt, until about the days of WHITBY, who gave it as a *new hypothesis*,—whether having excogitated it himself, or suggested by *Spener's* "Hope of better times to come," and the controversy with *Pfeiffer* and *Neumas*, I will not inquire. I had nothing to do with picking out, and leaving this or the other opinion of this or the other Father, on any subject. I was only concerned with their *evidence* as witnesses, to the faith of the church. If I have incorrectly quoted them; if I have not stated the facts as they are; and if, in one or two cases, where the evidence I admit was "rather of the *constructive* kind," I have not rightly construed the meaning,—let Prof. S. show it.

In view of the object I proposed therefore by the testimony of the Fathers, the reader will be able to form a correct judgment of Prof. S.'s candour and spirit, when after having given a list of names, and having stated what I have done myself in pursuing the chain of testimony,—that some have left behind them no certain relics of their writings, he says, "*All* these are made by Mr. D. to give testimony in favour of *his cause*; or (which he seems to regard as being equally in his favour) they did not give testimony against it. In this way he goes on till he comes down to a later age." App. p. 166. This is mere caricature, totally unbecoming Prof. S.

But what follows is even worse: "Nor," adds he," does he omit, even here (i. e. in a later age), to trace out his *traditionary history*. But the Fathers who were *opposed* to the Millennial views in question—Origen, Dionysius of Alex-

andria, Jerome, Augustine, and indeed most of the other distinguished Fathers—he slips over with slight notices, or with some little effort either to make them indirectly contribute to his purpose, or else to parry the force of their strokes and diminish the value of their opinions." App. p. 166. This is injustice and misrepresentation.

In tracing the history of the faith of the church, relative to the coming of Christ and the Millennium, I have said, that the evidence is direct and strong in the first two centuries, that it embraced the *fact* of the personal, visible, pre-millennial coming of Christ—that toward the close of the second century there grew up a style of interpretation which seriously affected the unity and simplicity of the church's faith, and the philosophical exposition of the Scriptures;—that this style of exposition may be detected first in Pantœnus, "the Stoic philosopher," Clemens of Alexandria his pupil, Justin martyr and others until Origen, who gave form and system to what I have called the spiritual or allegorical, in opposition to the literal system of interpretation;—that from that time forth the Millenarian faith began to disappear, from causes which I have stated, especially through the influence of Dionysius of Alexandria the disciple of Origen, having quoted Eusebius and Mosheim in proof of my statements;—that two conspicuous opposers of this faith were Caius and Dionysius, the former rejecting the Apocalypse altogether, and the latter, according to Eusebius' showing, virtually, if not formally, doing the same thing;—that just as long as the primitive church retained her greatest simplicity of faith, the personal pre-millenial coming of Christ was one of the items of her belief;—that the very first evidences of dissent from this faith appeared, among those who attempted to unite philosophy with Christianity; and that after prejudices had been excited against it by the gross sensual gloss, which certain heretics had given to the Millennium, so directly at variance with the Gnostic philosophy, its first opposers,

more successfully to overcome it, denied the canonical authority of the Apocalypse. Notwithstanding all this, I have shown also that traces of this faith are to be met with in subsequent ages, and even in the writings of those who opposed the sensual Chiliasm of the heretical Cerinthus, and others.

As to to the "*opinions*" of Origen, Dionysius of Alexandria, Jerome, Augustine, &c., they have nothing to do with *the simple matter of fact* I was stating about *the faith* of the primitive church, in reference to the coming of Christ and the Millennium, and the occasion and manner of departure from it when the church became corrupted by philosophy and vain deceit, and an allegorical style of interpreting the sacred Scriptures. It is utterly in vain for Prof. S. to attempt to condemn me for not giving the views and opinions of those who were "*opposed*," he says, "to the millennial views in question," (of course he means the personal, premillennial coming of Christ,) but I say, to the sensual Chiliasm of Cerinthus, &c., often confounded with the primitive faith. Their opinions on many subjects were vague and ill defined. I had no concern with them as an historian; nor did the nature and structure of my argument require that I should even state them. It is enough for me to say, as I did, that the common prevailing notions of the Millennium, in a season of great moral and spiritual improvement, and of glorious prosperity to the church of God for a thousand years before the coming of Jesus Christ, was no part of the faith of the primitive church, nor of the church for centuries, nor even of the men whose opinions Prof. S. represents me as studiously and artfully attempting to conceal. I challenge him to show the contrary to be the fact in the period referred to, or any proof of a spiritual Millennium like his own for centuries afterward.

My reference "to the Jewish Rabbies, and even to the Zend-Avesta, and my remarks as to the style of speech

adopted by Christ and his Apostles, Professor S. has also wholly misrepresented, by concealing their true and avowed design. I stated that the plain grammatical interpretation of the prophecies, especially of Daniel, gave rise to such an idea of the kingdom of God, as that which Millenarians, from the promises and predictions of Scripture, expect at the visible, personal, pre-millennial coming of Jesus Christ;—that such an idea actually did start in the world, cotemporaneously with the writings of the prophets, and may be traced down through two channels: *First*, the Jewish traditions and the rabbinical writings expressing the faith of the Jewish church; and *second*, the corruptions of Scripture and plagiarism to be traced among the Gentiles;—and that while the Saviour and the Apostles adopted the very same technical expressions, the same style of speech, and, in the case of the Apostle Paul, almost the identical ideas and language of the tradition of the house of Elias, and never defined their terms, or deemed it necessary to apprise their hearers, that they assigned a different meaning to them than what they imported, according to the plain grammatical sense; they never, in one solitary instance, so taught or expressed themselves, as to convey the idea of there being a great period of one thousand years of spiritual prosperity in religion, and the church of God, *prior* to Christ's personal, visible, second coming.

Prof. S. has not even touched or hinted at the argument. All this dust and mist about the fathers' crudities, puerilities, &c. &c., are just nothing to his purpose. The question is a question of fact, whether the primitive church did not embrace the Millenarian faith, and whether they did not do so, on the basis, not of superstition and puerile conceits, but of Scripture promises and predictions received and understood upon the principles of grammatical interpretation, the principles, in other words, taught and sanctioned by Ernesti and Prof. S. himself? No presiding or inspiring genius of inter-

pretation, at Andover, no tutelary god or saint, that may have the special care of her beloved Professor, will be allowed to rescue him from the contest here, as Homer's Venus did Paris:

τὸν δ' ἐξάρπαξε Ἀφροδίτη
Ῥεῖα μάλ', ὥσπερ θεός· ἐκάλυψε δὲ δι' ἠέρι πολλῇ.

The queen of love her favoured champion shrouds
(For goddess can all things) in a veil of clouds.

CHAPTER IX.

PROF. STUART'S STRICTURES ON THE SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT.

He first misstates the point of the argument, I adduce from the Scriptures, by saying that it is brought forward "in favour of his (my) *scheme*"—the reader would suppose of course, that "my *scheme*" embraced all that he has exhibited of the general outline. Do Prof. S.'s dialectics, and his sense of justice and propriety, admit of this? The argument is expressly, specifically, and avowedly this,—that the plain principles of grammatical interpretation, applied to the prophetical Scriptures, prove the second coming of Christ to be personal, visible, and pre-millennial. I have quoted Acts iii. 20, 21, and stated *analytically* according to the grammatical interpretation, the *facts* which the verse affirms, totally irrespective of the precise import of certain expressions contained in it, whose meaning is afterwards to be determined. Prof. S. has not denied that what I state to be the facts affirmed in these verses is correct: nor will he. He has, nevertheless, misquoted my language. For what purpose I cannot say: but when I say, referring directly to what I state are the facts asserted in Acts iii. 20, 21, as follows: "There can be no questioning *these* facts by any one who admits as truth—supported by sufficient evidence—and receives in the simplicity of faith the testimony of God," Dissertations p. 269, he, by leaving out certain words and parts of the sentence, makes me assert in general, something unintelligible, viz: "Here," Mr. D. says, "there can be no questioning of facts by any one who admits as truth . . . the testimony of God." App. p. 162.

My object is to direct attention, pointedly and specifically, to the main question that will be raised from this passage

in relation to the facts it affirms, by those who believe the Bible to be the word of God, viz., what will be the time of Christ's coming, so far as this passage declares it. This was the question proposed to be discussed; and in order to answer it, by the aid of this passage, I have undertaken a full and careful philological examination of its terms. Prof. S. would blow dust into the reader's eyes at the very outset, and then refuse to let me speak for myself, by misquoting and garbling my language.

Next he seeks to excite prejudice, both against me, and especially against the argument, by the most unwarrantable misstatement and perversion of my language. He says, "A little further on he remarks, that 'it is of essential consequence, if possible, *to enlist this text in favour of this* (his) *view*.'" My language is, "Of course it is of essential consequence, if possible, to enlist this text in favour of *our* view," and the context will show any child who will read it, that the view contemplated was not mine, for I had not stated mine, but that of Mr Faber, and the author of "Modern Fanaticism Unveiled," who attempted, by criticisms, one in one way, and another in another, to show that the times of restitution spoken of, and consequently the second advent of Christ, do not occur till *after* the Millennium. It was just the opposite view of mine. I will not say what I think of such misrepresentation and perversion of my language, nor can I devise an excuse for him. I can readily see, however, how it must prejudice the reader's mind, who takes all Prof. S. says on trust.

His third attempt is to put me down by his "ex cathedra" condemnation, for "*mistakes* in *criticism*." "Without adverting *now* (and I may add ever after) to the various mistakes in criticism which *the process of Mr. D.'s reasoning here developes*," (wonderfully guarded, obscure and ambiguous expression!) "it is enough to say, that every thing depends, of course, on the meaning of *χρόνοι ἀναψύξεως*, rest-

dered in our version, *times of restitution*;" just what I have said. "This our author of course considers, as declaring in favour of *his* views of *restitution*, i. e., in favour of the transformation of things in general at the commencement of the Millennium." App. p. 168. He does not say, as a matter of veritable fact, that I have made mistakes in criticism, but "the *process* of my reasoning has developed them!" Now, if the reader will turn to the Dissertations, pp. 271, 272, he will perceive, that I have introduced the criticism of the author of "Fanaticism Unveiled," who finds it necessary to give a meaning to the adverb ἄχρι, *until*, that will correspond with his dating of the times of restitution *after* the Millennium. I do but vindicate the reading of the English version, and the plain, popular meaning of the word *until*. Professor S. does not say whether the "mistakes in criticism" are mine, or the author's I refer to. He is very cautious in the use of his language. If he means that the mistakes are mine, it behooved him to point them out. I call upon him to do so, and to explain, if he dare, the passages I have quoted and referred to, according to the criticism I have shown to be fallacious. If he means that the "mistakes in criticism" are those of the author of "Fanaticism Unveiled," I have but developed them in the process of my argument, as he states; but it ill becomes him to write with such looseness and ambiguity, and virtually take advantage of his own wrong, to make his reader condemn me, as though he, the great critic at Andover, had detected at a glance *my* mistakes. There is nothing manly in this, to say the least. But perhaps he refers, also, since he uses the plural, to the other criticisms, which "the *process* of (my) reasoning has developed." This relates to the meaning of the Greek word ἀποκατάστασις, translated *restitution*. The criticism is Mr. Faber's, who says that the word denotes not "the *act* of resettling or *restoring* all things, but the *completed result*." I have denied that this is the meaning of the word, and de-

fended the plain and obvious grammatical import of the phrase "times of restitution," which is the time or season when that act takes place, or series of acts which commences the specific work of restoration. Whether he means the "mistakes in criticism" are those of Mr. Faber or myself, he has prudently left doubtful. It would have been much more manly to have spoken out plainly, than in such a covert and cowardly manner taken all the advantage he might wish against me, by an "ex cathedra" condemnation, exciting prejudice against my argument.

As to the simple meaning of the word ἀποκατάστασις, Professor S. agrees with me, in translating it *restoration*; but whether restoration in the sense of Mr. Faber, so as to include the *final, perfected result*—the actual *accomplishment* of all the things spoken of by the prophets, or, as I have said, according to the general import of verbal derivative nouns formed from the second person of the perfect passive, *the act or process of* restoration of all things spoken of by the prophets, which should be the date of the commencement of *the times* of restitution, he has not condescended to express himself. Does he mean that this is "the mistakes?" He admits "that Peter *might have* employed this word, in case he had believed in the same Millennium, which is advocated by Mr. D." Of course Professor S. is not prepared to condemn our English translation, and my defence of its meaning, by reason of any "mistakes in criticism," which *I* have made as to the meaning of this word ἀποκαθάστασις.

But Professor S. has added that "it is equally plain and true, that *if* he (Peter) had a *moral* and *spiritual Millennium* in view, he might appropriately employ it, just as the apostle (Rom. xii. 2. Tit. iii. 5) speaks of the *renewing* of our minds." App. p. 169. That is, he uses the word *metaphorically*; or, if Professor S. prefers it, *analogically*; about which import of words, we shall have more to say in

the sequel. Now it is important, essential, that the import of Peter's expressions, should be definitely settled. Prof. S. has no more right than I have, by general reasonings and a priori deductions, or preconceived notions of the nature of things, to do so. The Bible here must be its own interpreter.

The simple import of the word ἀποκατάστασις I will admit, for the sake of argument, will not do it: and for the same reason I will admit further, that the form and derivation of the word may not definitely and absolutely settle its meaning, so far as to determine whether it denotes the act and process of acts, or completed result and *accomplishment* of the restoration of all things, &c. I might, indeed, in support of the meaning which I say it has, agreeably to the analogy of Greek terms so derived, refer Prof. S. to Aristotle, lib. II. chap 3, Rhetor., where he will find three words of like derivation, denoting the act of doing: and as he may plead that καταστασις and ἀποκατάστασις differ in their shade of import, and that the preposition ἀπο here gives the word the increased import of actual accomplishment, and quote Whitby and Lightfoot, as authority, I might refer him to Matt. xvii. 11, the only place in the New Testament where the *verb* is applied by Christ to John the Baptist, "Elias indeed first cometh, and he shall *restore* all things—ἀποκαταστήσει πάντα—certainly not in the sense of *accomplishment*, for John the Baptist did but commence the publication of the kingdom approaching, and introduce, according to Prof. S.'s opinion, those new moral influences which were to issue in the transformation or restoration of all things.

But let this pass; and let us confine our attention to Peter's own language. He did not depend alone on the simple meaning of the word ἀποκατάστασις to express his idea. Prof. S. therefore shall not resort to any general reasonings, or theoretic, philosophical, or preconceived notion of the nature of things, to decipher Peter's meaning; especially,

as he admits the word "might" mean what I say it does, provided Peter had intended to express the idea which I say he did. Peter has given us two clews to his meaning. First, whatever the restoration—act, process or accomplished result—may be, it was something that should mark or characterize a predicted period yet future in Peter's day. "And *he shall send* Jesus Christ, which before was preached unto you. He shall send to you *this* (of whom he had spoken v. 19) Jesus Christ previously heralded—*ἀποστείλῃ τὸν προκεχειρισμένον ὑμῖν Χριστὸν*—see Winer's Gram., pp. 89, 90—whom the heaven must receive *until the times* of restitution of all things, &c., *ἄχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως*, &c. Prof. S. knows, agreeably to the just remarks of Winer in his Grammar, pp. 103, 106, that *χρόνων*, *the* times, is emphatic;—a definitely marked period. Now Peter, according to the plain and natural and grammatical import of his words, says, when that period arrived, God would again send Jesus Christ, him that had been previously heralded; for the adverb *ἄχρι* cannot mean *during*, according to the criticism I have shown to be incorrect and untenable, as though the sending of Christ would not occur till *after* the completed result of the restoration. Peter's use of the word *χρόνων*, *times*, proves that this cannot be his meaning: *ἄχρι*, in this connection, cannot mean either *during*, or *till after*, but *till the times*, that is, the commencement of them, according to the plain and ordinary use and import of the adverb in such connection.

In the next place, Peter has given us a second clew to his meaning, by characterizing the times to which he referred, as those in which would eventuate the restoration "of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." Just as we talk of the times of the reformation, referring to that whole period during which the measures commenced, and were prosecuted, which secured the reformation of the church, so Peter has his eye on certain times of restoration, that is, the times dur-

ing which these acts and measures should occur, which would effectually and fully restore all things—*the restoring times*.

Whether the relative pronoun which, *ὅν*, refers to *χρόνων*, the times, or to *πραγμάτων*, understood, the all things, I care not to determine. Prof. S. may interpret it either way, as he pleases, so as to make it read either of *which times* God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began, *ἀπ' αἰῶνος*, from the beginning of the age or dispensation, or *of which all things* God hath spoken by the mouth of his holy prophets, &c. It amounts to the same thing in the end, take it either way. The idea is, that the times of restoration would be characterized by the actual accomplishment of all the things which *all* the prophets had said should occur, in the way, or work, of restoration.

In a certain sense, all the measures adopted by God, from the very fall of Adam, may be said to possess this character; but Peter is speaking of some times and things beyond his day—things yet future when he spoke, and of which *all* the prophets had predicted. To determine what these times and things are, we are referred to the prophets; not to this or the other, but to *all*. They are times and things of which they have all in common spoken. I have referred to passages in the Scriptures from Noah down, and, to quote Jude, I might say from Enoch down, to prove, that the times of restitution,—especially the glorious advent of the Lord for his work of righteous judgment, and restoration of all things to their original pure and happy condition,—have been spoken of by *all* the prophets; i. e., sufficiently general and universal, to authorize, according to the common modes of speech, such language as Peter uses. I have done so to ascertain Peter's meaning according to the clew he has himself given to it; and yet Prof. S. in the most sneering and contemptuous manner, without even attempting to disprove, in one instance, the general point

for which the references were made, or to expose their inappropriateness, allows himself to hold the following language: "Mr. D. refers us (on p. 267) to nearly every one of them (the prophets) for passages of the like tenor with that in Acts iii. 21; that is, *as he expounds them*." I have given no exposition of them at all, but allowed the reader to do it for himself. "How easily," adds Prof. S. "are objects magnified, or the colour of them changed, when we look through a glass appropriate to produce these effects. If we can only forget that we are using a magnifying glass, or one which has a stain upon its surface, we may believe that we see every thing with our own proper eyes. And this is what Mr. D. has succeeded in completely doing, while inspecting the numerous texts which he has enlisted into his army." App. p. 169, 170.

If it should so happen that I was looking through the very glass which Peter was holding up, and following the very clew that he gave me, then what shall we say of the Professor's sneer? It lights where he would not have it. And to vindicate himself, he is bound, and I hold him responsible to prove, that I have used any coloured, or magnifying, or other glass, than just the very one which Peter gave his hearers, by means of which to understand his meaning. The Professor's dicta are no authority with me.

> Nec me tua fervida terrent
> Dicta, ferox: Dii me terrent.
>
> Impetuous accuser! I dread not your rod
> Of fervid OBJURGATION; but I fear my God.

If I have erred, in a careful analysis and attempt to interpret Peter's language by the help of Peter's own reference, let Professor S. point out the error; but let him not think to do so by such efforts.

I meet him now on the ground he has laid out for himself. He defines the meaning of the word ἀναπαύσεως,

restoration, to be "the putting of any thing which has been injured, has decayed, or is worn out, into a *renewed* and *good condition*." App. p. 168. I dissent from his definition. He will not find it in any good lexicographer. On the supposition that Peter had a *moral* and *spiritual* Millennium in view, he says, Peter "might appropriately employ it, just as the apostle (Rom. xii. 2; Titus iii. 5) speaks of the *renewing* of our minds;" App. p. 169; or, as he has added, as the Saviour,—speaking of "spiritual regeneration,—calls it *being born again*." If he meant, that the same reason for Christ's language applies also to Peter's use of his, then he says that Peter used the expression ἀποκατάστασις, *restitution* or *restoration*, "because language furnishes him with no more appropriate and significant means of indicating the nature and consequences of" the change. "Nicodemus," he adds, "would understand him (the Saviour) only in the carnal and material sense; and this I take to be exactly what Mr. D. has done with the words of Peter." App. p. 169.

Now in answer to this, I say that the idea of *restoration*, restitution, involves more than that of *renewing*. A thing may be entirely renovated, and there be no restoration at all. The government of France was renovated in 1830, when Louis Philippe was made king of the French, but there was no restoration of the dynasty of Napoleon or any other. So it is in the case of regeneration—where is the restoration there? Restoration, restitution, implies the idea of something being brought back, and put in its place, which had been lost or taken away—something strengthened, healed, or placed in a state of security again, which had been weakened, diseased, or perilled, and brought back to a former healthy and safe condition. No such thing can in truth be said of the sinner *born again*. He is a "*new creature*, old things are passed away, behold all things are become new." Holiness, spiritual life, the image of God,

or whatever else we please to call it, cannot be said to be restored to us miserable sinners, who are born again, for we never had it. It is communicated,—we are created anew in Christ Jesus, his workmanship; and to talk of restoration, is totally out of place, unless, indeed, we speak of man generically, that is, of human nature abstractly, when we may say correctly enough, comparing his fallen with his former state, the image of God, lost in Adam and by his fall, is restored in regeneration, and so lost and fallen man may be said to be restored to God; but to say that the sinner born again is restored, using the word as descriptive of his *character*, and make it synonymous simply with *renewed*, is to speak loosely and improperly. I refer Professor S., for the meaning of the English word restoration, to his English Dictionary; and for the meaning of ἀποκατάστασις, to Robinson's Translation of Wahl's Greek Lexicon, that he may correct his definition. Its primary and proper meaning is, that of placing any thing back into a former state, and so Peter understood and used it, as his reference to the prophets shows, for they speak of the recovery of this lost and ruined world back to its primitive, holy and happy state.

Even Prof. S. himself is forced to abandon his own definition. He tells us of *the original good condition* of this world—of the order and harmony that dwelt in it, till "Satan and sin, and sinning angels and men, destroyed and disturbed" them:—"all *very good*." Next he tell us that "a new heavens and a new earth will arise by the mighty power of God and the Redeemer, wherein will dwell righteousness, and *righteousness only*." Whence he has obtained this last idea of righteousness *only*, I do not know;—not surely from his Bible; but no doubt he means it to be understood tropically in all its looseness, and so we let it go. All the rest is good and true, morally, spiritually, and logically, and allegorically too, if he chooses; but I add also strictly and *literally*. It is a "literality" or "historical reality,"

according to my definition and meaning of the phrase;—all of it, as far as history goes, i. e. as it is already real matter of fact, has eventuated in this material world—has demonstrated itself to be external, sensible *reality*, or terrestrial visibility. I therefore affirm, that what remains to be accomplished, will do the same. Two of the most signal, noticeable, and stupendous results and tokens of the destruction and disturbance of the original order and harmony in this world, according to the sacred Scriptures, were God's cursing of the earth for man's sake, so that in sorrow he should eat of it all the days of his life, and it should bring forth thorns and thistles for his toil and vexation, Gen. iii. 17—19; and "the geological and atmospherical transformations" wrought in it by the deluge. These were both literally matters of fact, matters of veritable history. Now, however great may be the moral and spiritual renovation of mankind, even though I admit,—which I am perfectly free to do, along with Prof. S.,—that "the kingdom of Christ, and the *restoration* which He is to introduce, are *essentially* and *fundamentally* of a *moral* and *spiritual* nature," yet *the restoration* will not be complete, unless the world, this globe, be placed back into its original good condition, in all the harmony, order and blessedness reigning in it, when it was first invaded, and these things disturbed and destroyed, as he says, by "Satan and sin, and sinning angels and men." The redemption and restitution will not be perfect, till under Christ, "the second Adam," all things moral, spiritual, social, geological, atmospherical, physical, be brought back to the same original good condition in which they were under the first Adam. Where then, I ask, is there any thing *incongruous* in saying just what Prof. S. has done, but in a much wider and more varied extent of import:—"When the great period of man's probation, and the process of redeeming sinners shall be completed,—when (as Paul says) *the end cometh*—then ALL WILL BE RESTORED." The

incongruity and inappropriateness do not consist at all in the things themselves—they are all order and harmony, perfect and glorious—but in Prof. S.'s perceptions, who looks at them through the coloured glass or concave lens of his own metaphysical or philosophical idea of "the world of mind," which makes "historical realities" lose their external form, diminish, and become evanescent and volatile as thought and spirit. He has said something about seeing motes in others' eyes, but himself exemplifies the remark of Terence:

> Aliena ut melius videant, et dijudicent
> Quam sua!
>
> With how much keener and severer eye
> Man others' faults, and not their own, espy.

CHAPTER X.

PROFESSOR STUART'S SUMMARY PROCESS OF GETTING RID OF THE ARGUMENT.

THE proposed distinction, which Prof. S. has made between "the world of mind" and "the world of matter," and discovery of it as *a principle for the interpretation of prophecy*, may be called his *chef d'œuvre*. He uses it on all occasions as the universal solvent—*le grand œuvre*, the philosopher's stone—and it operates at his bidding like some concentrated sulphuric acid, to melt down and utterly dissolve the argument of his opponent. "Having thus," says he, "disclosed the fundamental principle of Mr. D., by the aid of which he summons help to his cause from the Scriptures; and having advertised the reader *by what means* ALL *texts* come to be *shaped* so as to suit his purpose, I must content myself for the rest, with merely giving, for the most part, a *list* to the reader of the passages on which he places his main reliance." Then follows "*the list*," in the midst of which he makes the remark, that those previously cited, "are all applied to the coming of Christ *before* the Millennium, i. e., at the commencement of it; and so of all other remaining texts." App. p. 170. His readers will be surprised, when told, that in Chap. 10 of the Dissertations, pp. 276–290, there is a *regular argument*, founded on the grammatico-historical interpretation of Dan. vii. 7–25, the object of which is, to show, that as Daniel has described the coming of Christ to exercise avenging judgment on the several constituent parts or regal dominions into which the fourth beast, or the Roman empire that succeeded to the Macedonian or Grecian, was to be divided, and especially the peculiar and formidable power that should rise up

among them, answers to the papal dominion, and "to give the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven to the people of the saints of the Most High, whose kingdom is to be an everlasting kingdom, and *all* dominions shall serve and obey Him;" so the little horn, symbolical of popery, is to continue undestroyed until the Ancient of Days comes, and judgment shall be given *to the saints of the Most High, and the time come that the saints possess the kingdom.* The conclusion is stated in the following words, viz.; "As popery, and the Roman empire, are *both* to be destroyed together, *before* the dominion is given to the saints; and as they are *never to continue* till the judgment shall sit, and *Christ shall come in the clouds of Heaven*, so His coming must be *before the Millennium*," Dissertations, p. 286; unless indeed popery and the secular oppressive dominion of the fourth beast are to exist during the whole period of the Millennium.

In presenting this conclusion, I have said, that there are but two ways of avoiding it; one is, to say that the coming of the Son of Man spoken of by Daniel, applies to his ascension, as Maclaurin affirms; the other, that Daniel does not describe a personal *visible* coming of Christ to judgment, as Faber and others affirm, both of which I have shown are altogether inadmissible. I have not, it is true, gone into any elaborate attempt at exposition, nor advanced reasons, at each step, in support of what I have given as the meaning of this prediction of Daniel; because I did not deem it at all necessary for the presentation of the argument, inasmuch as the exposition advanced is what the generality alike both of spiritualists and literalists, have conceded to be the true interpretation, fulfilled and verified to the *very* letter by historical events. Not to mention the views of Jerome, Cyril, Witsius, Hurd, Woodhouse, I might mention the names of Mede, Cressner, Sir Isaac Newton, Bishop Newton, Pyhot, Cunninghame and others. But I am not disposed extensively

to adduce arguments in support of what has been settled, by some of the ablest and best critical scholars and expounders of prophecy, whether Millenarian or anti-Millenarian; especially since Prof. S. has not condescended to present one item of proof for his own opinion, nor taken the first step to meet and answer the arguments of Mede, Sir Isaac Newton and Bishop Newton, and others on this subject. He has begged the question in the most unblushing manner, and spoken with a confidence, I know not how to reconcile with the slightest knowledge of the arguments of the above named profound scholars and expositors. "In v. 24," says he, "referring to the 7th chap. of Daniel, "the rise of Antiochus Epiphanes is described; for *the fourth beast* in vii. 7, 8; 11, 19–26, *as all must concede*, (!!!) is the divided *Grecian* dominion, which succeeded the reign of Alexander the Great." App. p. 83.

This is one of the things which I have said in the Dissertations Prof. S. takes for granted, as though they had not been and could not be denied. He must first meet Bishop Newton's* sturdy objections to this *gratuitous* assumption, before we shall feel under any obligations formally to review and reply to his dogmatic comment on this chapter in his Hints, pp. 83–85.

It is enough for me here to say, that Prof. S. renders the subject of chronological prophecy perfectly ridiculous. He has adopted the old interpretation of *apostate Jews*, approved of by *apostate papists*, and demands, with astonishing effrontery, that we shall see the predictions of Daniel relative to the 1260, 1290, 1335, and 2300 days, all fulfilled in the history of Antiochus Epiphanes during *so many literal* days, when for the life of him he cannot make one of the periods exactly agree with the events, and confesses it too; yea, worse, would have us believe that, notwithstanding the

* See his Dissertations, Diss. XV.

prophet has given us *statistically* the number of *literal* days, we must not suppose *that a statistical exactness would or could be aimed at!!!* He talks of Antiochus *springing from the dynasty of Alexander the Great!* App. p. 83. He might just as well and properly talk of Queen Victoria springing from the dynasty of Augustus Cæsar. Antiochus was the seventh monarch in succession from Seleucus Nicator, one of Alexander's generals, who did not succeed to Alexander at all as monarch of the Macedonian empire, but who commenced a dynasty of his own, or formed a kingdom of his own, in Syria—being one of the four new kingdoms into which the Macedonian empire was divided. A writer who is himself so inaccurate, who fails so egregiously in discrimination, cannot perhaps be expected to be more accurate in his interpretation of the prophecies. Precision is essential. Let Prof. S. ponder this, before he again affects to be surprised how such men of giant intellect as Mede, Sir Isaac and Bishop Newton and others, yea, the whole body of commentators, for a long period, should have understood these periods to be symbolical and not literal days.

He may therefore learn from these remarks, a solution of what he has affected to think so "passing strange, that after expending about 150 pages to prove the *necessity* of interpreting the prophecies *literally* (a misstatement I have already noticed, and totally inexcusable, because actually if not artfully *deceptive*), Mr. D. should everywhere, without even the semblance of an apology or justification, convert all the *day* periods of the prophets, *so far as his* purpose demands, into *year* periods. Where now, we are constrained to ask, is the strenuous zeal for *literality?* Not a trace of it seems to be left. The difficulty which doubters have about a *day* as meaning a *year*, is not even noticed, much less removed. How convenient such a power of metamorphosis! From one stage or form of development to another, the author moves on, now vehemently urging the absolute

and indispensable obligation to construe *every expression* LITERALLY, and then winking every thing of this nature entirely out of sight, or trampling it under his feet." App. p. 173.

Prof. S. either designed, or he did not, to make the impression that I have advocated the literal interpretation of *the language* of the prophets—"*every expression*," as he has it—totally inattentive to, or regardless of the different styles of speech employed by them, and of the grammatical or rhetorical rules appropriate for their interpretation. If he did, he has been guilty of a deliberate and wanton offence against the rules of honour and propriety; and if he has attentively read the Dissertations from p. 99 to p. 147, his offence possesses still greater turpitude, and is one for which it is not my province to call him to account. If he did not so design, then has he written with the most censurable looseness, so as to convey ideas contrary to truth and injurious to me.

After what I have already said, the reader is abundantly able to discriminate between what I have advocated, and what Prof. S. has represented me to have done, so that I need not here repeat it in repelling his sneers. I have not, it is true, entered on the discussion of the meaning of the prophetical DAY, because I have indeed assumed, *en passant*, the days noted in several of Daniel's predictions to be symbolical. Because I have not seen any thing from Prof. S., nor any of those with whom he coincides, which rendered it necessary to adduce the arguments long since presented: Sir Isaac Newton, in one page and a half, has pointed out thirteen particulars in which the predictions in the 8th chapter of Daniel, as referred by Prof. S. to Antiochus Epiphanes, is shown to be utterly false and inapplicable. The historical facts are perfect antipodes to the prediction, if we must apply it to Antiochus. See Sir I. Newton's Observations on Daniel, pp. 123, 124. The argument in proof of symbolical days, i. e., years, being meant in the numbers mentioned by Dan-

iel, need not here be much extended, nor is it at all necessary, in defence of the arguments I have advanced for the second coming of Christ, to defend it. A day is sometimes used in prophecy for a year. See Num. xiv. 34: Ezek. iv. 5, 6. It is worse than hypercritical to say that in Ezekiel the acts only, and not the days, were symbolical—God speaks of the days particularly as symbolical. This done once is sufficient proof that it may be again. Nor is it necessary, after the symbolical character of a day has been established, particularly to say as at the first a day is put for year, any more than that God should tell us every time when he uses metaphors and symbols. The judgment and observation of men are sufficient to determine when it is literal, and when symbolical. If the events described are of such character as could not, in the ordinary course of things, have happened during so many days, they must be regarded as symbolical. Especially must this be the case, when, as in all Daniel's numbers, it is absolute matter of fact, that no events whatever have ever yet proved them to be *literal* days. Other arguments adduced by the great mass of commentators, whether spiritualists or literalists, have not been set aside by any thing that Mr. Maitland, Prof. S., or his German authorities have advanced.

Here, by the way, I may remark as conveniently as anywhere else, that as Prof. S. in his Hints refers the reader to Bengel, whom he justly praises for his learning, as a specimen of sad wandering in his interpretation of chronological prophecy, it is worthy of notice, that like Prof. S. he rejected the symbolic day, departing from the track of commentators generally. Vitringa was more cautious, but Bengel adopted, by a most singular arithmetical process, a period which he deemed was the medium between the literal days and the year-days, and called a χρόνος, the prophetic time, &c., and having thus obtained his data, brought out the crisis in the year 1836. Bengel in this did but afford

one specimen out of many of the danger of resorting to mere notions and reasonings, instead of the plain, pointed, explicit shewing of the Scripture. His errors in his dates require but little attention to correct. Does his mistake here prove him mad—or will even Mr. Miller's mistake disprove the truth of prophecy?

Besides, it was not necessary for the argument, with which only I was concerned; since if the prophetic day be not symbolized of a year, but is to be understood literally, and Daniel's time, times and dividing of time, mean three literal years and a half, his language only directs us forward to an event yet future, when the little horn—having worn out the saints, in accordance with the predictions about the slaying of the witnesses, and the last phase of Antichrist, the personal Antichrist, which goes into perdition—shall have the saints and times and laws entirely in his hands for three years and a half. So far, therefore, as the argument is concerned, nothing is said about the symbolic day or year of days, because unnecessary. For if the little horn of the 7th chapter has not been proved to be Antiochus Epiphanes, but means popery, as I have taken it, in common with most Protestant interpreters, whether it is to last 1260 years, or only reach a crisis in its last terrible and tyrannical stage of its existence, or both, as events may show, continuing for three years and a half, its destruction should be accomplished by the coming of the Son of Man. Here is the point of the argument, and to this point Professor S. should have directed his attention, if he would have either faithfully represented the views of his opponent, or preferred reason to ridicule.

If the time, times and dividing of time be three and a half literal years, they are yet to come. For neither he nor any other commentator has arithmetically, logically, and demonstrably shown, that they have as yet been fulfilled. If he had adduced arguments to confirm his opposition, they

might be met; but it were folly to volunteer objections, after the arguments, of Mede, Newton and others, and the almost "*universal custom*" of commentators, as Professor S. admits, with nothing but his assertions, and attempts, in the loosest manner, to accommodate the language of Daniel to the history of Antiochus Epiphanes—and after it has been shown, by Bishop Newton, to be *far, very far*, from being *exactly* correspondent, which even Professor S. himself is constrained to admit, being therefore necessitated to explain Josephus's apparently contradictory statements. App. p. 85. It will be time enough to add any thing further on this point, when he produces something like argument in support of his assertions and conjectures.

If, on the other hand, they are years of symbolical days, in number 1260, they are not yet run out, so that, take it either way, the argument is not affected. Under another head, when speaking of the signs of Christ's coming, I have glanced at this subject, for the purpose of showing how improper it is to speak positively with regard to dates, as some have done, giving a variety of periods, adopted by those who have believed the prophetic three and a half years to have been 1260 years; but, at the same time, expressed my doubts, and dissent, for reasons stated from those who believe and teach that the witnesses have been slain, and who express themselves vaguely about the personal Antichrist, intimating, as my *opinion* only, that the rise of Antichrist in his last form, and the slaughter of the witnesses, may yet be future; so that the three years and a half may yet have the literal fulfillment they never have had to this day. But Professor S. has jumbled this up with the argument from Daniel vii. 7–25, and has taken occasion to make himself and his readers merry at my expense, as though I had fixed dates, and might ere long, should I happen to live a while yet, have the finger pointed "at some of" (my) "wanderings," and the public be reminded of "certain *four pat* words by me,"

if not be classed with Mr. Miller and others, whose dates he has not correctly stated, but whom in gross puerile wit, he, very unbecomingly for himself and his subject, would style *April fools*.

And here, by the way, in noticing his remarks about time, he stands chargeable with another misrepresentation, as inexcusable as any that have gone before it. He has assigned a decisive date, as taught by me for the coming of the Saviour, and that too but twenty-six years hence, when on the very next page I have stated expressly, that however near we may think it to be, the range of time may be seven times greater, for any thing that we can tell.* The reader will form his own comment on such treatment of an *argument*.

* Since writing the above I have seen Prof. Stowe's pamphlet on the groundlessness of what he calls *Millennial Arithmetic*, evidently aimed against Mr. Miller's views and calculations. Mr. Miller's calculations I have no doubt are erroneous in many respects. His Chronology certainly is replete with error; and his assumptions in some cases equally so, as for example when he makes the cleansing of the Sanctuary identical with the coming of Christ, and the visions of the 7th and 8th chapters of Daniel to be the same. I have regretted that Mr. Miller has been so confident in his assertions and his exposition; and having read all he has published for many years past, have never, in any respect whatever, been led to the conclusions, of the truth of which he seems himself to be so fully convinced. But I regret also, that he should be opposed in the way and spirit he has been: and particularly that Prof. Stowe should have dropped some of the remarks he has in his pamphlet. He has said that all writers on the subject of chronological prophecy have "ASSUMED," that the forty-two months, or a time, times and a half, are so many years as there are days in these periods. Some may have done so. I confess that I did in my Dissertations, because my subject led me not into the discussion of that point, because the argument rendered it unnecessary, and because I had been satisfied with the proofs adduced by Mede, Newton, Faber and others. *They* do NOT *assume* it. Their arguments may not be conclusive, but their inconclusiveness should be shown. Professor Stowe has not done so. Nor has he, as I think, proved that these are definite numbers used merely to denote a definite or *limited*

His representation of it *is* of a piece with his assertion, that I "everywhere quote the Apocalypse" by a new title, viz. Revelations. When I *quote* it, it is as he has done himself. When I *refer to the book* and speak *of it*, I frequently, not "*everywhere*," use the plural, in common with many authors, to express the number and variety of the revelations God made to the Apostle John, and which are embodied in it.

In the eleventh chapter of the Discussions, the attentive reader will find another argument, founded on the strict grammatico-historical interpretation of 2 Thess. ii. 1—12, (not ii. 5—7 as he has it,) showing that the coming of Christ will be pre-millennial, or contemporaneous, with the destruction of popery. Other passages of Scripture are in-

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paried. All times referred to in prophecy are of *necessity* definite or *limited*, whether a number is used to express them or not. It is a very easy thing to tell when round numbers are used, in which the speaker does not intend to be understood to speak exactly, and when statistical numbers and dates are used, where he does. Daniel's 2300 evening-mornings must be understood as statistically or chronologically *exact*, if ever any numbers can be; or else the angel did not answer his question which we read he did, for they are given in answer to the specific question, *how long*. I cannot take such liberty in explaining the word of God, because I would not dare to do it, in explaining Prof. Stowe or Prof. Stuart, or any one else, if in answer to my question, *how long*, they should give me a specific number in reply. Prof. Stowe's object is to excite distrust as to *all* dates, affirming that we cannot tell when the apostasy of Rome commenced. If he had said we know not the date which God had in view he would be correct, and we should be urged to modesty: but it is rather a matter of surprise to me, to hear it said that we cannot tell by a century when Rome became an apostate church. If we can tell that she is so *now*, there can be but little difficulty in determining about when she became so. Still more surprising does it appear to me, that Prof. Stowe, having rejected *all* dates and *all* "Millenial arithmetic" down at least till 1926, should have nevertheless told us that the most probable period for commencing the Millennium is about A. D. 2000!!!

troduced, as they serve to illustrate or throw light upon the language and meaning of the Apostle. Prof. S. has given a bald *list* of texts, without stating their connection, or my object in quoting them, or the specific use made of them, and affirms my "main reliance" to be on them. It suited his purpose, doubtless, to keep his readers in ignorance.

The only thing he has adduced, in reply to the argument in the eleventh chapter, is the following, which I give as a specimen of worse than puerile weakness: "Specially and at length does he argue the point, that 2 Thess. ii. 8, which speaks of the man of sin being destroyed by the breath of the mouth, and the brightness of the appearing of Christ, admits of no other than a strictly literal sense," p. 310, seq. If the point is argued, certainly it behooved him to notice the argument, and to show its fallacy; but this he has refused to do, falling back on his own claimed authoritative supremacy, as interpreter of Scripture, whose *ipse dixit* is law, and saying, "For myself, after turning this matter round and round, in order to view it on every side, *I have not been able to make out what the breath of the mouth*, in a strictly literal sense, is, of a being which at most has only a *spiritual body* (1 Cor. xv. 44: comp. Phil. iii. 21); for such must be the case, in respect of the body of Jesus in the world of glory. Nor am *I able* to see *how* brightness, (in the original ἐπιφανείᾳ,) in the *strictly literal* sense, can destroy either the man of sin or any other man. It might put out their eyes, if carried to a certain extent; but this would not be to *destroy* them. And as to this last word, *destroy*, if all the rest of the verse is *strictly literal*, of course this part of it is so. The consequence then is inevitable, that when Christ comes the man of sin and his adherents are to be *annihilated*; for *nothing less* than this *can* meet *the full and literal import* of the word ἀναλώσει, *destroy*." App. p. 170, 171.

Now this, what—notwithstanding I yield all the respect

to Prof. S. in other matters which he merits—I must call miserable drivelling *badinage*, is all that he pretends to offer, in reply to a regular extended argument! an "entertainment," as he calls it, quite as offensive to men who think for themselves and love to reason;

> 'Ut gratas inter mensas symphonia discors
> Et crassum unguentum, et sardo cum melle papaver
> Offendunt.
>
> As jarring music at a jovial feast,
> Or muddy essence, or th' ungrateful taste
> Of bitter honey, shall the guests displease.

In the argument, which he has thus attempted to laugh to scorn, I have denied, that the language in the text is metaphorical, or that it of necessity must be tropically understood. The *onus probandi* falls on those who say it is, and must be so understood. But I have fortified my denial by arguments, and have further shown, that the expressions, "the spirit of his mouth," "the brightness of his appearing," cannot possibly be construed into metaphor, and are, in common with other phrases employed on this subject, *always* used in the strict literal sense, when they occur in the New Testament. Dissertations, p. 311. I have also given two distinct and independent arguments, in proof of this point, and a reference to the words and an examination of their import, in every place where they occur in the New Testament. See Dissertations, pp. 311–325.

Prof. S. reverts to the *argumentum ab ignorantia*, and pleads his ignorance,—after his utmost effort to imagine what can be *the breath of the mouth of a spiritual body*,—as though it therefore must be, in any other than a tropical sense, an absurdity or impossibility. To this I might reply, in the well-known words of Shakspeare:

> There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy!

But I will not reprove him by the English bard, but by his English Bible, referring him to an historical fact, which, despite of all Prof. S.'s professed ignorance and imbecility of judgment, after turning the matter "round and round," remains a literal fact, nevertheless. The blessed Redeemer, in his raised body—his "spiritual body,"—stood in the midst of his disciples, and said once and again, "Peace be unto you, &c.," and when he had said this, *he breathed* on them, &c.—John xx. 19—22. Moses and Elias appeared with Christ, on the mount of transfiguration, *talking* with Him.—Mat. xvii. 3. What is speech but articulate sounds proceeding from the mouth? and what creates sound, but air put in vibratory motion?—all *strictly, literally true.* This were enough to reprove the Professor's attempt to make his notions of the powers of a "spiritual body" a standard and rule of interpretation, as to the meaning of Scriptural expressions.

But his attempt at wit, is even more censurable still; for I have shown that the literal system of interpretation does not treat with disrespect the idioms of speech, but requires them to be duly attended to in analyzing the meaning of expressions; and I have further shown, that the phrase, "the breath of his mouth," was an idiomatic form of speech among the Hebrews, and given examples from the Old Testament, which determine its meaning in two respects, according to the *usus loquendi*, or popular use of the phrase, to be either, or both, a mighty tempest or a mighty voice or *shout*. See Dissertations, pp. 321, 322. Now it is a matter of little or no moment, whether, in the first instance, such forms of speech were tropical or not. Ernesti tells us that "*usage sometimes converts tropical words into proper ones*," and by proper words, he means those that are literal "in respect to their meaning." See Ernesti's Principles of Interpretation, pp. 21, 23. Even Professor S. himself, in a note on p. 13, when speaking of Ernesti's condemnation of one of Origen's positions, approved by some of the Fathers after him, and echoed

by many Romish doctors, that *some passages of Scripture have no literal sense*, says, "By *literal* sense here, Ernesti means a sense not *allegorical* or *mystical*; for to this, *literal* is here opposed, and not to *tropical*, as it commonly is." This Professor S. knows is precisely the sense in which I have used the word *literal*, or if not, he betrays an obtuseness of perception, of which I would not have suspected him; for I challenge any and every unsophisticated and unprejudiced man, to read, with ordinary degree of attention, what I have written on the subject of the literal system of interpretation, and get any other idea out of it. I have never met or heard of one of my numerous hearers, who attended the delivery of the Lectures,—in substance the same with the Dissertations,—that ever conceived or understood me to use the word *literal* in the invidious sense, which Prof. S. has given it in his "strictures," or in any other than as he himself has defined or explained it.

His remarks about the meaning of the word *brightness* are almost too trifling, to receive a moment's attention. It is wit of the stalest sort. He admits that brightness might *put out the eyes*. I will not condescend to play as I might upon the proper and tropical import of these his idiomatic expressions, nor to notice what meaning the *usus loquendi* gives them, for it is too trifling for so grave a theme; but it would be only doing what he has done. All I have to say is, that if intense brightness is capable of destroying the organs of vision, it is not unreasonable to believe, that it can be so increased as to disturb yet more perniciously the animal economy. He had much better have consulted physiological and pathological writers, for information on the influence and effects of concentrated light upon the vital system, before he allowed himself to attempt, in his confessed ignorance, to be witty.

. . . . . .

Beside, it is a very common process of thought, and usage of speech, when we designate any thing by an expression

which describes one conspicuous and remarkable power or property, to judge and speak of its effects and operations by means of other powers or properties intimately, essentially, or inseparably united with it. The Scriptures, for example, designate the Saviour sometimes by the phrase the Son of Man, which is especially appropriate to his humanity, and yet at the very same time speak of acts or powers which pertain to and imply his divinity, and vice versa.

With intense brightness we associate the idea of intense heat, nor can we well separate them. It is not necessary to express an object by a term or terms that denote both; either will do. Prof. S. certainly cannot have forgotten, or failed to observe from other passages in the Scriptures, that *the brightness* attendant on the coming and manifestation of Jesus Christ, to which such destructive efficiency is attributed, is that of *devouring fire*. Paul says expressly, that "the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven—*in flaming fire*, ἐν πυρὶ φλογὸς, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from *the glory* (δόξης, which is but another word for concentrated light, effulgence or *brightness*, see Luke ii. 9, ix. 31; Acts xxii. 11, &c.) of his power." The plain common reader finds no such difficulty of apprehension as that of which Prof. S. complains.

Perhaps he is a philosopher, and does not take things in such a plain and obvious import, but must discover some other *quo modo* of destroying brightness, than "the fervent heat" which shall melt the elements, according to 2 Peter iii. 10. Has he then ever investigated, but forgotten, the immensely destructive power of that intense brightness, the concentrated electric fluid in its transits, and how instantaneously it does more than *put out the eyes*, even destroys life, rives the gnarled oak, and rends the very rocks?

Surely he has forgotten to consult even his Bible on this subject; for David would have solved the wonderful mystery for him, when he describes the coming of the Lord in glory and majesty; "At the brightness that was before him his thick clouds passed; hail-stones and coals of fire. The Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the Highest gave his voice; hail-stones and coals of fire. Yea, he sent out his arrows, and scattered them; and he shot out *lightnings* and discomfited them. Psalm xviii. 12—14.

Perhaps, also, he will tell us, this is a poetical description of a mighty and magnificent thunder storm. Be it so; but what if the presence of the Lord, his bright appearing, be in the very midst of such a tempest, as it once was when he descended on Sinai! Will Professor S. ask *how such* brightness can destroy? His plea of ignorance here is more than weakness. Nor can he relieve himself by assigning, as he has done, to the word *destroy*, *áπoλλύω*, the meaning of *annihilation*, as its only proper *literal* signification. For the proper or literal idea of the word destroy, is to pull down, to level in ruins, to dissolve and reduce to its original elements, to disturb and disarrange existing order and organization, always according to the nature of the thing of which it is predicated. The idea of *annihilation* is altogether philosophical, or I should say, anti-philosophical, and forms no part of the literal import of the English word *destroy*, or of the Greek word *áπoλλύω*. Fire consumes and destroys, but it does not annihilate. When the disciples asked, "Lord wilt thou that we *command* fire to come down from heaven, and *consume* them, as Elias did?"—*áπoλέσαι αὐτούς*—Luke ix. 54, they meant to be literally understood, and to destroy the Samaritans as literally as at Elias's command, "there came down fire from heaven, and consumed him and his fifty," 2 Kings i. 10; i. e., the captain and his company; but in all this, neither the idea nor the fact of *anni-*

hilation forms part and parcel of the literal import of the expression. Professor S. has attempted to be witty here in the most awkward manner.

> Ludere qui nescit, campestribus abstinet armis,
> Indoctusque pilæ discive, trochive quiescit,
> Ne spissæ risum tollant impune coronæ.
>
> The man, who knows not how with art to wield
> The sportive weapons of the martial field,
> The bounding ball, round quoit, or whirling troque,
> Will but the laughter of the crowd provoke.

CHAPTER XI.

PROFESSOR STUART'S ADROITNESS, ETC. IN EVADING A MAIN QUESTION.

A VERY important and essential inquiry kept in view throughout the Dissertations is, whether the Scriptural idea and account of the day of judgment are not, in many respects, much more extended, comprehensive, and widely different from the popular notion of a mere judiciary trial for personal retributions. I have admitted that this limited, floating, ill-designed, and generally prevalent idea, of the nature of the day of judgment, if assumed, will render it exceedingly difficult, yea impossible, to harmonize the predictions of the prophets relative to the day of judgment by the literal system of interpretation, and indeed I may add by any other. I have nevertheless assumed, that they can be harmonized, and stated some reasons why it is found difficult to do so.

God is the author of order and not of confusion, and therefore, if there are to us apparent inconsistencies and contradictions in the Scriptural account of the day of judgment, it is but fair and right to conclude that they are owing, not to the fact of there being such things in the system of prophecy, but that we have neither rightly apprehended the meaning of the prophets, nor seen the different parts and provisions of God's wondrous plan from the same point or in the same light in which they did. We find difficulty in harmonizing the historical accounts of the resurrection of Christ, given us by the Evangelists; yet is it not impossible to do so. How much more difficult, however, must it be, where the future, and not the past, becomes the theme of investigation?

In the twelfth chapter of the Dissertations, I have attempted to compare the different accounts of the day of judgment given by Daniel, Christ, Paul, and John, especially the more extended account of the Saviour, in the 25th chapter of Matthew. Two very different ideas have been apprehended by biblical students, as to what is the scriptural view of the nature of the day of judgment. One is, that it will be a very short or limited period, during which the dead in all ages, and the living, will be all promiscuously gathered, in one vast assembly, before Jesus Christ the Judge, to be tried and to receive their final and eternal sentence. One portion, the righteous, being separated from the wicked and placed on the right hand, called *the sheep*, the other, the wicked, on the left hand, called *the goats*, to whom respectively, in their universal collections or segregations, the awards of grace and of justice, which fix their condition for eternity, shall be simultaneously made. The other idea is, that the Scriptures do not give this account of the day of judgment; but that it is properly and strictly a new dispensation, viz. that of the kingdom of Heaven actually come upon the earth, introduced by the visible manifestation of Christ with his raised saints, as the Avenger and Judge of his people; at which time the nations then existing, in their character as organized bodies, or masses of men in national bonds and relations, shall be judged and punished as their crimes shall deserve; those denominated antichristian, who had opposed and persecuted the people of God, shall be judged and destroyed; the remnant of the Jewish race converted, collected, and established in the land promised to their forefathers; the Theocracy revived; and the reign of Jesus Christ, and of his associated and raised saints, as his subordinate agencies, and as administrators in some new, peculiar, and to us inconceivable yet glorious manner, appropriate to their spiritual and glorified condition, be extended over the earth, in a blessed

and wonderful system of rule or judgment, during which Satan shall exert no influence among men. This dispensation, after having continued a thousand years, shall be succeeded by the last effort of satanic and human wickedness, issuing in the utter destruction of the conspirators in the final acts of retributive justice, in the judgment of the dead and living, in the eternal expulsion of Satan and of his hosts from this world, in the eternal retributions of the wicked, and in the eternal state of peace, glory, and felicity, when this world, renewed, refashioned, and restored to its pristine glorious and good condition, shall be the abode of righteousness, and the mediatorial kingdom of Jesus Christ give place to the direct, immediate reign of Heaven, in which "God shall be all and in all," and death for ever cease its ravages. This is but the most rapid sketch of the great scenes comprehended in *the day* or *dispensation of judgment*, lasting for one thousand years, and dwelling into exercise not only the judiciary, but the legislative and executive functions of Jesus Christ, our Judge and Lawgiver and King.

I have endeavored to show that this idea of the Millennium, being itself *the day of judgment*, the dispensation of Heaven's rule, is that which naturally grows out of the grammatico-historical interpretation of the prophecies, renders all that the prophets and apostles have predicted perfectly harmonious, and is in accordance with the fair and legitimate import of Christ's language in the 24th and 25th chapters of Matthew, and their parallel passages in the other Evangelists, thus interpreted. Prof. S. has not dropped a hint, that such a difference exists as to the scriptural import of the day of judgment. On the contrary, the idea of the Millennium being itself the prolonged and glorious judgment-day, he has studiously concealed, and represents me as making a great effort "to remove the great stumbling-block to" (my) "system," as he chooses to call it, viz., "the

day of judgment and the coming of the Son of Man, when this day shall be ushered in." App. p. 171. All that I have to say in reply, is, that he *chooses* to use the word judgment, in his own limited and assumed sense,—keeps back what I declare to be the scriptural idea, and then, carrying his own idea along with him,—as though mine too was identical with his,—attempts to point out, and sneer at, my alleged inconsistencies. I leave honourable men to judge of such a method of evading a main question at issue, not doubting what their judgment will be.

I am not at present concerned to establish these views. The reader may consult what I have written, and Prof. S. is respectfully requested, not in the spirit of his "strictures," but in Christian courtesy and calm investigation, to review the subject, and to say what are, and what he has to support, *his* ideas of the day of judgment, as well as what are the fallacies, in the application of the principles of grammatico-historical interpretation, that bring out from the prophetic writings the idea of the kingdom of Heaven, and the Millennial state, being *the new dispensation of judgment*, in the multiform varieties and administration of governmental rule or dominion, commencing at the Saviour's coming, but prolonged, until it is perfected in the consummation of this world's redemption from the tyranny of the devil. It concerns me only to notice the few specimens of what I must call, without meaning any personal disrespect, either his misapprehension of the whole subject, or misrepresentation of my language and argument.

"The sum of" (my) "results," he says, "is as follows: (1.) The nations in the flesh, and such *only* as have persecuted the Jews and the Church (p. 364), are to be gathered, judged, and destroyed; and this judgment is to last through centuries," p. 366. The reader would suppose from this, that I taught that the divine retributive punishment of the nations devoted to destruction, which is the sense in which

he uses the words judge and judgment, as here applied, is to be in a *course of infliction for centuries*. I have not so written or taught. Prof. S. has jumbled together his own conceits, not my statements.

On page 364, I am tracing the resemblance between Christ's account of the judgment, and Ezekiel's, in ch. xxxiv., on "the Gentile nations for having scattered his people abroad," &c., that is, the retributive judgments or punishment inflicted on them. On p. 366 I am speaking of the Millennial dispensation, as the great day or dispensation of judgment, according to the view already stated, of its being the entire, varied, and extended dominion of Christ and his saints. Prof. S. has confounded these things, and thus misrepresented the views expressed.

He continues, "(2.) No resurrection of the wicked precedes this judgment, but only the resurrection of saints."—If he means, by "this judgment" the *Dispensation* of judgment, or Dominion of Christ and His saints, introduced by Christ's coming, the resurrection of his saints, and the destruction of the antichristian nations, he has stated my views correctly. If he means by "this judgment," his own notion of the day of judgment, then he has misrepresented them; for I believe with him, that, at the termination of the 1000 years, the wicked shall be raised, and all shall be judged.

In the third particular about the visible dominion of Christ and his saints on this earth, if "by arranging and governing the new terrestrial kingdom," he means "the kingdom of Heaven," as I have taught, in its own glorious, peculiar and wonderful adaptation to the circumstances of the occasion, and the design of Heaven, he has stated my views correctly; but if he means any thing else by the phrase "new terrestrial kingdom," he has misrepresented them.

He thinks that little or no comment, on his part, is necessary, to expose "this effort of Mr. D.," as he calls it; but adventures, in a futile effort—(I was about to characterize it

more severely,)—to convict me of having contradicted the Saviour. "(1.) Christ himself," he remarks, "says, that 'he will come in his glory, *with all his holy angels*,' when he is about to sit upon his throne of judgment. Mat. xxv. 31. Mr. D. says, that he will come with all his *saints*, thus making ἄγγελοι (angels) to mean *holy men* or *saints*." On the next page, referring to the same thing, he adds; "he violates *the idiom* of the Greek, by making *angels* into *saints*." There is something too little in this sort of criticism almost to deserve notice. As a specimen alike of candour and scholarship it merits the severest rebuke. I have heard of a certain Professor who commenced a *series* of intended classical publications, with the Tusculan questions enriched *cum notis et annotationibus*, whose errors, and ignorance of *Latin* idioms, were so glaringly exposed by another more erudite Professor, as to make him desist from the enterprise. What Prof. S. means by "the *idiom* of the Greek" being violated by my translating οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι, the holy messengers, i. e. the saints, which I have supported by reasons stated, I will not undertake to say, but I must ask something better than an ex cathedra judgment, from one reproved for ignorance of Latin idioms, before I submit to be thus condemned.

The word ἄγγελος (angel) denotes, generically, a *messenger*; οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι means *the holy messengers*. Prof. S. must prove that invariably, in Greek, this last phrase, οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι, means the immaterial, spiritual beings employed as messengers by God, appellatively and distinctively called οἱ ἄγγελοι, *the angels*, before he can charge me with having violated the Greek idiom by an attempt to show from parallel passages of Scripture that "the holy messengers or angels" οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι, spoken of in Matt. xxv. 31, are not this class of messengers, but the saints. He must also show, that these latter *cannot* ever be employed as messengers. He can do neither of these things.

On p. 382 of the Dissertations, the reader will find a criticism on this subject, supported with reasons, showing that parallel passages of Scripture raise the strong presumption, at least, that the angels or messengers who shall attend the presence of Christ at His coming, and when seated on his throne, will be the saints, the holy ones, of whom Enoch, Jude v. 14, and Zachariah xiv. 5, prophesied. Prof. S. has taken no notice of this at all, but *says* I have *violated the Greek idiom!!* Now the words in Mat. xxv. 31, are *οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι μετ' αὐτοῦ, the holy angels with him.* It is not *οἱ ἄγγελοι*, appellatively and emphatically THE ANGELS, as he would evidently, but falsely—I do not say designedly—lead the English reader to think. Winer, in his Idioms of the language of the New Testament, will tell him, that words *qualifying* nouns, which have the article, are placed either between the article and noun or after the noun, if the qualifying terms be adjectives or nouns with prepositions: *ἅγιοι*, therefore, in Matt. xxv. 31, is the *qualification* of the *ἄγγελοι*, *messengers* that shall attend the coming of Christ—their peculiar, distinctive property, or honour.

According to the common use of the word, *ἅγιοι* in the New Testament, used adjectively, denotes *holy*, and as a noun, *saints*; it is the special quality of God's elect, i. e., of His saints. In the present case it qualifies the angels or messengers, as *the holy—the saint-messengers*. Luke ix. 26 is a parallel passage with this, affording a like example. But in Mark viii. 38, another parallel passage, we have an example of the second method of arranging the words according to the Greek idiom stated by Winer, viz., the qualifying noun or adjective occurring after a preposition, *μετὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων τῶν ἁγίων; with the angels or messengers, the holy ones or saints.* In the one case, Matt. xxv. 31, it is *the saint-messengers*; in the other, Mark viii. 38, *the messenger saints.*

We can see a very sufficient reason for the use of *ἅγιοι*

and ἁγίων in this connection, as the words designate who are to be the attendant messengers of Christ at His coming, when he takes his seat, and while sitting on his throne.—There is none whatever in Prof. S.'s supposition, that *the angels*, appellatively and emphatically so called, the incorporeal, spiritual beings of another order of intelligence from the saints, are here spoken of. Moreover, I call upon him to produce *one single passage* in the New Testament where *they* are *thus* designated and called, emphatically and denominationally, *the holy angels*—οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι. He will find one case, Acts x. 22, where Cornelius is said to have been warned by one special messenger, ὑπὸ ἀγγέλου ἁγίου, and other Greek forms, such as οἱ ἄγγελοι τῶν οὐρανῶν, &c., but never except in the cases where I say, according to Winer, the Greek idiom designates a special, distinctive qualification of the messengers of Christ. Prof. S. has assumed, and referred to the very texts in dispute in proof, that the phrase, *the holy angels*, οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι, is applied to the angels of Heaven, the angels of God, i. e., the incorporeal spirits of a different order of intelligence from the saints. This is begging the question.

If Prof. S. means to say, that I have violated the idiom of the Greek, as his language expressly declares, by making ἄγγελοι alone, or simply and emphatically, refer to the saints, and as thus *translating the* word, he says what is not the fact, and deceives his reader. He has his choice here, either of gross misrepresentation, or of excessive and highly censurable carelessness. If he means to say that I violated the idiom of the Greek, by my explanation of the passages referred to, where the phrases οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι or τῶν ἀγγέλων τῶν ἁγίων, *the holy messengers*, or *the messengers the saints*, occur, then I leave those who can appreciate the value and accuracy of Winer, on the idioms of the New Testament, to say whether he is not the transgressor here,

and not I. If the reader thinks this to be severe, I have no other apology to offer, than the remark of Juvenal.

> Omne animi vitium tanto conspectius in se
> Crimen habet, quanto major, qui præerat, habetur.
> The fault, so much the worse, is always deemed,
> As he that errs, for greatness is esteemed.

I give another specimen of Prof. S.'s misrepresentations. He says, App. p. 171: "(2.) Christ says no more about the resurrection of the bodies of *saints* here, than he does about that of *sinners*. He says in truth nothing of either; knowing of course, that the mass of his hearers took the resurrection for granted." If he means to say that I have said the contrary, he is not sustained by the fact. I have said, however, that the *οἱ ἅγιοι ἄγγελοι*, the holy messengers, whom He brings with Him, according to "the Greek idiom" are the saints; and of course, if that be the fact, the resurrection of their bodies occurs at this epoch, seeing it is explicitly taught by Paul, 1 Thess. v. 16, who asserts a *priority* of the resurrection of the saints, but *how long*, whether one hour or one thousand years before the wicked, says not. If Prof. S. says *simultaneously* or *immediately after*, let him *prove* it, especially before he charges me with error here, as he has done.

A third and still more glaring specimen of misrepresentation occurs in what follows: "(3.) Christ says that *all nations* are to be gathered before him; Mr. D. says that *only persecutors* of Jewish Christians are *to be judged*, and these while *in the flesh*." There must be some unaccountable obtuseness of perception in Prof. S.'s mind, to admit of his being betrayed into such unfounded assertions. He knows, or, if he reads with ordinary attention what I have written, he could not fail to know, that I have not used, as synonymous, the words "gathered before Him," and "judged," as he has done. The reader will see in the Dis-

sertations, pp. 343, &c., a careful examination of the import of the expression, "gathered before Him," and reasons also to show that it cannot mean *the universal promiscuous resurrection of the dead*, but something very different. Prof. S. pays no attention to this; but, assuming his own notion of the process of the day of judgment to be correct and scriptural, he uses *it* for the purpose of charging me with having contradicted the blessed Redeemer.

I appeal here to his own sense of justice, and to every honourable mind, to say, what such conduct should be called. I have not denied, that all nations shall be gathered before the Saviour,—not even in Prof. Stuart's sense of a final, promiscuous, universal resurrection of the dead. I have not said that *only persecutors* of Jews and Christians are to be *judged*, and these while *in the flesh*. I challenge him to the proof of his assertions, and charge him with having, either totally misapprehended the plain and obvious import of my language and remarks, or with having egregiously misrepresented me, and deceived his reader.

I give the reader another specimen. "The separation" says Prof. S. "of the two parties—sheep and goats—is affirmed by Christ to be complete, universal, and of eternal duration, Matt. xxv. 32–46: Mr. D. makes it *the work of centuries*, a long and difficult and gradual process, and finally extends it *only* to persecutors of Jews and Christians." Before he can charge me with contradicting the Saviour, he should have proved *first*, that *the separation* of which Christ speaks, between the sheep and goats, is that of individuals, and not of nations; *second*, that it takes place instantaneously; *third*, that it occurs at the time of the universal resurrection of the dead, of which John speaks, Rev. xx. 1—6. This he has not even attempted.

I have shown, see Dissertations p. 342, 343, 359,—365, that there are such radical differences between the account of Christ's separating between the sheep and the goats, and

John's account of the final day of retribution after the Millennium, when the dead, small and great, shall be personally judged, is to prove they cannot refer to the same identical scenes and transactions. And as to *the process of separation* being *the work of centuries*, &c., as Prof. S. affirms that I teach, all I have to say is, that I have done no such thing, and challenge him to the proof. Were I disposed to adopt Prof. Stuart's style of argument, by which he seeks to convict me of contradicting Christ, and to apply it to him, how easy would it be for me to make out, a far stronger, and more striking case against him, than he has attempted against me!

Thus Professor S. has said (1,) that there will be one general, universal, and, if not simultaneous, at least rapidly succeeding, resurrection and congregating of the righteous and the wicked before the throne of God. But Paul says the dead in Christ shall rise *first*. And John says the souls of the martyrs "lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years, *but the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished.*" Rev. xx. 4, 5.

(2.) Professor S. says that there will and can be *no visible kingdom of Christ and his raised saints* ON THE EARTH; but the glorified saints themselves, redeemed to God out of every kindred and tongue and people and nation, say, "Christ hath made us unto our God kings and priests; and WE SHALL REIGN ON THE EARTH." Rev. v. 9, 10.

(3.) Professor S. says that Jesus Christ will not come in the clouds of heaven personally and visibly to establish his kingdom on the earth. But Daniel says, "I beheld one like the Son of Man *come with the clouds* of heaven, &c., and there *was given him* dominion, and glory, and A KINGDOM, that all people, nations, and languages should serve Him." Dan. vii. 13, 14. Other examples might be added. I have just as good a right to *assume* as he has. If he accounts it unjust thus to charge him, what, I ask, makes that unjust to

ward him that is not toward me? He actually, without show of argument, assumes. I have done no such thing, but supported my positions by Scriptural argument, and critical, philological, exegetical exposition.

The reader is now prepared to see how perfectly gratuitous are Professor S.'s charges against me, of contradicting Christ, of violating the Greek idiom, of foisting in this or that, to meet my purpose,—of making "the process (and of course the punishment) a mere temporal and terrestrial matter," and of continuing the connection of the sheep and goats for *centuries* after a final and eternal separation is asserted by Christ to be made. What "process" Professor S. means, whether of the resurrection, or judgment, or what, he does not say, nor can any one divine from his language. But he asks, "What shall we say now to such argumentation as this?" That is, as he has stated it to be. I answer, it is all false—the creations of his own excited and perturbed fancy—and say, in relation to his dreamings, in his own words: "It would be difficult to find in any or all the adventurous works on the prophecies, which have hitherto made their appearance, any thing which exceeds this, either in *boldness of assertion*, or *in unfounded and presumptuous criticism and philology*." App. p. 172.

He assumes certain things to be true, which he has not proved, nor attempted to prove; he applies his assumptions to my definitions, criticisms and exposition of the Saviour's language; he "foists into the account just so much and no more," of my real meaning, "as suits his purpose," and, as it were saying unto me,

> Udum et molle tatum es—
>
> Soft and moist clay thou art—

he works up the vessel to dishonour, for his own and readers' entertainment. "All that is said," says he, "in Scripture with respect to his (Christ's) coming to destroy Jerusa-

lem, and coming to vindicate his chosen, &c., is applied by him, with little exception, to the anti-Millennial coming of Christ, and applied in what he names the *literal* sense." App. p. 172. It remains for Professor S. to prove, that the Scriptures ever speak of Christ's *coming* in the sense HE *here* ASSUMES they do, and that the passages I have cited, in proof of his second visible personal coming, mean what HE SAYS they do. He is not allowed thus to try the question in dispute, and then turn round, impertinently, and raise the shout of victory: He may think he has perfectly triumphed, and sent through the length and breadth of the land, such a version of my views as will secure from the hundred trumpet tongues of crying fame my unavoidable overpowering condemnation, so as to make me regret the folly and rashness of which he has accused me; but

Conscia mens recti, famæ mendacia ridet.

The mind with conscious sense of right,
May hear the crowd its thoughts revile,
While in its calm sustaining might,
At all the lies of fame can smile.

CHAPTER XII.

PROF. STUART'S CHARGES OF THE WANT OF EXPLICITNESS.

THE reader, by this time, will not fail to be surprised that a writer, who is himself so loose, and far from being explicit, should bring a charge of this nature against another, who thus far at least has shown, that with what other things he may be charged this is not appropriate. But that surprise will quickly cease, when he learns that the charge is not founded so much upon what has been, as upon what has not been written.

His *first* count is, that in giving the general outline of the Millenarian's views of scriptural prophecy—one item of which is the expectation of a revived Theocracy in this world, having Jerusalem for its centre and capital, and extending as efficiently and fully its blessings to all the nations of the earth, as the old Jewish Theocracy did to the tribes of Israel,—I spoke only of "rites of worship adapted to the dispensation in which Jerusalem and the Jewish nation are to stand pre-eminent among the nations," and did not "say plainly," as he would have me, "that the *Levitical ritual* of sacrifices, and offerings, and ceremonies, is to be *reinstated*." This he has been pleased to ask his reader to "observe," as proof, "how guardedly" I have expressed myself, lest perchance Prof. S. or somebody else might convict me of "a point blank contradiction of what the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has affirmed and taught."

Now this is a grievous charge. In reply to it, it were enough for me to state, that the charge, true or false, has nothing whatever to do with the leading object and arguments of the Dissertations. I have undertaken to investi-

gate the language and statements of the prophets relative to the second coming of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and affirmed and taught, that the fair, candid, and consistent application of the true principles of grammatico-historical interpretation, bring out, as the result, that that coming will be pre-millennial. In doing so, I have incidentally given an outline of the views of Millenarians, one item of whose belief is, that a Theocracy shall be established in the world. To give the details of their views, the arguments in support of them, my own views and reasonings, or any appeal to the Scriptures on the subject, I have not even attempted; because not necessary to the general argument, nor embraced in the specific object of the Dissertations. And yet, for not doing this, I am accused of the "*want of explicitness.*" But how does he attempt to establish this charge? By direct quotations of any thing I have written? By a careful analysis of any of my arguments? By fair and legitimate inferences from any positions I have advanced? By no means. This would have been a very explicit and honourable mode of procedure. But the reader will be disappointed, if he expects any such thing. It is by a process quite tortuous and complicated, the very reverse of this, that Prof. S. attempts to establish his charge of a want of explicitness against me.

First, he assumes that the Jews will not be restored to their former relation to God, return to Palestine, and enjoy the benefits of a theocratic government. See App. p. 174. All the point and force of his objection against what he calls my "views and system," are in this assumption. With far more assurance of truth and propriety of argument than he has exhibited when he charges me with contradicting Christ and Paul, might I charge him with "neither more nor less than a point blank contradiction of what the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has affirmed and taught," on the express authority of the Spirit of God speaking

by Jeremiah the prophet, that, by the very covenant described by the latter, referred to and in part quoted by the former, God has stipulated and pledged Himself that *if* the sun and moon, those ordinances of God, depart from before Him, *then* the seed of Israel shall *cease from being a nation* for ever." Behold, the days come, saith the Lord that *the city shall be built* to the *Lord* from the tower of Hananeel unto the gate of the corner, and it shall *not* be plucked up nor thrown down *any more for ever.* Jer. xxxi. 31—40.

I am not now going to argue this point. The restoration and return of the Jews to Palestine, their conversion and re-establishment in their own land *as a nation*, are points so clearly, fully, explicitly taught in the Bible, that nothing but the most ingenious efforts, not of criticism, but metaphysical, philosophical exposition, and allegorizing the predictions, can set aside the scriptural evidence on this point. Prof. S. has the countenance and support of few compared with the mass. He and Mr. Miller, with his followers, stand here precisely on the same ground, and adopt the same principles of interpretation. He is infinitely nearer to them whom he so severely denounces than I.

The only important difference I see between them is, that Mr. Miller, with precisely the views of Prof. S. as to the nature of the day of judgment, brings it here in a few months—before the Millennium—while the latter defers it till after the one thousand years; and that while Mr. Miller makes the righteous rise one thousand years before the wicked, Prof. S. brings them all out of their graves simultaneously.

It is enough for me to take such passages as Deut. xxx. 1—10, xxxii. 26—43, Jer. xxxii. 36—44, xxxiii. 7—26; Ezek. xxxvii. 20—28; Zech. x. 6—12, xii. 2—4, and others parallel with them, and having learnod, by those parts of the predictions already fulfilled, the principles of interpretation, that they have been verified in literal historical realities, according to the plain grammatico-historical meaning of the language

apply the very same principles to the parts not yet fulfilled, and look for the literal historical reality of the events predicted. It is insulting the understanding of men, to tell us, that they have been all actually already fulfilled, and allegorize, philosophize, and generalize, to make them suit this or the other theory or speculation. Prof. S., in so doing, is guilty of the very thing he so justly and severely reprobates and condemns in his Hints. It will cost him a vast amount of time and labour; and I may say to him,

> Sæpe stilum vertas, iterum quæ digna legisint
> Scripturus—
>
> Would you the reader's just esteem engage,
> Correct with frequent care your blotted page—

before he can prove, what now he so dogmatically and authoritatively assumes, that the prophets did not mean to teach the literal restoration and re-establishment of Judah and Israel, in the land which "God covenanted with their fathers to give to them for an everlasting possession," but meant something entirely and fundamentally different from the plain, grammatical import of their language.

Having, however, assumed this, in order to make good his charge, his next step, which we have already seen he is wont to take, is to excite prejudice against my alleged views, by telling the reader to observe my extreme caution "not to appear flatly to contradict an epistle which is mainly occupied with taking down and removing that very building which Mr. D. *covertly* endeavors to rear up and adorn anew." App. p. 175. Having thus prepossessed the reader's mind with false views and prejudices, he comes to the direct proof—all turning upon the meaning he chooses to give to the terms *theocracy* and *rites of worship*, which I have used in stating the views of certain Millenarian writers. "Observe how guardedly this is expressed" by him: "A *Theocracy* and *rites of worship* CANNOT FAIRLY mean, IN THE IDIOM OF THEOLOGIANS AND CRITICS,

any thing *less* than this;" that is, as he most unequivocally means to be understood, the *identical Mosaic, Levitical rites*, which Paul says "serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things," and are "the figures of the true." "The hasty reader," he admits, "may not, perhaps, at first view, discern it;" that is, what he charges on me, and, therefore, forsooth, he must resort to "*the idiom* of theologians and critics, to determine what a Theocracy and rites of worship must mean. This is a new rule for the interpretation of Scripture, which may suit the dark ages of popery, when for centuries they had the only key, and it was the prescriptive right of theologians and critics to say what the Bible did mean: but it will be laughed to scorn by the sober, intelligent, reflecting laymen and members of the church, who, however they may render the honour which may be due to "theologians and critics," will never consent to adopt their idiom in order to determine what a *Theocracy* and *rites of worship*, or any thing else revealed in the Scripture, *cannot* or *must not* mean. By the aid of this new rule of interpretation, proposed for the special benefit of biblical professors, theologians and critics, he brings out his conclusion, and fixes on me, as he thinks indelibly, his accusation: "In so many words, plain and unequivocal, the Old Testament, repeatedly, and in a great variety of ways, (I mean, of course, when it is *literally* interpreted, as Mr. D. would have it in other places,) declares the renewal of the *Levitical rites* in connection with the return of the Jews." Here we are at issue on a point of fact. I say it does not: nor do the passages in Isaiah lxvi. 16—24, or Ezekiel xliv. and seq., to which Prof. S. refers.

I admit that Jerusalem, and the temple, shall be rebuilt and a new division of Palestine take place for the tribes, and that the special ordinances detailed by Ezekiel, "even the very measures of the city, temple, and possessions of the Levites, as also the names of the city gates and every

thing of this nature, are all drawn out with exactness, like the diagram of a building, or of a plot of ground; so that any doubt as to what is to be the future arrangement of all these matters, is out of the question on the literal ground of Mr. D." App. p. 175. But what then? It is a perfect *non sequitur*, which Prof. S. draws by way of inference, *therefore* the *identical Theocracy* and ritual of Moses, shall be revived. Has he never read and compared Ezekiel and Leviticus, and seen the wonderful difference? A Theocracy, with a ritual of commemorative sacrifices, and institutions, devoid of any mortal high priest, especially adapted to the state of things in the world, to be developed in the providence of God on the restoration of the Jews, and in every respect much more glorious, cannot be called the same identical economy of Moses, which Paul says was but a type and shadow of that which was to come, the commandment of which previously given has been disannulled for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, now that the true High Priest, *after the order of Melchizedec*, has "not entered into the holy places made with hands, the figures of the true, but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us"—and where he is discharging for us the offices of High Priest within the veil, seated "on the right hand of the Majesty in the Heavens," "at the right hand of the throne of God," "after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God, from henceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool," when He shall return, Priest and King upon *his own* throne, and give his raised saints, to sit down with Him on His throne, as He is now sat down with His Father on *his* throne. If Prof. S. thinks, that any sacrificial rites, or theocratic institutions, are inconsistent in themselves, let him show what greater impropriety there is, or can be, in commemorative sacrifices, than in prospective sacrifices. But it is not for him or for me to judge here. The question is, what saith

the Lord? We must guard against any preconceived notions whatever; any assumptions and postulates of our own, and inquire at the mouth of the Lord, applying to the interpretation of His language, the principles which He himself hath taught us, and sanctioned by his holy providence, fulfilling the predictions as far as the dispensations of his grace have been developed in this world.

He thinks to terrify me, by his inferences, and doubtless has persuaded himself, that I have studied reserve, if not something worse, on this subject, for which he charges me with want of explicitness. I fear not to follow, where the Spirit of Christ leads. I am under no apprehensions about the results, that will flow from the principles of interpretation, which God Himself has authorized to be applied to his word. I care not here to defend the position into which he thinks he has driven me.

I have said and taught that the Millennial dispensation, as set forth in the word of God, is a new dispensation, miraculously to be introduced, as all the former were, having its own peculiar, glorious, and wonderful features, which, however Prof. S. and I may be unable to understand now, the day itself will abundantly declare. I value, infinitely more, the word of Jesus Christ, than all the philosophy and sophistry of the schools; and dread nothing more, than to exalt my preconceived opinions of the nature of things, as a standard or rule, by which to judge of the glorious things, "which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, and of which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive." I confide implicitly in the wisdom of Jesus Christ, and the perfect knowledge he has of human nature, and the ease and success with which he can adapt his own institutions and arrangements, to the compound nature of man, and bring the benign sway of Heaven to bear directly on this revolted world, when the time comes for Satan to be violently expelled, retributive justice executed on the nations, and the

Kingdom of Heaven established in its visibility on this earth.

I know no safe depositary of power, among mortal men, for the purposes of government. Tyranny and oppression, in church and state, under every form and organization of government, social, civil, ecclesiastical, monarchical, aristocratical or democratic, have sooner or later characterized the governments of earth, and have done so from the beginning of this fallen world. Nor do I see, from any experience of the past, from any developments at the present, from any peculiarities in our own republican system and church organizations, any pledge, security, or reasonable prospect, that the existing nations of the earth, in their governmental character and capacity, are ever going to be brought under the dominion of Jesus Christ, by the simple, faithful preaching of the gospel of the grace of God. The gospel has been preached for 1800 years, and powerful revivals of religion, and great and extensive reformations have occurred; but where is there, or has there been a solitary nation, which, in its organization, legislation, administration of justice, execution of law, and prosecution of its interests, has recognized the supremacy of Jesus Christ, owned and honoured His sway, and given a specimen of what many persuade themselves the preaching of the gospel is destined to accomplish morally, socially, politically, and nationally, in this world? The sheet-anchor of the world's security and ultimate blessedness is in the covenant of peace, announced to Abraham, ratified to him, and confirmed to all that have like precious faith with him.

It is the sway of Heaven alone, that can redeem this fallen world. Mortal men are not safe depositaries of power. The saints, that have been disciplined by affliction, that have suffered in this world, and by the grace of God have been taught to deny themselves, that have been subsequently trained in Heaven, and rendered incapable of ambition, envy,

pride, malice, revenge, &c., and shall be associated with Jesus Christ Himself, as his kings and priests, living and reigning with Him, can be safely intrusted with the dominion of the nations. And when my Bible tells me that at the coming of Christ, the corrupt powers of earth shall be destroyed, and the power and the kingdom, and the greatness of the dominion under the whole Heaven shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High, I rejoice in the prospect, and rest upon the promise, and the covenant of God, and while I feel anxious to tell, to every mortal living, the good news, to preach the gospel of the kingdom, and to save as many as possible from the wrath to come, I trouble not myself about any difficulties or inconsistencies that may occur in my imaginings; but rest assured, that the blessed Redeemer will do all things well, and accomplish, to the very letter, all His plans, and all that He has promised. Prof. S. may smile or sneer at my faith, just as he pleases, but I defer with infinitely greater reverence, to the authority that has enjoined us to "be followers of them who through faith and patience inherit the promises."

The reader will perceive, therefore, from this frank exposure of the feelings of my heart, how little I am affected by, and how utterly out of place and imbecile I regard, his complaints, and the numerous questions which Professor S. has propounded on pp. 175, 176, in reference to the minute detailed state of things, to arise in this world, under the new dispensation. Conjecture might be busy; but it would not profit. All I have to say is, that his questions might be multiplied without end, and ninety-nine hundredths of them, like those he has already propounded, will resolve themselves into censurable ignorance, discontented curiosity, or carping censoriousness.

> Percontatorem fugito nam garrulus idem iste.
>
> Th' impertinent be sure to hate;
> Who loves to ask, will love to prate;

is an admonition extremely appropriate. But lest the reader may think that I am disposed to evade his questions, I remark, that already has he his answer, as to all that I have not told about Jerusalem to be rebuilt, the new or heavenly Jerusalem, where it alights, who live there beside Christ, and what sort of intercourse or relation they maintain. The specific topic of the book did not require it. Some of his questions I have already answered, by showing that they are founded on absolute misstatements of what I have said, particularly those which he has marshalled under No. (10.)

To this I may add, that, if the entire dispensation is miraculous, utterly beyond any thing we know in the present stage of human developments, it were impertinent to propound inquiries, based on our limited knowledge and experience. Paul, who had a glimpse of the heavenly state, whether in the body or out of the body he could not tell, but who was caught up to paradise, lets us know, that what he heard was incommunicable. Professor S. may find himself trespassing on a province, that pertains not to him, by indulging his inquisitiveness. Yet still, I may add, that, if he will but read and study the prophetic scriptures, in the simplicity of faith, with an humble, teachable, and prayerful spirit, applying the principles of interpretation God has sanctioned, instead of philosophy falsely so called, he will learn a great deal of which he is now ignorant, to enlighten his mind as well as to refresh and comfort his heart. It is an admonition, not for purposes of style, but inestimable information, that I care not how often or how earnestly it is pressed upon myself; and there want not indications in Professor S.'s Hints, that it is, at least, as appropriate to him as to myself:

Vos exemplaria (ista)
Nocturnâ versate manu, versate diurnâ.

Make more the (prophets) your supreme delight,
Read them by day and study them by night.

CHAPTER XIII.

PROF. STUART'S CHARGE OF "APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES AND INCONGRUITIES."

THIS is the *second* count, in his bill of complaints against "Mr. D.'s statements." The reader will observe, that it is even more guarded than the other. Whatever inconsistencies and incongruities, he thinks he has detected, he ventures no further than to call them "*apparent*." It is the commonest thing imaginable, for *apparent* inconsistencies to be discovered, on a closer and more candid examination, to be *but apparent*, not real. The infidel and skeptic charges them upon the apostles, and prophets, and Christ Himself. The Bible in their view is but a tissue of "inconsistencies and incongruities."

In attending to a charge of this sort, therefore, we must always have regard to the temper and design of the accuser. He may look through a distempered medium,—may have on magnifying or "coloured glasses," or have the very organs of vision imperfectly developed, so as to "see men as trees walking." The reader is prepared to believe, by this time, that many of Prof. Stuart's alleged apparent inconsistencies in "Mr. D.'s statements," that is, as they appear to him, may be accounted for, by the influence of his own imperfect vision, and the distorted medium through which he contemplates them.

In reply to this charge, it may be proper to remark, that Prof. S. has, in some instances, assumed as true, what is denied, and what he has not attempted to prove; and on these false assumptions, founds his charge of inconsistency, &c. If I should assume a white man to be black, or an innocent man to be guilty, I should discern a multitude of

apparent inconsistencies in him. In other instances, his charges are founded on his own misapprehension of their views, which I have attempted to sketch in the general outline. I may hear the opinions of a man but partially reported, and differing with him entirely in my own views, on the general subject, while I attribute my opinions also to him, his own may appear to me, nothing but a bundle of inconsistencies. It behooves me, in such a case, to see well to it, that I make myself fully acquainted with his opinions, and not attribute mine to him, before I attempt to charge him with inconsistency.

In other instances Prof. Stuart's charges grow wholly out of his utter ignorance of the writings and views of those whose views I have rapidly sketched in the general outline. Had he read them, he would have seen his objections and charges anticipated, and met, as they encountered those, who have done precisely what he has; and therefore, as a candid man and lover of truth, he would never have revived and repeated charges of inconsistency, which had been answered to the perfect satisfaction of many who made them, and so as to revolutionize and secure the abandonment of their own opinions and the adoption of those which they had ignorantly condemned. In a word, Prof. S. has allowed himself to rear his castle of absurdities on the mere framework or scaffolding of the system he condemns. His conduct in this particular, is precisely of a piece with that of the man, entirely unacquainted with the limner's art, who, on seeing "the general outline" or sketch upon the canvass, begins to criticise, to point out deformities, and to multiply his charges of inconsistencies and incongruities, as though he had before him the full and finished picture, with all the shades and colouring and blending of features yet to be added.

He has given us in his Hints, a sketch of his own views on some points of prophetical story. Let us try his own

method in application to his own work, and see what apparent inconsistencies and incongruities we shall find there. (1.) "*The fourth beast*, in Dan. vii. 7, 8, 11, 19—26," he says, "as all must concede [?] *is the divided Grecian dominion*, which succeeded the reign of Alexander the Great." *All!*—of whom does he speak?—all critics, all expositors, all readers? If so he is very wide from the truth. *Multitudes* of writers and readers have not conceded it, do not concede it; nor have they ever felt, that any thing now or heretofore said in favour of it, induced any obligation to do so, but just the contrary.

How can the fourth beast be the divided *Grecian* dominion? How can that which was divided into *ten* kingdoms be identical with the empire divided into *four*? Where will he produce a parallel passage in the Scriptures proving *a beast* to be the symbol of a dismembered empire? What propriety is there in making the symbol of *one beast* to denote an empire *divided* into *four* kingdoms. Prophecy is far more explicit than all this. If the beast denoted the empire—what did the *seven heads* denote? and what the *ten horns*? How was the fourth beast diverse from all that went before it? If the four kingdoms, that "succeeded the reign of Alexander the Great" is the beast, what was *his* dominion? How does Prof. S. harmonize the several members of this complicated symbol, the fourth beast? What were the *three* kingdoms preceding the Grecian? How, and when was *it* divided into *ten* kingdoms, and where is there *any agreement* between the fourth beast and the Grecian dominion, either as established by Alexander, or divided into four parts at his death by his generals? (2.) He makes Antiochus Epiphanes to be the little horn that rose up after the ten kings, as Daniel has it. Who, what, were the ten kings before him, and the three plucked up by the roots? How did Antiochus Epiphanes *prevail against the saints until* the Ancient of Days came, with the fiery stream issuing from

before him, thousand thousands ministering unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand standing before him, and the judgment was set? When, and how did all this take place, even long before the *first* coming of Christ? Who were the saints? How did they take possession of their everlasting kingdom, when that tyrant was destroyed?

(3.) He says Antiochus Epiphanes prevailed until a time, times, and a dividing of time, or 1260 days. Where is the exact fulfilment of this? How can Prof. S. reconcile his own statement with the words of the prophet? How can he prove, after insisting that the prophet MEANT *literal* days in number 1260, that "it was not his design *to be exact to a day?*" and if so, that he was not mistaken?

(4.) Prof. S. says "Dan. xii. 7 marks the *terminus ad quem* of the predictions which immediately precede it, and affirms that the *dashing in pieces*, i. e. utterly destroying or suppressing the power of the Jews, is to be referred altogether to Antiochus, no one who reads Dan. vii. 25 and xi. 21—45, and makes comparison of them with the annunciation here, can well doubt." Hints, p. 37. Now multitudes do doubt, and have doubted, and, for reasons shown, *do well to doubt*. With what spectacles therefore does he read these passages so *clearly*, as to give *him* the liberty thus to condemn every one who doubts and differs from him, as mere dolts? In what dictionary of synonymes too has he learned, that "*utterly destroyed*" means only "suppressed" the power? When and how did the resurrection spoken of in Dan. xii. 2, 3, 4, which was to take place at the time of the end, when "all these things [that is, according to Prof. S., the things spoken of before to Daniel] shall be finished"? Dan. xii. 7. What manner of agreement is there, between the prophet's predictions, and Prof. S.'s comments? Why does he confessedly contradict Daniel as to time some thirty days? Why has he not told us how Daniel stood in his lot, at the time of the end, as the angel promised? Why has he not told us the *terminus ad*

quest of the 1290 days more exactly? Does he suppose that we will be satisfied with *his* saying "it is plainly implied"? Why has he not placed in so clear a light "the correspondence of prediction and history," which he says "is *so striking* —that none *can refuse* to perceive it"? Whence did he obtain authority thus to settle the question, to suit himself, and by sweeping denunciation, condemn those that cannot see the visions of his own brain?

(5.) Professor S. has completed the fulfilment of Daniel's predictions long before Christ came. Of course he must guard against appearing to be guilty of "a point blank contradiction" of Christ, who, after he came, admonished his followers that even after his departure from earth, *they* should "*see* the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place," and recommended them which should be in "Judea, to flee into the mountains." Matt. xxiv. 15, 16. But in order to do so who gave him the right to introduce a principle of interpretation to suit himself? which he has done, when he says, that these words of Daniel, as quoted by Christ, "were *not* intended to have such an application as is made of them by interpreters," and I may add, was made of them by Christ's followers at the time, "but *only* that they described events of altogether a *similar* nature," and that "*perhaps* even more than *half* of the fulfilments spoken of in the New Testament, are of a like character." Hints, p. 102. What sort of a rule of interpretation is that which involves a *perhaps*?

(6.) Professor S. makes the beast in Rev. xiii. with seven heads and ten horns, to symbolise the persecuting power of Rome, especially as exercised by Nero. Hints, p. 115. He also tells us a long story of the superstitious impression produced by "the soothsayers," that Nero had not been killed, or would re-appear on the throne, and passes this off, no doubt by the aid of his "*perhaps*," as the fulfilment of John's prediction, that one of the heads of the beast should

be "wounded to death," but revive again, and "*all the world wonder after the beast.*" He has not told us on what authority he has assumed that John wrote the Apocalypse during Nero's reign, as he evidently implies, when he says that instead of calling the beast Nero by name, "which would have been, in connection with what he said, a *treasonable offence*," he has "*purposely* adverted to *him* in such a way, that his readers might easily know who he meant." Hints, pp. 117, 118. He did it "secretly to intimate to his readers, who was meant by the beast," by repeating those things which "*popular rumour* had spread abroad respecting him." p. 120. How does this agree with the high and independent character of John as a prophet, and with the fact of his inspiration? How does it agree with the internal evidence in the book itself, that it was not written either during Claudius' or Nero's reign? "He has not told us" how he sets aside the arguments of Woodhouse and others, showing the date of the writing of the Apocalypse to have been under Domitian, years after *these* and other things, such as the slaying of the witnesses, &c., which, according to his interpretation, John wrote as *prophecy*, had become matter of *history*? He has not told us how it lies on its very face, that the Apocalypse was written for Christians only, in the midst of a bitter and bloody persecution; nor how he even attempts to answer Dr. Cressener's demonstration, in fourteen particulars, that the fourth beast of Daniel is the same with the beast described by John!

I might swell this list, but having done enough in this "repulsive task," adopt his own language, which he most inconsistently and unjustly applies to *me*, and in which, notwithstanding he has taken special pains, once and again, to inform the reader that I have presented "*nothing* NEW," he nevertheless, now that it suits his purpose for ridicule, can, like all who love to create a laugh, contradict himself by giving me credit for novelties not rarely surpassed since the

days of Jacob Bœhman or Immanuel Swedenborg. I do it not to revile in turn, nor to retaliate, but merely to show how easy it would be to apply his own ribaldry to himself: "The one half is not yet told, but enough. Such a tissue of incongruities and inconsistencies, has rarely made its appearance before the world at any period since the days of Jacob Bœhman and Immanuel Swedenborg. How it is possible, for any sober and educated man, in possession of his reason, seriously to believe and earnestly to defend such things as these, I confess myself unable to see." I have made out by his machinery as fair a case as he has. But I am not concerned to review his Hints. They need but little. The simplest and most uneducated can do that with great ease for themselves. For further particulars, however, I refer Professor S., or any one who is curious in such matters, to certain numbers published very near him, in a work he perhaps affects to despise for various reasons, viz., the Signs of the Times, which appeared during October and November last. Let him also read Mr. Miller's letters in the same work reviewing his Hints. He may think and talk as he pleases about the Signs of the Times, and Mr. Miller and his followers, and call their opinions ignorant, uneducated, fanatical hariolations, and what not. I am not their apologist, having less alliance with them in my mode of interpretation than he; but one thing is certain, they deserve, as men and Christians, other treatment; and there are objections and reasonings, sober, solemn, urgent argument in that review and those letters, which Prof. S. is not going to meet and put down by *laughter* and *contempt*, as he has attempted with me. Professorial critics may aspire to the reputation of superior learning, open schools for their laudations of German professors and lofty literati, and titled dignitaries, and pour contempt on ignorant hariolators, but like Horace, who disdained such hotbeds of conceit, I care not to approach them, either to hear their effusions, or

bespeak exemption from their attacks, even though I should be charged, as he was, with the very thing which more especially pertains to all imprudent pretenders to literary merit.

> Grammaticas ambire tribus et pulpita digner.
> Hinc illæ lacrymæ! Spissis indigna theatris
> Scripta pudet recitare, et nugis addere pondus,
> Sidixi. Rides, ait, et Jovis auribus ista
> Servas; fidis enim manare poetica mella
> Te solum, tibi pulcher. Ad hæc ego naribus uti
> Formido.
>
> The tribe of grammar pedants I despise,
> And hence these tears of spleen and anger rise.
> I blush in *grand* assemblies to repeat
> My worthless works, and give such trifles weight;
> Yet these professions they with wonder hear—
> "No, you reserved them for dread Cæsar's ear;
> With your own beauties charmed, you surely know
> Your verses with a honeyed sweetness flow;"
> Nor dare I rally with such dangerous folk.

After this general notice of Prof. S.'s charge of inconsistencies, and the admirable contrivances by which he attempts to establish it, a mere cursory notice of his specifications, is all that I feel to be necessary.

No. 1, grows out of his own mistaken apprehension, that I believe and represent the Millenarians to believe, that the *complete* restoration of the Jews is "the first act in the great drama." I have done no such thing. A partial restoration may take place; other events occur; and *after all this*, the elect remnant be gathered. There is just as great a difference between his statement and mine, as there is between *complete* and *partial*. One instance of false assumption.

No. 2, grows out of his confounding two things, entirely different, and distant by at least 1000 years, viz., Ezekiel's war of Gog and Magog, and John's battle of Armageddon, with John's war of Gog and Magog. He identifies them, I-

deny that they are the same, and so have made the statement. Let him prove his assertion.

No. 3, is a specimen of worse than puerile captiousness. Suppose I admit, what I say some have conjectured, that the Gog and Magog of John, are all the wicked dead raised up at the final judgment, led on by Satan and his hosts, let loose, in a last desperate and violent attack against the camp of the saints, and represented by John as coming "from *the four corners of the earth*,"—what then? Prof. S. interpolates the passage by his own paraphrase, viz., "*the utmost extremities*," and then asks, "Are there no wicked men, then, who are buried elsewhere than in these extremities, and who must be raised up at the end of the world?" Who said the contrary? And if the camp of the saints be the abode of Christ and his raised saints, the place of his throne, and the seat of his supernal dominion, a general conspiracy of the wicked of earth, rising on all sides, could not have been more graphically described—from every corner of the earth they come—I have as good a right as he has to interpolate my meaning, which I think better and more accordant with scriptural usage, and say from the four corners of the earth, means from the four quarters, as in our translation, N. S. E. W., i. e., every direction. This is the merest trifling.

No. 4 is a specimen of misrepresentation and of the confusion of his own thoughts. I have not said that Christ and his saints will dwell permanently in the air; however, in stating Millenarians' views, and referring particularly to those of Mr. Cunninghame, I have said, that for a season Christ and his saints will be together in the air. If Prof. S. denies it he is guilty of "a point blank contradiction" of Paul, 1 Thess. iv. 17. Will Prof. S. say how long they shall remain with Christ in the air; one hour, a day, a month, or a year, or forty years? I have not said it;—nor that Millenarians say how long. They can be with Christ in the air for a season,

where the quickened saints meet him, and thereafter attending his presence and movements, be ever with him, as the child that always dwells with its parent, however he may remove the locality of his dwelling. And as to Prof. S.'s criticism on the words ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, to mean the aerial regions, I admit it, remarking, that as this is the residence of Satan before the Millennium, as Prof. S. admits, so nothing can be more appropriate than that Christ and his saints should enter and occupy it, when they come, according to prophecy, to establish the dominion of Heaven on the ruins of Satan's kingdom. Will Prof. S. read his New Testament a little more attentively before he adventures again sneeringly to say that "the air is a *new* abode of Christ and the saints," meaning one of my novelties?

No. 5 grows out of certain assumptions of his own about the impossibility of glorified bodies dwelling on this earth. I have no concern with the rash impertinent questions he asks, but refer him to his Master for his answer.

No. 6 is a complaint of difficulty of apprehension growing out of his neglecting to distinguish between *apostate* Christian nations, and nations simply wicked and persecuting. Millenarians use the word antichristian, in a specific, emphatic sense, when speaking of the final apostasy, and destruction of the nations guilty of it, and also in a generic sense, comprehending also idolatrous nations. Prof. S. makes no such distinction, and charges their views with the confusion of his own thoughts.

No. 7. In reply to the questions propounded here, I refer him to his Geography and History, to know what part, and how much of the earth were included in the Roman empire.

Nos. 8 and 9 are impertinent questions, growing out of his own gratuitous assumptions. Yet I may answer, that the language of the prophet, according to the usage of Scripture, will be fully and exactly fulfilled if delegates from the na-

tions, and voluntary visitors, frequent Jerusalem as the capital of the nations in the flesh, the centre and seat of her Theocracy, especially on the great public occasions referred to by Isaiah—Jerusalem never wanting, on those occasions, the presence of more or less worshippers, from different parts of the earth. But Isaiah does not say, chap. lxvi., that "all flesh, from month to month and Sabbath to Sabbath, shall come to worship before God" at Jerusalem. Zechariah says that such a visitation and presentation before the Lord at Jerusalem, shall take place *annually*, under certain penalties for neglect, chap. xiv. 16, &c. Isaiah refers not to the same thing, but to another feature in the wonderful arrangements of that period.

If Prof. S. wants any clew about the time, to convert the nations left in the flesh, and will search for it, he will find it in the prophetical scriptures. It was not my object, nor did the argument require me to give the clew;—only to bespeak attention to the whole subject, and induce inquiry and study. And as to any reason *why* the saints should remain on the earth, after the conversion of the nations, alleging as he does their work is done, he has his answer already, that it is but just begun. If he does not relish a *terrene* residence for them, he and his Master must settle that matter, not I.

No. 10, I return and press upon himself. "If *all* Christians," as he says the Bible tells us, "are to be made kings and priests unto God, who are to be the subjects?" *He* must answer it, nor will he be allowed to dodge it. It is part and parcel of his own scheme, and he must show its consistency with that scheme. "When *all* are kings, who are to be ruled?" Millenarians have nothing to do with this question. It finds no place in their views. The poor persecuted, afflicted, despised, trodden down, and martyred saints, and faithful witnesses of Christ that have died before, and shall be on the earth at His coming, *they* are to be the kings and priests. The nations in the flesh, during the

whole Millennial period, form the subjects. Prof. S. has a hard task to perform, if he undertakes to prove from the Bible that all who are, or ever shall be, on this earth, subject to Jesus Christ, shall be His kings and priests. This is another of his assumptions. They are the redeemed up to a given date—the date of Christ's coming, that are to reign. If Prof. S. dates that coming after the Millennium, at the last epoch of judgment, the final consummation of all things, he will have more need of theological looseness and generalization, or poetic flights and descriptions, to help him make the language of the Bible at all intelligible on this subject, than he has yet had, in his interpretation of prophecy.

No. (11) I have already answered. Christ may judge, for any thing we dare say, that sacrificial *commemorative* offerings not expiatory may be better adapted to human nature—mankind in the flesh—as means of *summary important symbolic instruction*, than any other. Certain it is, the world has hankered after such strong representations, and God from the beginning saw they were needed, and that it was best to give them. But I am not concerned to answer such questions, though I could say much from Ezekiel, about the *use* of the *offerings* to be made at Jerusalem. The question is, What hath the spirit of Christ taught?

No. (12) is a tissue of misapprehension, and misrepresentation. As long as nations in the flesh have different localities, there will be different peculiarities. The union between Jews and Gentiles, consists not in the destruction of these things; but will be perfected in the very state of things predicted to occur at Christ's coming. If Paul did not "*separate*" he certainly *distinguished*, between Jews and Gentile Christians and churches. Nor has Christianity destroyed *the distinction*. While the Jews, according to God's covenant and oath, are never to cease from being a nation, will Prof. S. show how the distinction is ever to be abolished? The Millennial dispensation will unite, and

blend in perfect harmony, under One Theocracy, all the nations and families of earth; but it will not destroy national and domestic *distinctions*. Prof. S. assumes this singular and ridiculous position, that there can be no union of parts and parties without the destruction of identity or peculiar characteristics, personal, social, national.

No. (13) I have already answered under 8 and 9.

No. (14) I have also answered under No 4. I add, that it is another specimen of misrepresentation. Mr. D. nowhere says "that the saints all descend and live in the new *earthly* Jerusalem," as Prof. S. says he does. I distinguish between Jerusalem with its temple rebuilt by man, the seat and centre of the Theocracy among the nations in the flesh, and the heavenly Jerusalem,—which comes down out of heaven,—the city which hath foundations, whose maker and builder is God,—the object of hope and expectation by all the saints that died in faith, an interest in which is the inheritance of each, and where they shall dwell with Christ, needing no light of the sun, or of the moon, and having no temple; for the Lord God Almighty, even the Lamb, is the light thereof, in the light of which the nations of them that are saved walk, and into which the kings of the earth, the raised saints, do bring their glory and honour.

No. (15) is mere trifling. As to the dimensions and description of this heavenly city, I might refer Prof. S. to the learned Lord King, though not adopting his views in his Morsels of Criticism, for some suggestions to stop his laughter, which perhaps he would respect from him more than any thing from me. But I answer, the whole dispensation is miraculous; and as no description can give us accurate ideas of the thing, till we see it, when the description becomes perfectly plain, and obvious, so it concerns me not to meet what he has said, about the height of houses, streets, uppermost apartments, dwellings accommodated to the spiritual *bodies* of the saints, and all such puerile nonsense.

It is enough for me to say, in exact accordance with my principles of interpretation, that the vision of John, when he saw the New Jerusalem descending out of heaven, &c., is a symbolical description of some real abode of the saints with Christ, the nearest approximation to which we can make in our thoughts, is of a city, built of the most splendid and gorgeous materials known in the whole physical universe. If Prof. S. will not dare to deny that Jehovah the Angel of the Covenant, our divine Redeemer, was on Sinai with his twenty thousand angels, Psalm lxviii. 17, and Moses and Elias in splendour above the sun were with Christ upon the mount of transfiguration, he should be cautious how he allows himself to sport with the sublime descriptions given by the Spirit of Christ, that he may make his reader laugh either at my folly or my *faith*.

Nos. (16) (17) contain questions which require no other answer than what I have given to No. 5.

No. (18) is founded on his own misapprehension of the statement, according to which, if the Millenarian view I quoted, but said nothing about my own opinion, be correct or deserving of attention, it will be a conflict between spiritual principalities and powers, an assault of hell against the saints. Here I remark, there are differing views among Millenarian writers, but it is felt to be a solemn theme, deserving of grave and reverent attention, widely different from the flippant efforts of Prof. S. to excite mirth.

No. (19.) Here Prof. S. assumes that the Gog and Magog of John and Ezekiel are the same. He must first prove it. Having assumed their identity, and that therefore they precede the Millennium, he charges me with teaching that they both follow the Millennium. I have denied their identity, and have not taught as the opinions of Millenarians, what he attributes to me. I can only preserve my charity for him here, by attributing to him entire ignorance of the views he undertook to criticise.

No. (20) contains the same sort of egregious trifling which any and every man must be guilty of, who allows himself to ask questions, and criticise, and captiously urge objections against that of which he is, and in the nature of things must be, profoundly ignorant. It contains moreover one of the most remarkable specimens of the *non sequitur* I have ever met with—given too as clear, cogent, convincing exposition! establishing a fundamental position, or putting a key into his hands, to unlock the mysteries of the prophets!! I give it in his own remarkable words. "Paul assumes 'that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,' (1 Cor. xv. 50,) *for the evident reason* that that kingdom is *not* material." And this Prof. S. gives as an argument to prove that there is to be no materiality about the future and final world of the blessed!!! Let him first prove that Heaven is absolutely, totally disconnected from the material Universe, before he attempts to pervert Paul's language in this style. Let him say what Paul means by the phrase *flesh and blood*, 1 Cor. xv. 50. He certainly means no more than human nature, in its present corrupt and mortal state. It must pass through the alembic of the grave. It must sustain the transforming process of the resurrection, before it can inherit the kingdom. Does this prove, that in the resurrection state, that is, as Paul means, in the kingdom of Heaven, there is to be an utter destitution of every particle of materiality? Let Prof. S. try to prove it. Paul does not assign as the reason why flesh and blood, i. e. man in his present corrupt and mortal state, cannot inherit the kingdom of God, that that kingdom is *not* material. Paul nowhere said it;—nowhere assumes it;—and Prof. S. shall not "foist" in any transcendental notions of the heavenly state, first to explain Paul, and then turn round and claim to have a key, wherewith to unlock the mysteries of the prophets, and make short work of the whole business of interpretation, by telling us it all belongs to "the world of mind." If the *spiritual* body,

on which he lays such great stress, is utterly devoid of materiality, then is it nonsense to talk of a resurrection of the body as any thing that literally is to take place. It is all spirit, or poetry, or what not, no materiality about it at all, according to Prof. S.!! I challenge him to show how, in what imaginable way, there is a resurrection of the body, if the spirituality of the saints means utter, absolute immateriality; and how he can escape the condemnation, which Paul has pronounced on Hymeneus and Philetus, who, so far as I understand language, were guilty of this very thing, and allegorized, spiritualized, in their vain babblings, so as to give him occasion to say to Timothy, "if we be *dead* with Christ we shall also *live* with Him; if we suffer, we shall also *reign* with Him;" and that however extraordinary and improbable this may seem, so that even "if we believe not, yet he abideth faithful: he cannot deny himself." 2 Tim. ii. 11—18. Verily, if Prof. S.'s views of the nature of the spiritual body be correct, that it is utterly, absolutely immaterial, I see not but that along with those men he has erred concerning the truth; virtually, to all intents and purposes, saying, "that the resurrection is past already," for the dead saints are now, for aught we know to the contrary, wholly *spiritual*, totally disconnected from all materiality; and what sort of a resurrection can it be, that adds no materiality to them? I charge not Prof. S. with this heresy, but I see not how it is possible to prevent his principles of interpretation and notions on this subject, if fairly and legitimately carried out, from leading there. It will not do to tell me, of its being etherealized, and attenuated. I care not to what degree he does this, it is still associated with matter.—If some organic power of luminous emanation, or modified electric galvanic ethereal subtilty, be the element of the raised spiritual body, it is still associated with matter, and capable of *terrene* dwelling. I say not what it is; the day will declare it. He may extricate himself the best way he can from this

difficulty, but I see no way possible for him to do it, while he denies all materiality to the kingdom of heaven, and by consequence to the raised saints. If he uses the word *material*, in some gross sense, and does not mean to deny *all materiality of being* to the raised saints, then he had better learn to write with more precision, and to beware how he thinks that other people will understand him just as loosely as he expresses himself.

No. (21.) I might here say, that my remarks, under the last head, are also an answer to this: but there are one or two additional specimens of gratuitous and false assumptions, *non sequiturs*, and other things, deserving attention. Prof. S. says, that it "looks very suspicious," that I have not urged "1 Cor. xv. in favour of" (my) "scheme." My object was not to treat of the resurrection. It only comes in, incidentally, as connected with the main argument. Had I treated specifically of the first resurrection, it would have been appropriate. I have done it when publicly lecturing on this subject. What *suspicions* Prof. S. has conjured up, I know not: but I know, that Prof. S. has said 1 Cor. xv. contains "an account of the resurrection of the saints ONLY." App. p. 181. And yet, in almost the very next breath, he turns round and says, "Paul here *asserts*, that *it* (he means, apparently at least, the resurrection of the *wicked*, but if he means the *resurrection of the saints only*, then he takes for granted what he must prove) takes place at *that* period," i.e., what he calls *the end of the world*, the very same period at which he says occurs the resurrection of the saints; that is, both, according to Prof. S., occur together. *How* does Paul ASSERT this, when, according to Prof. S.'s own admission, he is speaking of the SAINTS; *resurrection*, and *of* THEIR *resurrection* ONLY?" It can only be *implied*, just as Prof. S. *assumes*, that both resurrections occur together.

He professes "truly [to] regret to be obliged to give

any account of [my silence in] this matter, since [he] must seem to accuse Mr. D. of want of candour and fairness." Strange tenderness all of a sudden, when he had done the thing over and over again in reality, without any apology or squeamishness. Perhaps there may have been other reasons for his regrets. I shall not undertake to pry into them: but ask him, where, in all the xvth chap. of 1 Cor., he finds that Paul *asserts* any thing about the resurrection of the wicked, as he says he does? And how he, Prof. S., reconciles his own statements here? I agree with him, that Paul speaks of the resurrection of the saints, and of "*their* resurrection *only*." Now it will not do for Prof. S. to say, that the resurrection of the wicked is *implied*, for he says Paul "*asserts*" it—two very different things, which others can distinguish, if not he.

But Prof. S. has settled it in his own mind as things not to be disputed, which things also he attributes to Paul as equally assumed by him, that the world is to have an end, that all connection with the *material* universe on the part of saints is to cease then—and that at this end of the world, both saints and sinners all rise together. Observe how adroitly he uses his key to unlock these mysteries. "Paul says that 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.' *Of course* Paul *supposes* [?] that kingdom in which the saints will live after the resurrection, to be of a *nature which is incompatible with the residence of* MATERIAL *bodies*." App. p. 181. Paul neither *supposes*, nor assumes, any such thing; nor can his language be made to imply it. The things, which Prof. S. says *of course* Paul supposes, (he means implies,) are all of them *non sequiturs*. Not one of them flows legitimately from any thing Paul has said in this chapter. Yet on these *false assumptions*, or *non sequiturs*, call them what you may, he has modestly regretted to be obliged to *seem* to charge me with a want of fairness and candour, because forsooth, I have not *attempted* to prove my

views from this chapter!!! Marvellous, marvellous forbearance and tenderness!

But I have not done with this cluster of *non sequiturs*. Where, I ask, does Paul speak in chap. 15, of 1 Cor. of the *end of the world?* In the 24th verse Prof. S. says. Let us see what Paul says: "*Then* cometh *the end*,"—what end? Prof. S. says *of the world*. I answer, *non sequitur*. Paul says no such thing, nor does it follow by fair inference. But what does Prof. S. mean by the end of the world? His language, argument, accusation against me, and the whole drift of his remarks, especially his assertion about the kingdom of Heaven being not material—entirely disconnected from the material universe—show that he means *the annihilation* of this globe. If he does, I challenge him to the proof, from the Bible, that ever, to all eternity, such an event shall occur, whatever may be its conflagrations or transformations? The word "END," τὸ τέλος, may mean, either the consummation, or the termination, in this connection the completion, either of the present state of things, or of the things consequent on Christ's coming to establish His kingdom—the kingdom of Heaven. The connection proves it to be the latter. This consummation, Paul says, shall take place *when* Christ shall *deliver up* the kingdom to God, even the Father. The date of this consummation, he says, shall occur when He, Jesus Christ, shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power, *having reigned* till he hath put all his enemies under his (αὐτοῦ, his own) feet. For it is too plain, to admit of any question, that there can be no delivering up a kingdom by Christ to the Father, in the sense in which Paul means, until it is completely, thoroughly established *in his own* possession—all enemies subdued and put for ever to rest. But, at what stage, in the developments of the scheme of redemption, ist his termination, or consummation, to occur? *Then*, says Paul, *when* His ene-

mies being subdued; He shall have delivered up the kingdom to the Father, and God be all in all.

Paul's account of the matter, wonderfully corroborates the views I have stated. He gives the order of the resurrection exactly. *First*, Christ "the first fruits" and pledge; *second*, they that are Christ's, his saints, *at his coming*—not a word about the wicked. *Then*, when certain other things occur, the consummation takes place. Paul does not say that the *then* is at Christ's coming; but *when* He shall have subdued his enemies, and delivered up the kingdom to the Father. At his coming, Christ and his saints, according to Daniel, enter into the possession of the kingdom. The work begins with retribution, even the slaughter of apostate nations, the expulsion of Satan, and an entire new, heavenly and miraculous organization of affairs in this world,—the kingdom of Christ,—the kingdom of heaven. John says, that this kingdom of Heaven, this reign of Christ with the saints that rise at his coming, will last for one thousand years. The prophets describe it, as glorious beyond conception. The beast and the false prophet receive their doom; but there remains yet one enemy, death. This is the last enemy, and the destruction of this, Paul says, closes up the dispensation, forms the consummation. "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death." Here then, in v. 26, Prof. S. might have found Paul's *allusion* to, not his *assertion* of, the resurrection of the wicked, and not in v. 24, as he says. The scenes of the great final closing up the work of judgment, at the termination of Millennial sway, when the wicked dead shall be raised,—hell judged, and all men then alive on the earth, or that have ever lived, have their eternal state determined, is "*the end*," the end of *the mediatorial sway of Christ—not the annihilation of the globe.*

It is said by John, that the earth and the heaven shall

flee away, from the face of Him that shall sit on the great white throne to judge the living and the dead. This does not, and cannot, mean *the annihilation* of the astronomical earth and heavens,—this planet and the stars, but refers to their inhabitants. The terror of the scene will strike universal horror into the wretched beings that shall either rise from hell, or who may at that time be alive on the earth, over which heaven's dominion had swayed one thousand years, but no place shall be found for them. They shall all appear before the judgment seat of Christ;—they shall all stand before God and be judged;—death and hell shall be cast into the lake of fire; and this world, recovered fully back to God, purified, rescued from death, the seat of Christ's mediatorial dominion, originally given to Adam, but usurped and tyrannized over by the devil, be handed back to God, restored, and for ever confirmed as an integral part in the great, universal, celestial empire of Jehovah. I am not concerned to add any thing more about the *eternal* dispensation which then shall succeed. The end has come;—the scheme of redemption has accomplished its work: Christ triumphs: his saints celebrate his victories, and share in his glory:—the kingdom reverts to the Father; and God for ever reigns. Yet I may say, that the consolidation and consummation of the divine dominion, in the restored unity of the universal empire of Jehovah, does not in the least degree imply but that still the earth shall be the inheritance of Jesus Christ, and He the great head, prince and sovereign under God, and the avenue of access to Him for ever for his saints. Should a monarch say to his son, Reduce to subjection that revolted province, unite it to my dominion, and it shall be your inheritance, in which, under me, you shall reign, it would be easy to see how, on its reduction and his delivering it up to his father, the father's dominion should be entire, and yet the son have the principality still. Thus it is that Christ reigns one thousand years, the end comes,

He delivers up the kingdom, and yet He reigns for ever and ever in His everlasting kingdom.

The reader cannot fail now to perceive, how baseless is Prof. S.'s charge, of want of candour, preferred against me, because, as he insinuates, I felt that 1 Cor. xv. militated against the views I had expressed, and *therefore* MOST SUSPICIOUSLY abstained from all reference to it. It is of a piece with his attempt, in closing up his charge, to make it appear that I contradict the apostle. "Paul," he says, "as before remarked, puts the resurrection of the saints at the *end of the world*, 1 Cor. xv. 24, but Mr. D. *before* the Millennium." App. p. 181. He has not proved the first part of this assertion, nor is it implied in the 24th verse to which he refers, as I have shown, at least in *his* sense of the words.

As to my mixing up the righteous and the wicked together, in the Millennium, it is what he has done himself avowedly, and to an extent that leaves far in the rear most commentators of his own class. See Hints, &c., pp. 141–143. I challenge him to produce the proof from the Dissertations, of my having mixed up the righteous and the wicked, as he says, or of having made any allusion to the presence of any wicked on earth, during the Millennial reign of Christ and his saints, save in referring to the prediction of Isaiah lxv. 20, and that without even expressing my views as to the full or precise import of the passage, having alluded to it but for one specific purpose, viz., the quick retribution that shall be seen in the comparatively early death of individuals, who might be found "sinners," under the Millennial dispensation. But I have offended, and must by some means be convicted. I do not belong to the school of Prof. S., nor have I ever cared to obtain the sanction of one whom the little myrmidons that court his favour, style "the giant in biblical literature." This perhaps is my offence. I have dared to dissent from him, to deny his assumptions and exegesis, and to state, distinctly, the reasons of my dissent and denial. He has not

condescended to notice them; but attempts authoritatively, and with ridicule, to silence me and put me aside. But whatever he and his flatterers may think, I have neither attempted, nor thought of rivalship. I have felt perfectly satisfied if I have the sanction of the Bible, fairly and honestly interpreted. And that I have not erred so egregiously as Prof. S. attempts to make his readers believe, I can refer to names good and great,—as good and great as Prof. S. or any of his admirers can claim to be,—in support of all that I have stated, to be the belief of Millenarian writers, high in fame for learning and piety.

Quicquid sum ego, quamvis
Infra Lucilii, sensum ingeniumque, tamen me
Cum magnis vixisse, invita fatebitur usque
Invidia, et, fragili quærens illidere dentem,
Offendet solido.

What though with GREAT LUCILIUS I disclaim
All saucy rivalship of birth or fame,
Spite of herself, even Envy must confess,
That I the sanction of the great possess,
And, if she dare attempt my honest fame,
Shall break her teeth against my solid name.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROF. STUART'S REMARKS ON HIS PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION.

With these, in general, if I understand them, I have no fault to find. He has stated them, distinctly enough, in his writings, and comments on others who have written on this subject, and in his App. p. 182. But from his application of them, growing mainly out of his confusion of thought, in reference to *analogical language*, and from one or two assumptions for that purpose, I do most pertinaciously dissent, for reasons which, I think, the candid and unprejudiced reader will deem abundantly sufficient. He says that language,—which, in its primary meaning, being employed to denote *sensible* objects and actions, must have a *sensible* import, by reason of the very necessities of the case,—possesses an analogical significancy, when used in relation to things and actions wholly mental; and gives examples of words of this sort, expressing various mental acts, such as understanding, comprehension, perception, idea, imagination, &c. So far, well.

Hence, having no direct and immediate, or intuitive perceptions of God, and things purely spiritual, we are necessitated to speak of Him and of them, as he says, *more humano*, that is, in terms that originally denote sensible objects and actions. Such is the language which the Bible employs, to designate God and his natural, intellectual, and moral perfections. Thus far also it is well.

All that Professor S. says here, has long, long since, been well and truly said, even by the Fathers whose puerilities he affects so heartily to despise, and of which even *modern* fathers, I might add, are sometimes guilty. The more sober

and intelligent of them denied, that we can have any direct perception, of any thing in the divine nature, by *spiritual* ideas, or by a *direct intuition*, or by any *supernatural notions* and conceptions infused directly from above. Here, to speak metaphorically, the eye of the mind is just as blind as the eye of the body. So Chrysostom, Gregory Nyssen, Nazianzen, Plotinus, Justin Martyr, Cyril, Hilary, Athanasius, and especially Tertullian,—to quote them irrespectively of their priority or posteriority in point of time,—thought and expressed themselves. *God could have no intercourse with us*, said Tertullian, *otherwise than by taking on himself the Dialect of our senses and affections.* With the mystic theology, which grew out of certain principles of the Platonic philosophy, taught by the Alexandrian philosophers, and applied to Christianity, arose different notions and modes of speech, with respect to our knowledge of God, which may yet be traced in the schools and systems of modern days. Whatever may be said about union, and contemplation; about the philosophic lying beneath the spontaneous consciousness; and about transcendental knowledge of the Deity, it will not be pretended, that the idiom of metaphysicians, and of mystic theologians, is to be made the rule for the interpretation of Scriptural language in reference to spiritual realities; or, as Professor S. has it, "*the invisible world.*"

He has said that "some analogy, real or supposed, lies at the foundation" of the language, employed to express our views of things strictly and exclusively mental or spiritual, p. 183. But in the use, which he has made of this important principle, he shows that he has confounded Analogy and Metaphor, and has left his reader in utter perplexity, without any assignable or imaginary clew, by which to unravel the import of words, when used either *analogically* or *tropically*. I deny that these are convertible expressions, any more than that the things which they are employed to express, are at

all identical. He has assumed that they are. No wonder, therefore, that he is himself perplexed, and finds it difficult to apprehend the meaning of those who think and write with more precision. To expose his fallacy here, it is necessary for me to be a little more explicit and full on this subject than he has been.

Of the *substance* of God, as a Being really existing, we have no knowledge, and can have none; because we can find nothing, in the utmost stretch of our conceptions, which we can adopt as a representative of it,—nothing whatever, between which and it, we can trace or assume any analogy. It is true, that we call him a Spirit, and Light, &c., as the nearest approximation we can make to an idea of his essence. But what do we mean by these words? and how do we apply them to God? SPIRIT, in its original *sensible* import, means *breath*. We take this subtile element, as the convenient representative of our own sentient minds or spirits, and form a conception of them as something entirely, essentially different and distinct from matter. Christ's own explanation of the popular conception is given negatively—"A spirit hath not flesh and bones." But, as to any direct, intuitive, or other knowledge of the substance or essence of our immortal minds or spirits, we have none; and therefore can have no more definite and distinct knowledge of the Essence or substance of God, whom, nevertheless, we call a Spirit. As to light, we have no knowledge of its essence either, but endeavouring to comprehend it from its effects and operations, we conceive of it, as some exceedingly subtile element, removed from every thing we are accustomed to account gross and impure. We use it, therefore, as the symbol or representative of different things, according to the character or form of its operations—designating *purity* at one time by it, and *knowledge* at another, between both which things, and something answerable in the operations and manifestations of God, we can trace an analogy.

In like manner, when, by means of scriptural expressions on this subject,—designed to reveal to us, and to assist us in forming some conceptions of, the different attributes or perfections of God,—we speak of His goodness, love, power, forbearance, wisdom, justice, holiness, &c., we first conceive of something in us, which we have learned thus to express, according to a process of thought not here necessary to state, and making these things in us representatives of something analogous, i. e. correspondent or answerable to them in God, use the same language to express our views of His properties. I state the idea in the language of a clear and profound thinker and writer. "There must be something, in the Divine nature, that bears a similitude only, and correspondency, with the commendable passions and affections (and I may add powers) of a human soul: for otherwise, there would be no analogy between them; and then, those perfections in God, the nature of which are signified by them, would be as truly the very same in kind with your passions and mine, as the passions and affections of any other man. The reason is, if we ascribe *knowledge to God which in us is performed by ratiocination*; that is, by thinking, which requires the help of imperceptible fibres in the brain, and the concurrence of the animal spirits; we may as safely ascribe to him those *passions* and *affections*, which are also the operations of the rational soul, composed of matter and spirit acting in essential union. These indeed show themselves, more in the sensitive part of the body, than ratiocination or the motions of the will; that is, than the several modes of thinking and willing; and are attended with a more extraordinary commotion of spirits. But there is still a motion or commotion of bodily parts and spirits in both, which are often even wasted and impaired by intenseness and vehemence of thinking and willing. And therefore, all to be inferred from thence is, that in this state of corrupt nature, our passions are ascribed to God, in a lower

degree of analogy, than our intellectual operations and moral virtues: though in a state of innocence, they must have been all equally complete representations of the divine perfections."

This is not to attribute human passions and affections to God. Nor is it saying, that if we infinitely remove all imperfections which attend their existence and development in us, they will then be literally and properly passions and affections in God, of the *same kind* in Him that they are in us: for, remove all the imperfection incident to those commotions of bodily parts with which they are blended, and the passions, &c. are extinguished; and when we undertake to attribute them, as the Bible teaches us, to the disembodied spirit, it is only as bearing *some analogy* with what we now experience, that we can form any conception of them. In like manner, when we speak of them in reference to God, who is a pure unembodied spirit, we do not affirm them to be of *the same kind*, but something in his nature *analogous* with what we find in our own, so as to make the latter suitable representatives of the former.

This analogy is founded, solely and primarily, not on the imperfection of human language, which necessitates us to resort to tropes and figures of speech, as Prof. S. says, to express the resemblances we may design to trace; but on the interesting, wonderful, and to us honourable and glorious fact, that God made man *in His own likeness after His own image*. He laid a foundation, in the very constitution of our nature, by virtue of which, we contemplate somewhat of Himself by the help of what we could discern in ourselves; and although, in its splendid and glorious moral features, that image has been greatly blurred and defiled by the fall, yet has it not been wholly defaced or obliterated, as Paul teaches, by denominating even fallen man still the Image of God. For had that been the case we could no more have ever attained to any knowledge of God, than can the

brute creation—since the very basis, on which all our knowledge of Him rests, or rather, the very processes of mind, in the exercise of which God originally ordained we should possess the knowledge of Himself, would have been utterly destroyed.

It was owing to the neglect, or ignorance, of this important fact, which, for distinction's sake, may be called *divine analogy*, that men run into the two extremes, either of making, with some Arians and Socinians, the language applied to the nature and operations of God, *literal*, and so materialize the Deity; or with certain metaphysical scholastic writers, of making it metaphorical, and so denying that there is any thing, *in reality*, in the nature of the Divine Being, answerable to the moral virtues and perfections, and in their laborious efforts to obtain some *direct, intuitive* knowledge of God, to mysticise their conceptions of Him, and foster the wildest enthusiasm.

The same remarks apply, with equal force and truth, to the angelic intelligences of Heaven. As to any properties, which, as simple spirit, they possess, we know no more about them than as there is something in their nature analogous with our own. This, we are led to believe from the facts, that they have assumed, at times, external visible forms and manifestations; that they had converse and communion with men; and also, that the Bible expresses some of their properties, by terms which designate those of our own nature. Still there are certain acts, just as in the case of God Himself, which they are stated to perform, implying powers, of which we can form no conception; because we can discern nothing in ourselves analogous or answerable thereto, so that, both of God and of them we are constrained to confess, it is but in part only that we have knowledge.

Now, beyond God, angelic and satanic intelligences, the disembodied spirits of our own kind, the raised Redeemer, and those of his saints that were either quickened or raised with Him, we have no manner of knowledge or hint what,

ever. Of whatever other existences there may be in the spiritual world, we *know* nothing. "The world of mind," as Professor S. calls it, meaning the actings of the human intellect *in this present stage of our existence—the incarnate mind*—not the unembodied or disembodied mind, but plainly *the mind of man in the flesh*, does not properly belong to the *spiritual* world. It is part and parcel of *this* fallen world, and we have a variety of means by which to obtain knowledge of its actings and properties, other than the analogy appropriate to the spiritual world. It is a mere metaphor, or trope of speech, which Professor S. uses when he talks of "*the world* of mind" in contradistinction from "*the world of matter*." He means the mind of man in this world—while yet in connection with and operating in the flesh—a thing as different from the mind of angels and disembodied saints, as earth is from Heaven, and angels from men. He shall not, therefore, be allowed to confound them, and then attempt to spiritualize and mysticise the whole gospel of the grace of God, by telling us, that the very same sort of analogy, which forms the foundation of our knowledge of God, of angels, and of the spiritual *invisible* world—(he means by *invisible*, devoid of *sensible* manifestations)—is to be adopted by us, as the basis of all our conceptions and knowledge of the things which God has revealed to us, concerning the scheme of redemption, the kingdom of Heaven, and the coming of Jesus Christ, which the prophets declare shall have their developments and manifestations *in this world*, among and before rational creatures *living in the flesh*.

Professor S. has deceived himself and his reader, by misapprehending and misstating the true foundation of the import of *analogical* language. He has excluded *the living active mind of man in this world, now dwelling in the flesh, with all its external sensible manifestations and facilities for our obtaining knowledge of its actings and holding communion with it*, as completely and absolutely from this world,

as is the unseen world of spirits, where God and Christ and the angels and saints now dwell. Speaking of the "*invisible world*, and all the beings and objects that belong to it," he says, "they are not objects of sense to us." But *the mind* of man *in this world*, does manifest itself by external sensible sounds, expressions and actions. The language which we use to express such actions and manifestations, of course is taken from *sensible* objects, and we understand it well, because we assume, and are so constituted that we do assume, the existence of an analogy in the actings of mind, with its external bodily actings in and through the flesh. It is not mere tropical language, therefore, which we employ, when we speak of intending, perceiving, comparing, comprehending, imagining, concluding, and the like—we mean to express something more, yea, much more, than mere metaphorical resemblance, even the correspondence and agreement, in the very *nature* of the mind's actings, with the external sensible actings by which it manifests them, or by which we express them, so that there is an analogy, which has its foundation, not in the mere tropes and embellishments of diction, but *in the nature of things*.

What we thus learn of our own mental and moral acts and properties, and express on the foundation of such an analogy between the inner actings of the mind and its outer manifestations, becomes, in its turn, the means of knowing and expressing our conceptions of God, and of perfectly pure unembodied mind, by reason of the analogy assumed to exist, in the very nature of things, between unembodied and embodied mind.

The employment of tropical language is done with different intent, and altogether on different principles. Prof. S. has lost sight of the important and essential distinction between them, and confounded *analogy* and *metaphor*. For he says, that "spiritual objects of the eternal and unseen world, cannot be the same as the material ones, from which

language has taken its origin. Of course a *tropical* use of words, at the foundation of which some analogy real or supposed lies, is the *only* use which can be supposed or sanctioned in cases like these," that is, when we speak of God, of Christ, of the spiritual world, of the kingdom of Heaven, and of other invisible realities. He evidently thinks, and so reasons, that there is but one or other of two alternatives to be adopted. Either our language must be understood *literally*, which being taken from sensible objects and actions, cannot, without absurdity, be so understood when applied to God and spiritual things, or *tropically*, that is, as he attempts to explain himself, "we must give to these latter declarations"—he means analogical expressions—"a sense, which will make them *compatible* with the *well known* nature of *spirits*."

Now, not to notice for the present, the excessive confusion and floundering of thought here, let us for a moment, put his position to the test. By tropical language, he understands metaphorical, figurative expressions, applied to God and spiritual things. He has admitted, that our use of them in reference to these things, is founded on some *real* or *supposed analogy*, so that all he has said on this subject, when fairly brought out of the confusion in which it lays in his own thoughts, amounts to just this, and no more, that we conceive of God and spiritual things—the spiritual world—by analogy, and express them only by metaphor; for that is the trope of speech, under which the expressions he particularizes must be classed. "He might just as well have said, we conceive of them only by *Hyperbole*, and express them by *Irony*."

I have said that *analogy*, which Professor S. confesses lies at the foundation of our knowledge of God, and *metaphor*, or tropes of speech, are very different. "*Metaphor* in general," says the author already referred to, "is a *substitution* of the *idea* or conception of one thing, with the

term belonging to it, to stand for another thing, on account of an *appearing* similitude only, *without any real resemblance and true correspondency between the things compared*, as when the Psalmist describes the *verdure* and *fruitfulness* of vallies, by *laughing* and *singing*. *Analogy* in general, is the *substituting* the idea or *conception* of one thing to *stand for* and *represent* another, on account of *a true resemblance*, and *correspondent reality in the very nature of the things compared*. They both agree in this, that they are equally a substitution of the idea, or conception, of one thing to stand for another; and that, by these a word is *transferred* from its *first* and *proper* signification, to express some other thing in a more remote and *secondary* meaning. They agree also in this, that the *substituted* ideas or conceptions cannot, either in analogy or metaphor, *represent* to our mind any thin of the *real, true, essential nature* of the objects they stand for, i. e., *as they are in themselves*. They only furnish us at best with *similitudes* or *representative* and mediate conceptions of those objects. But they differ in this. First, that the *ground* and *foundation* of metaphor, consists only in an *appearing* or *imaginary* resemblance and correspondency, as when God is said to have hands, and eyes, and ears. But the foundation of analogy is an *actual similitude*, and a *real correspondency* in the very *nature* of things, which lays a foundation for *a parity of reason* even between things different in *nature* and *kind:* as when God is said to have *knowledge, power* and *goodness*. They differ in this: *metaphor* is altogether *arbitrary*, and the result merely of the *imagination;* it is rather a *figure* of *speech* than a real *similitude* and *comparison* of *things*, and therefore is properly of consideration in Rhetoric and Poetry. But *analogy*, being built on the very nature of things themselves, is a *necessary* and *useful* method of *conception* and *reasoning*, and therefore of consideration in Physics and Metaphysics. It is the result of reason viewing the *true nature* of beings. The

comparison here contains something not only *actual* and *real*, but *correspondent* and *similar*; and the parity of reasoning upon it is just and true."

It is very easy therefore, from this very clear and satisfactory view of the matter, to determine when language, applied to God and spiritual beings, has a mere figurative or metaphorical import, as when Christ is called a door, the vine, the way, a Lamb, &c., expressions designating a mere imaginary resemblance; and when it has an analogical import, according to which, words are transferred from the proper and immediate objects of our senses and reason, to import something divine and supernatural, as when they represent any similar and correspondent reality in the nature or operations of spiritual or heavenly beings, which is the case when we use such expressions as Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Redemption, Intercession, Throne, Kingdom, Dominion, and the like.

This, no doubt, is what Prof. S. meant to express, when he claims that such expressions as new birth, regeneration, resurrection, new creation, used to denote the moral and spiritual renovation of corrupt and fallen man, must be interpreted "in a *tropical* way." Yet this does not prove, that they are not employed to designate "historical facts." He says, "it is as much a matter of fact and of history, in respect to the Christian, that he has been born again, as that he has been physically and naturally born." Unquestionably. But it would not be, if it was all metaphor or figure, denoting mere arbitrary or imaginary resemblance. It is correspondence in reality, in the nature of things, between the commencement of a man's spiritual and moral existence, as a renewed, regenerated sinner, and the commencement of his physical existence, as born into this world—the analogy between these things—that makes such language import reality, and not mere fanciful resemblance. Yet has he expressed himself most obscurely and unintelligibly, yea, contrary to truth, if his words have meaning, when he says,

in reference to such expressions as derive their import from the divinely constituted analogy of things, that "we must give them a sense which will make them *compatible* with the WELL KNOWN *nature of spirits!*" This is actually putting the cart before the horse. We have no *well known* notions, and can have no *well known* views—he means accurate ideas—of the *nature* of spirits. All our knowledge of them is complicated, and obtained by a circuitous, not by a direct route, the basis of which is laid in the analogy between God and spiritual things, and the things which, because of this their correspondence, in the nature of things, we use as representatives of them.

Prof. S. will have us use some preconceived notions of *the nature* of spirit and of spiritual things, by which to judge of the meaning of scriptural language, in relation to them. Hear what he says: "If then I am asked, why I give a spiritual exegesis to all those passages that respect his (Christ's) future reign on earth, my answer is, that I do it for a reason which leads me to explain *all the anthropopathic* expressions concerning God and the future world in a spiritual manner, i. e. *because any other exegesis* would be utterly opposed to the *well known*, and certain nature and condition of the Messianic reign." "In fact, one might just as well appropriate and assign all our bodily qualities to *spirits*, as appropriate, to Christ's kingdom, the qualities of a temporal, earthly, visible, kingdom." App. pp. 185, 186.

Thus has Prof. S. actually separated and discarded the kingdom of Christ from this world. By denying, and ridiculing, as he has done, the idea of its *visibility*—that is, its perceptibility by *any* of our senses, for he speaks tropically, by synecdoche using *visibility* for *all external sensible manifestations*,—he has made it as completely and absolutely a matter of mere mind, intellect, spirit, as is God Himself. Having, in his extreme confusion, and obscurity, failed to give us

any hints, or clew, by which to understand the import of language as applied to God, when it is to be understood analogically or tropically, and having left us wholly to the dominion of our imaginations here, to explain as mere *metaphors* the meaning of all words designating God's names, titles, personality, modes of subsistence, relations, offices, attributes, acts, operations and manifestations, as well as the "terminology," as he calls it, of the whole scheme of redemption, and of the mediatorial government and kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,—he has contributed a vast amount, to sanction the practical skepticism and infidelity, and *rationalism* of the times, and to fix indelibly and for ever, by his incautious attempt to wash it out, the "stain" which he has seen "on English and American expositors," who, like himself, have "no standard, no landmark, no compass," but "every man says," of course rightfully, when using and interpreting metaphors and figures, as applied to God and spiritual things, "what is right in his own eyes, and then calls upon others to agree with him;" Hints, p. 144, because he claims to have some clearer and better notions than they, about the nature and operations of mind or spirit by which to explain, or determine what is *tropical* language.

I do him no injustice here, and would not charge him with opinions and positions he has not actually advanced. "No principle," says he, "which belongs to the science of hermeneutics is better established than this, viz., *that language is always to be regarded as tropical, when, if literally interpreted, it would make a sense absurd, frigid, incongruous, or inconsistent with the context or nature of things.*" App. p. 186. He does not seem ever to have thought distinctly that there is a *third* style of language, the *analogical*, sanctioned by God, and based on His own divine constitution of things, in the use of which, we express other than

imaginary, arbitrary resemblances, even those which exist, as has been shown, *in the nature or reality of the things compared.*

What he has said in reference to *tropical* language is correct and plain enough, except the word "frigid," which means any thing or nothing, according to men's temperament, and had better have been left out. The rule applies to language that is *tropical;* but it does not apply to that of which we have spoken, viz., the *analogical*, for God, by his own divinely constituted analogy, has for ever debarred us in His second commandment, from the indulgence of our own imaginations, as well as our senses, in the framing and employing of mere pictorial or metaphorical, which are also figurative, representations of Himself, and of heavenly things. *He* has used similitudes, and He only has the right to do it, when speaking of himself. The neglect and practical contempt of His prerogative here, led to idolatry. Men never will, never can, be satisfied, without some knowledge of God and divine things, which they can feel is certain. Tell them that there is no foundation of certain knowledge laid in any analogy at all between God and man, as man exists here in his compounded being, mind and body—mind acting and manifesting itself externally and sensibly—but that we must depend on mere metaphorical, tropical representations of Him, and it will drive the ignorant into the use of pictorial images, and lay the foundation of idolatry, while the more reflecting will resort to some form of mysticism or of rationalism, which presumes to judge of God, according to preconceived philosophical or metaphysical notions of *the nature of things.* The dangers of adopting the *literal* import of language, on the one hand, and the tropical or metaphorical, on the other hand, will be best and easiest avoided by adhering to God's own method, the analogical import of words founded on the divinely constituted resemblance or analogy in the nature of things. *In 'medio tutissimus' this*

Prof. S. has wholly neglected this *analogical import of language*, and having confounded it with tropical expressions and the plain rule of Rhetoric applicable to them, must of necessity be just as confused and bewildered often, in his interpretation of other parts of Scripture beside the prophecies, as are they who undertake to explain the prophets and distinguish not between tropes and symbols.

But there are further fallacies in Prof. S.'s attempt to develope his principles of interpretation. He contradicts some of the plain and fundamental facts of Scripture. For he assumes, and so claims to interpret the Scriptures, that Christ and the kingdom of Heaven, the kingdom being *spiritual*, are as truly in their nature *invisible*, devoid of all external *sensible* acts and manifestations, as is Jehovah himself, the invisible God. On this assumption too, he says, the prophets so thought and spake of Christ, and so expected their language would be interpreted: "*The kingdom of God*," says he, "*is spiritual*." "The prophets took it for granted, that in speaking of a *spiritual* Redeemer, and of his kingdom, their language must be *spiritually* interpreted." Hence he concludes, that all our language in reference to Christ and His kingdom, is merely tropical. Now he has not proved these assumptions; nor can he: for they are directly in the face of scriptural facts.

Whatever he may say about God, as a pure unembodied spirit, who is essentially invisible; and whatever he may think of our remarks,—about the analogy, which gives significance to our language in reference to God and spiritual things, having its foundation in the divine constitution by which man was made in the image of God and after his likeness, and about that analogy being the means of our knowledge of Him,—one thing is certain, he cannot say, that Jesus Christ our blessed Redeemer is an *invisible* being, and has no *external sensible* relations to the material universe, nor interest in this fallen visible world of ours. That He is

not now actually seen by us, is no more proof, that he is *invisible*, than it is, that Prof. S. is invisible, because I and many others do not see him. The eternal Son of God became visible. God was *manifest* in the flesh. He was constituted and still "*is* the *image* of the invisible God," Col. i. 15, "the brightness of his glory, and the express *image* of his person," Heb. i. 3. He took upon him a material nature, and in the likeness of sinful flesh lived, acted, suffered and died among men; all *literally* true. In that very body, which had died, which was pierced in its side and hands and feet and marred in its countenance, He rose again. His human soul resumed its relation to matter; rising from the dead, He again appeared, acted, ate, spake, and consorted with men in the flesh, for the space of forty days. He was known by his followers, recognized as the same—their identical Lord and Master.

Thomas was incredulous, and when told of his resurrection, deemed that it must have been an apparition which the other apostles had seen, and would not be convinced to the contrary, insisting that he must first "see in his hands the print of the nails, and *put his finger into the print of the nails, and thrust his hand into his side*," John xx. 25, that is, must *feel* him, as well as see him—exercise the very sense by which we have the presence of a material world. The Saviour subsequently appeared to him, and said, "Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side, and be not faithless but believing," v. 27. Verily he would have been unbelieving still, on Prof. S.'s principle, a notion about a *spiritual* body being devoid of all materiality, if on reaching forth his hand, he had not *felt* as well as seen. It would have but confirmed him in his belief that it was only a spirit, an apparition that both he and the apostles had seen, and not what he found it to be, his *Lord* and his *God*.

In that same body, the Saviour often afterwards appeared

to the disciples, having eaten before them, Luke xxiv. 42, 43, and having, as Luke says, "showed himself alive, after his passion, by many *infallible* proofs, being seen of them forty days." Acts i. 3. Paul says "he was seen of five hundred brethren at once." 1 Cor. xv. 6. I am not concerned to say, think, or imagine, what were the properties of his raised or spiritual body. It is enough for me to know, that the Redeemer did not become *so spiritual*, as to be *invisible* to mortal men. He still retained some connection with matter. That he ever parted with the materiality he had after his resurrection, Prof. S. has produced no proof; nor can he: for, in that same visible body he ascended into heaven, and was followed by the wondering gaze of his disciples, till "a cloud received him out of their sight." Acts i. 9. In that same glorious body, he subsequently appeared to Saul of Tarsus, and was identified by him as Jesus of Nazareth, so that he became qualified, with all the other apostles, to testify the fact of his resurrection. "Last of all," says he, "he was seen of me also." 1 Cor. xv. 8. All this was *literally* true. And the angels who appeared to the wondering apostles that had literally seen him go into heaven, announced: "This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, (that is *literally* as they saw,) shall so come, *in like manner* AS ye have *seen* him go into heaven." Acts i. 11.

It is not possible for language to assert, in plainer terms than this, the fact of the *visible personal* return of Jesus Christ, *in the same body* with which he ascended into heaven. Language must have lost all its meaning, and we must for ever be at the mercy of the whims, and conceits, and philosophical, metaphysical absurdities and nonsense of philologists, critics, professors, and what not, if we are to be told, that Christ has parted with *all* his *materiality*, become an invisible spirit, and will not, as literally and truly appear, and be seen again, as when he went into Heaven. And yet

Prof. S., notwithstanding all this overwhelming evidence from the word of God, establishing incontestably these facts, if I can understand language and gather the mind of a writer from his expressions, has the rashness, I must say the bold and daring presumption, to deny, that the second coming of Christ will be *visible*. Of course he also must deny, that he ever will be again visible, or *so* manifest himself, as to be seen by men in the flesh. "Christ's *coming* to extend and complete his kingdom," he says "is no more evidence, that his kingdom is *visible* and an object of *sense*, than *his coming to set up his kingdom at first* [a most gratuitous assertion] is an evidence, that this kingdom was *then* visible. Christ himself *assumed* a visible appearance then, *only* that he might take on him our nature and die for sin. Heb. ii. 9, 14 [a most awkward assertion.] When he *appears* a *second* time, there is no necessity of assuming *such* a nature; [did he ever lay it off?] he will *appear*, i. e. [let the reader mark this] he will give manifest *tokens* of his presence, *only* for the purpose of salvation—salvation *spiritual*, not temporal. Heb. ix. 28." App. p 185.

If this is not to "wrest the Scriptures," it comes as near to it as any thing I can well conceive. Yet to this result is he driven, to maintain consistently his fundamental principle of interpretation, that the predictions, concerning Christ's coming and kingdom, relate *only* to "the world of mind," and not at all to "the world of matter." I deny that when Christ first came *literally* in the flesh, it was then "to set up his kingdom," as Prof. S. assumes and asserts it. Let him produce the slightest shadow of proof for it from the word of God. He tells us himself distinctly that his object was very different. Where did Prof. S. learn that it was *then* actually to *set up* his kingdom? Not a breath to this effect ever dropped from the Saviour's lips. Where too did Prof. S. learn, that the ONLY *object Christ had in view, in assuming a visible appearance, was that he might take on*

him our nature and die? I wonder at the extraordinary looseness of such expressions.

How marvellously also has he been betrayed by his principles, into "a point-blank contradiction" of Paul, Heb. ix. 28, who says, without any tropes of speech at all, that "unto them that look for him shall he *appear* (ὀφθήσεται) 1st fut. pass., "SHALL HE BE SEEN," a second time, without sin (a sin-offering) unto salvation;"—of the two angels whose words we have quoted, Acts i. 11;—of John, who says, expressly, "Behold he cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see him, and they also that pierced him, and all nations shall wail because of him;" Rev. i. 7—of Christ himself, who, speaking of a vision of himself, to occur not merely after his death, but after his return to the Father, said to his disciples, "A little while and ye shall *not* see me; and again a little while, and ye *shall see* me, and because I go to the Father." John xvi. 17, &c. When speaking of these being but the *tokens* of Christ's presence *only* for salvation,—"salvation *spiritual*, not temporal," i. e., as his language means, *invisible*, how is he betrayed into "a point-blank contradiction" of Peter, who says of that salvation expressly, that it is "ready to be *revealed* in the last time—*at the appearing* of Jesus Christ;" 1 Pet. 5-7—and of Paul, who referred the Thessalonians to their glorious day of rest and *salvation*, "*when* the Lord Jesus shall be *revealed* from heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God and obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ." 2 Thess. i. 7, 8.

Surely Prof. S. has forgotten himself, or forgotten his Bible, or both, in his zeal to establish his interpretation of the predictions relative to the coming and kingdom of Christ, by denying their *visibility*, as he has done. But to this result, his confused notions about spirit, and "the world of mind," and "tropical language," have driven him. To use his own language, "There is no stopping short of this,

without entire and absolute inconsistency. And I will only add, that whatever proves too much—too much in such an immeasurable degree—proves NOTHING, absolutely NOTHING." App. p. 189.

The reader, perhaps, is ready to ask, Does he not offer proof of his assumptions and positions?—surely he must have proof, clear and strong as holy writ? He does indeed offer proof of his *main* position, that "*the kingdom of God is spiritual*," of course he means entirely, absolutely, exclusively, for if not, then all he has said, is but just beating against the air—words to no purpose; for no one denies, that the kingdom of Christ embraces the minds or spirits of men, whatever may be the degree or extent, the grandeur or the glory, of its visibility. His proof is, "So the Saviour has most explicitly declared: 'The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; neither shall they say lo here! or lo there! for behold, *the kingdom of God is within you*." Luke xvii. 20, 21. Did Prof. S. examine the context? did he ponder the language of Christ here? Is he at all aware of the numerous and pointed criticisms, that he must meet and answer before he can establish the meaning he assigns to these words? and that this passage is strictly and properly a *locus vexatissimus*, as he says? If he is ignorant of these things, his ignorance is inexcusable. If he knew them, and observed silence that he might use the *argumentum ad captandum*, his silence is highly censurable.

It was to the Pharisees Christ addressed these remarks. See v. 28. THEY were the persons who "demanded *when* the kingdom of God should come?" His remark that it cometh not by observation, *μετὰ παρατηρήσεως*, was intended to be a declinature of any satisfactory answer to the Pharisees about the time when this event should take place. The kingdom of God, as both Christ and the Pharisees on this occasion used the phrase, means the glorious dominion which God should establish on earth under the reign of the Mes-

siah. The word *παρατηρήσις*, here translated *observation*, occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, and very rarely in classical Greek. It is derived from a word, which, in the Greek Testament means to watch from a near position—and so metaphorically to watch closely, narrowly, or with malicious design. Mark iii. 2: Luke vi. 7; xiv. 1; xx. 20: Acts ix. 24. In Gal. iv. 10, it is used to denote the manner in which the Jews kept their festivals, &c., which occurred at fixed, definite times, after well-known and stated intervals, so being objects of regular anticipation, looking forward to, or expectation. The preposition *μετὰ*, here translated *with*, occurring in connection with the genitive, is sometimes, in a similar connection, translated *inter, among—in the midst of;* and may denote here in the midst of expectation, watching, or looking closely for it. Supposing an ellipsis of *καιρον*—which may appropriately be done, as the subject refers to time *when*, &c., and connecting it thus with the accusative, it may be translated *after*, and the same idea still presents itself, viz., *after a season of watching*, or *expectation*, of course up to the very time of its arrival.

The idea of Christ then in this passage is, that, unlike their Jewish festivals, whenever the kingdom of God would come, it would not be in the midst of watching or looking after it, not at a definite period to which expectation or attention had been directed. While this would be a declining to answer their question *when* it would come, just as he always did decline to answer that question, by whomsoever proposed, it nevertheless agrees exactly with other statements which he has made on the subject. What he says afterwards, that "*neither* should it be said lo here, or lo there," is plainly intended to intimate, that when it did come, it would be instantaneous, no time, notice, or opportunity for observing, announcing or watching it, however short in its progress after it made its appearance, should occur. Before men would have time to say lo here! or lo there! it would be upon them,

right in the midst of them. Behold the kingdom of God is *in the midst of you*, *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν*, not *within* you personally, for that in no sense was true of the Pharisees, much less in Prof. S.'s sense, who to support his scheme assumes that the phrase denotes the dominion of grace, the reign of Christ, in the heart.

The plural *ὑμῶν*, you, shows that he addressed them collectively, as men dwelling on earth, in the midst of, that is *among* whom, the kingdom should suddenly appear. It should have been in the singular in order to convey the metaphysical, psychological, spiritual meaning, that Prof. S. gives it. This view agrees exactly with what Christ, immediately after, said to his disciples, warning them against being deceived by those who might tell them either that it had come, or was appearing here or there, and that they should not go after them or follow them, "for as the lightning that lighteneth out of the one part under heaven, shineth unto the other part under heaven, so shall also the Son of man be in his day." Luke xxiv. 24. He identifies the season of his coming and kingdom; and when it did come He says it would be sudden, unexpected, instantaneous, in the very midst of them, and take them by surprise, like the lightning's flash. This is one view of the passage it behooved Prof. S. to have noticed. He may find some things, though not from a professor of biblical literature, in a work entitled, Essays on the Kingdom of God, by Philo-Basilicus, deserving his serious and attentive consideration, and which, as an Exegetical professor, he is not doing himself or his students justice to neglect any longer.

There are other views, that may be given of this passage, consistently with sound philological criticism and strict analysis, but they all bring out the same result. Thus, if the phrase *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν* be translated *within you*, it can mean no more than within their nation. For as a matter of fact, it is not true, that it was in their hearts, which Christ would not therefore assert. There was, however, a very important

sense, in which the kingdom of God, at that time, was in the midst of them, within their nation. He, the destined king, stood before them. He was performing the miracles predicted, triumphing over the devils, and thus giving proof that the dominion of Heaven, the kingdom of God, was come unto them; Matt. xii. 28, *ἄρα ἔφθασεν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*. It was as Luke says, "come upon" them, xi. 20. In some important sense it had so arrived as to be at their very doors. This was in the person of the destined king, demonstrating his powers and benevolence, and tendering himself and his services to the Jewish nation, to whom he confined his personal ministry. It was exactly in the same strain that John preached the kingdom of God to be at hand, and that Christ and his apostles, during his personal ministry, did too.

The kingdom in all its fulness of bliss and glory was preached to them, offered for their acceptance, according to the design and extent of its blessed and wonderful provisions. Matt. iv. 15, 17; x. 7: Mark i. 15: Luke x. 9. The very first step for them, and indispensably necessary to possess the kingdom, and to secure its bliss and glory, was to repent, to accept Christ, to yield to all his instruction, to give up their own wills, wishes, thoughts, notions, reasonings, plans, and expectations, and to learn of him. Who will dare to say, that if the rulers and Pharisees, and entire Jewish nation, had accepted Him thus, and cleaved to Him with all their heart, Deut. xi. 1—28, God would not have been faithful and his kingdom have been set up at once, in his own abundantly veritable manner, by which to maintain his own faithfulness? and thus all the direful consequences of his coming to his own and his own receiving him not, of the Jews' rejection of Christ, and of the subsequent long delay and postponement of the kingdom, been obviated? No man dare to say the contrary. For thus run God's promises, Deut. xxviii. 1—18, of old to the Jewish people, made through Moses. Our ignorance as to how God would or could act

under certain contingencies, forms no excuse for our unbelief. But they did not embrace Christ the promised king; nor his proffer of the kingdom which he had brought nigh to them, and which had actually thus come unto them and upon them. Accordingly he distinctly informed them, that the kingdom, which had come nigh them, should be taken from them, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof, Matt. xxi. 43, in exact accordance with what the Psalmist had predicted, Ps. cxvii. 22, 23; Matt. xxi. 42. After they had crucified "their king," according to Pilate's own showing, on the cross, and he had risen from the dead, he conversed with, and gave commandments to his apostles about the kingdom of God. They continued still to preach the kingdom of God, not as set up and established, but as an object of hope, desire and expectation—*the gospel*, or GOOD NEWS, of *the kingdom*. They went among the Gentiles, agreeably to the synod of Jerusalem's decision, Acts xv., in the premises, that God by them might visit the Gentiles, and take *out of* THEM a people for the glory of his name, who should be, as Paul teaches, "heirs of the kingdom." But the kingdom was no longer preached as having *come nigh* to them, either Gentiles or Jews; nor as being at hand, approaching, as it had been before the crucifixion of Christ, to the Jews. Prophecy thenceforth pointed to a long and dark night to come upon the world, a dreadful tide of evils that should flow in upon it; and so it has been ever since, that "we must through much tribulation enter the kingdom of God."

In whatever way therefore we translate the words of Christ, agreeably to their strict grammatical import, we get no such idea as Prof. S. assumes. It makes the language of Christ utterly destitute of precision, and is directly contradictory of what Christ says; for the reign of grace in the heart, was not true of the Pharisees; and the very way by which it is to be secured, and to be advanced in the world, is by close, diligent observation, and watching of times, opportuni-

ties, occasions, means, and all other things, that may invite to action, and promise fair for the abundant effusions of the Spirit of God or the success of missions. Ordinarily here, the most watchful and observant are the most successful; yet has he assumed a disputed passage, in which a word occurs that nowhere else occurs in the New Testament, given it a meaning for which he can produce no authority, and without one solitary remark, attaching his own meaning to the expressions, palmed it off upon the reader, as Christ's own *definition* of the invisible spiritual nature of his kingdom, and laid it down *as the fundamental principle* of his whole scheme and system of interpretation!!! I hold Prof. S. exceedingly censurable here, considering the position he occupies, and the influence he sways as an interpreter of the sacred Scriptures. Surely he cannot be ignorant that his views have been contested, and need strong arguments to support them. Has he never, with all his fondness for the Germans, read the excursus of Koppe on the formulas "kingdom of God—of Heaven—of Christ," in which he carefully examines, and analyzes the import of every passage, where the phrases occur, to determine their scriptural import? If not, he may find something there deserving his attention, and also a very clear and satisfactory solution of the method of interpretation, which he, in common with many others, adopts in relation to these phrases.

The next passage he adduces in support of his position as to the essential spirituality and invisibility of Christ's kingdom is, Rom. xiv. 17; "So, says Paul, the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." And no Millenarian denies or teaches any thing to the contrary. In the exalted state of happiness, in which Christ and his saints shall live and reign together, there will be no place or occasion for the differences that existed in the primitive church, about meat and drink. Why said Paul, will you attach such importance to these things here,

when they shall have no place hereafter, but righteousness, peace and joy be the elements of your delight? This text proves nothing for his position; for if he means to say, that the influence of Christianity, the reign of grace in the heart, has nothing at all to do with meat and drink, so that our actions and feelings in relation to them form no part of our religion, he contradicts Paul, whose very object was to show that it had, and that it should make us willing neither to eat meat, or drink wine all our days, if the indulgence of our liberty would cause a brother to offend. This is only additional proof, of the exceeding looseness with which Prof. S. quotes and applies Scripture. He has much to do in the way of exegesis to make this text speak what he has cited it for.

Of like nature is the passage which he partially quotes from John xviii. 36:—"My kingdom is not of this world—not from hence." Christ in so saying does not deny, nor mean to teach aught to the contrary, that He and His saints will reign *on the earth*, which the Scriptures assert they will; much less that He and His kingdom are so *essentially spiritual* as to be *invisible*, which it is the object of Prof. S. to prove by quoting these words. He disavowed the idea that His kingdom was like the governments of earth, to be established and maintained, as they are, by military powers and standing armies: for he explains his meaning, which Prof. S. has conveniently left out of view: "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence." He was not *then* going to set up a visible dominion, like the governments of earth; and this was his answer to the charge of sedition at Pilate's bar. It is marvellous to see how Prof. S. has contrived to make it prove that he will *never* have a *visible* kingdom on earth!

The nature of this visible kingdom hereafter to be *revealed*, the Jews had mistaken. They charged Him with sedition.

He replied to the charge, that *now* His kingdom was not of *this* world, nor was he seeking, by military movements, to establish one. How does, and how can this prove, that in the "*world to come*," of which Paul so expressly treats, Heb. ii. 5, he should not have a *visible* kingdom, and which should be established, too, on the ruins of the nations of this present world? The inference of Prof. S. is another pregnant example of the *non sequitur*. To the same purport, and equally fallacious, in point of logic, is all he says about the *spiritual* change necessary, the *spiritual* enemies with whom we have to combat, and the holiness and purity of heart necessary to see God. However true and important in themselves these things are, and however indispensably necessary, in order to a part or lot in the kingdom of God, they prove just nothing at all as to his purpose. They do not prove that the kingdom of Christ, however deeply His dominion may be seated in the heart, is devoid of all *visibility*, and shall never be manifested and established on this earth. It is a remarkable specimen of logic, to take up one feature of an object or subject described by an author in a particular place, and then talk and reason about it, assuming and using it as a key-note of interpretation, as if that one feature were all it possessed, while the same author elsewhere, and others too, had spoken of other features and aspects as belonging to it.

The truth is, Prof. S. has lost sight of the foundation which God has laid, in the very nature of things, in that divine analogy, by virtue of which we use terms and expressions denoting things pertaining *to man in his being, relations and interests, created in the image of God, and constituted head over this lower creation*—as representatives of that which corresponds with them in God revealing himself in Jesus Christ, the second Adam, and in His relations and interest in earth as Head, Lord, and "Heir of all things," as well of this as of other worlds. Neglecting these grand fundamental

facts, which, when apprehended, render all our language, taken from sensible objects, and used either analogically in application to God and divine and spiritual things, or even sensibly to Christ and His kingdom, perfectly intelligible and expressive, certain and definite, he finds himself doomed to float about in the ocean of his imagination, with nothing but mere metaphorical, tropical terms, to assist his conceptions of these things. He gives it, as "the consequence of all this, that I feel just as well satisfied, that the predictions respecting the future state and prosperity of Christ's kingdom are to be *spiritually* interpreted, as I do that the declarations of Scripture respecting the hands, feet, eyes, ear, mouth, etc., of the Divine Being are to be spiritually interpreted."

The reader will perceive, that I have not done Prof. S. injustice; but fairly stated his principles, and the results to which they bring him. And although "it were easy to say things, that would occupy as much space as" Prof. S.'s Hints, on the subject of the incarnation of the Son of God, his being constituted the second Adam—made the Head of all his people, having the dominion, originally given to Adam and usurped by the devil when he sinned, put into his hands, and being constituted Heir of all things, according as Paul has taught in his epistle to the Hebrews—a wonderful, glorious, and divine analogy—all which would come properly into view, in estimating the Millenarian views of Bible truth, yet enough has been said, to show how vague, confused, and shadowy, is Prof. S.'s scheme of interpretation, as he has applied his principles to the glorious plan of *redemption*, through our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

I merely add here, that his attempt to make it appear, that the Jews rejected Christ, because they interpreted the Scriptures *literally*, as he says, is like all the rest. They would not take the *literal* interpretation of their prophets. That was the very stumbling stone: but having, like Prof. S., conceived in their own imaginings, an idea of Christ

and his kingdom, not to be sure the same, but both alike the product of their own fancies—they would not believe the plain literal statements of the prophets about the first advent, under circumstances of humiliation, poverty, suffering, and contempt, but run away with those which related to his second advent, and interpreted them to their liking.

As to my treating Christians who with Prof. S. believe only in a spiritual invisible kingdom, with disregard and contumely, it is much easier for him to assert it than to prove by any thing I have said. The contumely is from the other side; and the history of Millenarian views, both from the beginning and at this present time, will prove that the spirit of vituperation, of persecution, and exclusive claims to orthodoxy, find no countenance and support from their advocates. Millenarians have ever plead the solemn obligation to exercise implicit faith in the promises of God, and relied on the plain evidence of truth presented in His word, interpreted on the principles of grammatico-historical exegesis, rather than on the miserable appliances of bigotry, pride, malice, ambition, envy, and conscious individual weakness, so eagerly sought and often mischievously employed by those who intrigue with ministers, and virtually pronounce the decisions of ecclesiastical courts and councils, presbyteries and synods, to be authoritative and final, conclusive and infallible.

As to Prof. S.'s assuming, for a moment, the position he opposes, to trace out some of its consequences, App. pp. 186, 187, I deem it totally unnecessary to notice and reply to such ribaldry. I was going to give it even a harsher name; for as he starts from positions which I have not laid down, and which are not legitimately deducible from any thing I have said, but which he obtains and maintains by ringing his changes on his meaning of the simple word *literal*, I am in no wise concerned to follow him or listen to his badinage. And as to his utter contempt of the idea of the restoration of the Jews,

and kindred topics, both in his appendix and his sermon preached at the ordination of Rev. W. G. Schauffler, Nov. 14, 1831, wherein he just as flatly contradicts the Scriptures, as in the cases I have already pointed out, I have but to say, in his own words, "no principles of hermeneutics can be sound which make the Bible to contradict itself," which, whatever may be said of his, and whatever he has falsely charged about a yoke of bondage, &c., he has failed in every respect to show that mine have done. He has indeed undertaken to sit in judgment on the plans of God, and impertinently and presumptuously to ask, just as the Unitarian does at times, in interpreting the oracles of God, in reference to orthodox views, "Cui bono?" "What end is to be answered by all this?" and similar questions. His ignorance, or inability to comprehend God's plans, is no rule or reason for interpreting His language, in some way to adjust it to *his* sense of propriety and utility. Christ was a Son of David, in the ordinary sense of that term, and the establishment of His kingdom on earth, as set forth by the prophets, and that kingdom, swayed by Him, first through the agency of His raised saints in the heavenly Jerusalem, yet having the literal Jerusalem and the Jewish people as the centre of its *terrene* organization, and the nations congregated around it like so many confederate tribes, renders the language of Jeremiah and others, at which Prof. S. stumbles, just as plainly and literally intelligible as that the Son of God should be "born of a virgin, and his name should be called mighty God, wonderful Counsellor, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace, and the government should be on his shoulders."

Doubtless Prof. S. will regard all this as proof of insanity, and try to comfort himself with the belief that I am bereft of reason, as he has intimated in no unequivocal terms, App. p. 181. But the charge of madness is very easily made: not always so easily established. I might, indeed, after all I have shown, with some appearance of truth retaliate:

Putidius multo cerebrum est, mihi crede.

Believe me, dear reader, with all this ado
His brain is more addled by far of the two.

But this would be uncourteous and unbecoming; and therefore I content and comfort myself with Damasippus' just remark:

Velut sylvis, ubi passim
Palantes error certo tramite pellit,
Ille sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum abit; unus utrisque
Error, sed variis illudit partibus; hoc te
Crede modo insanum nihilo sapientior ille,
Qui te deridet, caudam trahat.

When in a wood we leave the certain way,
One error fools us, though we various stray;
Some to the left, some turn to t'other side:
So he, who dares thy madness to deride,
Though you may frankly own yourself a fool,
Behind him trails his mark of ridicule.

CHAPTER XV.

PROF. STUART'S FINAL NOTICE OF THE FATHERS AND OTHERS.

He tells his reader that he "must not, for a moment, suppose, that the leading features of Mr. D.'s scheme are new, or the product of long continued and accurate investigation, on his part, of the Scriptures." In the first part of this sentence, he contradicts himself, as I have already shown. The latter has meaning, which cannot be misunderstood, and is intended to insinuate things far beneath what common decency and the respect he owes to himself would have required, and certainly too far beneath my notice, at least as long as I am no believer in his omniscience.

He has admitted the facts, which I have stated, and the truth of the quotations I have given, relative to the faith of the Fathers on this subject. The only hint to the contrary, that he has dropped, is his remark about Justin Martyr, the text of whose "so called Millennial passage," and "the only one," (Dial. cum Tryphone, p. 306 ed. Colon.) he says, "is not settled." The dispute about the text I have noticed; and shown, that the rejected version, which learned authors believe to be correct, makes his testimony still stronger. He affects to be doubtful as to Justin Martyr's views, but is constrained to admit "he was a Millenarian." Justin Martyr's "Hints" are more explicit than Prof. S.'s, and if he wishes to know how they strike other minds, beside mine, let him consult the Bishop of Lincoln's account of the writings and opinions of Justin Martyr, Chap. 5.

He has admitted, that in Germany and Switzerland, not a few writers of the same class have appeared since the Reformation, and that for thirty or more years have been on the increase, especially in England. He should have also added

the land of his ancestors, with whose literature and theology it would seem he is not as well acquainted as with those of Germany, and certainly much to his loss, if it be the fact. For he has not made the most distant allusion to Scotland, which has furnished some of the most powerful writers on this subject, as in almost every other department of literature and theology. I had even anticipated him in his allusion to the American Austin, who, although deranged, nevertheless has given, in writings which he has left behind him, proofs of a vigorous intellect, impaired by other causes than his Millenarian views. His allusion to him and to myself, in the connection and manner in which he has made it, reminds me more of Horace's wild bull than any thing else.

> Fœnum habet in cornu, longe fuge dummodo risum
> Excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico.
>
> Yonder he drives—avoid that furious beast;
> If he may have his jest, he never cares
> At whose expense, nor his best friend he spares.

Prof. S. has not pretended to deny, that the Fathers, whose testimony I have quoted, and the whole traditionary history I have given, establishes the point for which I introduce it, viz., that the literal system of interpretation defined and explained as I have done, was that which obtained in the primitive church, and until the simplicity of faith was corrupted by the philosophy of the schools. But it is necessary for him to set it aside, if possible, and this he attempts, in his usual *ad invidiam* style of argument.

In the first place, he leads the reader to suppose that I quote the Fathers "*as authority.*" He does not even hint the *real* object for which the traditionary history is given, but assigns one totally unfounded, and of his own invidious charging.

Next he endeavours to throw odium in general, on what I have given, as though it were a long, unnecessary effort,

spread out over 100 pages, while, almost in the same breath, with beautiful consistency, he tells his reader that "Corrodi has drawn it out to *four volumes*; and yet has told his story *tersely* and BRIEFLY too, in his *Geschichte des Chiliasmus*."

But his principal effort consists in endeavouring to excite prejudices against the Fathers by throwing odium, first on Lactantius of the 4th century, who nevertheless, with all his literal and figurative interpretation, he says, "*shuns* many of the absurdities into which Mr. D. has fallen,"—then on Tertullian, the loss of whose work *De spe fidelium*, he greatly regrets,—then on Justin Martyr, to which I have already referred,—then on Irenæus, and finally, on Papias, Ap. pp. 191, 192, reviving and repeating Eusebius's condemnation of the latter, whose prejudices were just as strong as Prof. S.'s, and on the same account, viz., that Papias took the prophetical Scriptures in their plain meaning, instead of explaining them *mystically* or *spiritually*.

And what makes this invidious attempt still worse, is, that notwithstanding he had promised his reader "more than once," some "specimens of opinions among the early advocates of the visible personal reign of Christ," as puerilities and incongruities and absurdities, to be met in the writings of the Fathers, sufficient to destroy their *authority*, he has after all his trumpeting and flourishing, confined himself to the old stale and hackneyed extract from Papias, about the wheat and grapes, which the earth would produce in the Millennium. He has given no specimen from Lactantius, but told us about his "interpreting the Scriptures now *literally*, and then figuratively, and sometimes both ways, in the same passage"—remarkable specimens of which can be produced from Prof. S.'s own Hints. Of Tertullian he has given nothing, but what I had done myself. Of Justin Martyr, nothing. Of Irenæus, nothing more than that, "in support of a visible and terrestrial reign, the ingathering of the Jews, &c.; for the most part, so far as he quotes Scrip-

ture, he quotes the same passages which Mr. D. also produces, and interprets them in the same literal way."

From Irenæus and Eusebius he quotes the story of Papias' wheat and grapes, and strives to create a laugh at the expense of "Washington Temperance Societies, who inhibit *all kinds* of intoxicating drink," whose "day he says will soon be over, when the Millennium of Papias and Irenæus is come," as though they had identified with grapes the abundance of intoxicating drink; but, as he confesses himself to have been trifling here, it is almost condescending on our part to trifle too, to repeat or notice what he says.

Still it may be necessary to remark that he has done me injustice,—and with what intent his own conscience may answer,—when, in allusion to this boasted extract of his, as though he had, and claimed, all the merit of bringing it to light, he says, "Mr. D. has indeed *carefully suppressed the specimens* which I am about to produce." Prof. S. knows that I did not quote the Fathers as "authority" per se or "traditionary authority." He knows, also, that I distinguished carefully between their own private opinions and their historical testimony as to the faith of the church. He knows, further, that I actually did refer to the sentiments of Papias, and to this very passage, which he has endeavoured, in imitation of Dr. Whitby, who did the very same thing before him, to turn to his account against Millenarian views of Bible truth. See Dissertations, p. 261. And he knows, still further, that I referred to as respectable authority as himself, so far as scholarship, sound exposition of Scripture, and exalted standing are concerned, no less than that of Gresswell in his admirable and elaborate work on the Parables, who has surmised, with great plausibility, that the passage of Papias found in Irenæus, has been incorrectly translated; and I may add, according to Prof. S.'s own rule of interpreting round and large numbers in Scripture, that a large number was used to express indefinitely and hyperboli-

cally Papias' views of the earth's exceeding fruitfulness during the Millennium, and nothing more. There are internal evidences in the passages themselves that they are mere hyperbole, a very common figure of speech, adopted by fervid writers, when speaking especially on the subject of the Millennium, whether literalists or spiritualists.

Papias' opinions on this subject—whom, says Bengelius, "people generally *decry*, without regarding what the ancients say to his *praise*,"—had nothing to do with the evidence I was citing of the faith of the church. The joke is too old, too stale, too "putrid," which Prof. S. has attempted. It failed when Whitby tried it, and has long lain buried with him. Like every second-hand joke, especially when exhumed, it fails still more flatly when dug out of the grave by Prof. S. He may think, that if it succeeded with Whitby, and as Whitby probably thought it succeeded with Eusebius, it must certainly do so with Prof. S. But it will not do.

> Nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit.
>
> By such examples, truth can ne'er be tried:
> They but perplex the question, not decide.

In conclusion, I have but a remark or two to make. If I have replied to Prof. S. with severity, it is the severity of fraternal faithful rebuke, which I feel he has merited, and which Christian obligation requires me to administer, and which I have done not with bitterness or personal ill will. If there has been less of that respect, with which he is wont to be addressed and spoken of, it has been because he has not respected himself; but has greatly lowered himself below the estimation in which I had formerly held him, by the style of his argument, his contemptuous treatment of myself, and the ribaldry of which he has made such liberal use.

Should he again turn his attention to me, or to the subject, there are certain points which he must fairly and logically meet; and not attempt to make any false issues. He

must *prove* the assumptions on which he has founded his own exposition of prophecy as unfolded in his Hints, and which I have denied. Prof. S.'s dogma, or assertion, will not be received as argument, nor will his Jewish, Popish or German authorities. He must meet fairly and fully the question where, when, and whence originated the idea of the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Heaven, and what is the Scriptural sense in which those phrases were used by Christ and his apostles,—wherein, and how far, and what proof there is, that they used them differently from their current import in their day? He must further prove, from the word of God, what specific authority he has for interpreting such phrases as Zion, the Zion of God, the Hill of God, Jerusalem, the holy city, the Mountain of the Lord, in his allegorical, spiritual sense, as denoting the church this moment and heaven the next. He must show—how the Abrahamic covenant does not guarantee to the Jews on their repentance and conversion, the possession of the land promised to their forefathers, and once inhabited by them, how God can in any way be understood to have promised that land to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob *themselves*, when they never have possessed it,—and how, on any principle or pretext whatever, which will commend itself to the sober judgment of common sense, the possession of an inheritance by their remote posterity could be spoken of and promised as their personal possession and estate. Especially must he meet the question fairly and fully whether the kingdom of God, the kingdom of heaven, as spoken of by Christ and his apostles, is not regarded by them as FUTURE—not something in another globe or in heaven, but here, on this earth, to be developed in a new and glorious dispensation, to be introduced by Jesus Christ at his personal visible coming.

These are grave and solemn themes. Minds of the highest order, Christians of the most ardent and devoted

piety, and scholars of the profoundest erudition, have embraced the Millenarian faith as the true and genuine import of God's promises and the scheme of prophecy. Modesty and humility, patient and laborious investigation, the absence of every thing like dogmatism and ridicule, become those who would inquire into the import of the sacred Scriptures in these matters. When Prof. S. has any arguments to submit, suggestions to offer, analysis of Scripture to present, expositions and applications of his own principles of interpretation to the promises and predictions of the word of God to exhibit, if done in a respectful, courteous, becoming manner, even though differing from his Millenarian brethren, he will find them willing to give them all due consideration. Truth is to be elicited and established in no other way: and whatever may be the action of councils, the decrees of ecclesiastical bodies, the dogmas of the schools, the prescription of ages, the errors and controlling influence of public opinion, in the end the truth must triumph.

MAGNA EST VERITAS ET PREVALEBIT.

THE END.

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